




# ***JPRS Report***



## **Soviet Union**

### ***Political Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

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### CONTENTS

10 December 1991

#### NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

DER SPIEGEL Transcripts of Coup Leader Interrogations [Hamburg DER SPIEGEL No 41, 7 Oct 91] .....	1
Former Procuracy Official Ilyukhin Defends His Actions [V. Ilyukhin; PRAVDA, 12 Nov 91] .....	8
IZVESTIYA Scores Ilyukhin's Legal Procedures [V. Ilyukhin, A. Larin; IZVESTIYA, 14 Nov 91] .....	12
Constitutional Committee Chairman on Union Process [MOSCOW NEWS No 43, 27 Oct-3 Nov 91] ....	13
Alternative Names for New Union Assessed [S. Kondrashov; IZVESTIYA, 20 Nov 91] .....	14
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on Failure To Initial Union Treaty [A. Pankratov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 26 Nov 91] .....	14
Law Expert Points to Power Vacuum Caused by Collapse of Union Structures [G. Atamanchuk; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 12 Nov 91] .....	15
USSR, Yugoslav Crisis Parallel Drawn [G.A. Buznikov; IZVESTIYA, 1 Nov 91] .....	17
Yakovlev Speech to 'Rome Movement' Meeting [A. Yakovlev; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 7 Nov 91] .....	18
4 November State Council Session Summarized [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 7 Nov 91] .....	20
Alimzhanov on Role of New Parliament [A. Alimzhanov; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 44, 6 Nov 91] .....	21
Yeltsin Adviser Discusses Return of Shevardnadze [NEPSZAVA, 22 Nov 91] .....	21
Shevardnadze on Resignation, USSR's Prospects [E. Shevardnadze; MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN No 10, Oct 91] .....	22
Soviet Diplomats 'Rightly Fear for Their Future' [A. Vasilyev; PRAVDA, 5 Nov 91] .....	28
Constitutional Democratic Party Chairman States Party's Aims [M. Astafyev; PRAVDA, 30 Nov 91] ....	29
PRAVDA Deplores Anticommunist 'Witch-Hunt' [PRAVDA, 26 Oct 91] .....	30
Western Media's 'Sensational' Treatment of CPSU Finances Faulted [A. Oskin; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 12 Nov 91] .....	31
CPSU Financing of European CP's Detailed [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 42, Oct 91] .....	33
CPSU Files on Opposition Rumored [Yu. Petrov; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 9 Oct 91] .....	35

#### NATIONALITY ISSUES

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Tofalars [SOYUZ No 36, Sep 91] .....	37
SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Tuvin [SOYUZ No 37, 11 Sep 91] .....	37

#### LAW AND ORDER

KGB Staffer Discusses Intelligence Directorate, Its Leadership [MOSCOW NEWS No 41, 13 Oct 91] ..	39
'Top Secret' Program Interviews Former KGB Agent [Moscow TV, 23 Nov 91] .....	41
Tizyakov Accused of Corruption in Running Missile Plant [V. Sanatin; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 16 Nov 91] .....	42
Trubin, IZVESTIYA Comment on OMON Deputy Chief Perfenov's Deportation [N. Trubin, S. Parfenov; IZVESTIYA, 7 Nov 91] .....	43
Inquiry Into 1954 Disappearance of Labor Leader Requested [TASS, 22 Nov 91] .....	47
Draft Law on Economic Amnesty Hit [N. Kozlova; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 6 Nov 91] .....	47

#### MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

INTERFAX Rated First by Foreign Correspondents [Moscow TV, 2 Nov 91] .....	49
BBC Official on Plan for Broadcasting From Moscow [Moscow TV, 19 Nov 91] .....	49
Creation of RUS-YEVROPA News Agency Reported [IZVESTIYA, 20 Nov 91] .....	50
Subscriptions to Most Newspapers Show Decline in Last Year [IZVESTIYA, 18 Nov 91] .....	50
PRAVDA Readers Cite Subscription Problems [PRAVDA, 2 Nov 91] .....	51
NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Protests Restrictions on Freedom of Press .....	52
Editor's Protest [V. Tretyakov; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 29 Oct 91] .....	52
Comment on Text of Warning [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 31 Oct 91] .....	53

RSFSR Official on Criticism of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA	
[S. Stankevich; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 31 Oct 91]	54
Journalists Protest Charge of Selling Information [Moscow TV, 14 Nov 91]	56
New Supplement To Publicize Economic Laws [IZVESTIYA, 21 Nov 91]	56
New Russian Weekly for Peasants Published [PRAVDA, 19 Nov 91]	57
New Weekly Paper NADEZHDA Published for Disabled	
[N. Bobrova; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 4 Oct 91]	57
Independent Political Journal KENTAVR To Be Published [N. Zagladin; PRAVDA, 4 Oct 91]	57
Paper Gains Access to Far East Using New Facilities [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 5 Nov 91]	58
New Sociological Weekly Views Chernobyl Panel Findings [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 Nov 91]	58
Trial Issue of Journal Released on Disk [V. Lagovskiy; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 19 Nov 91]	59
Central TV's Yakovlev on Plans for Television	
[G. Rezanov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 20 Nov 91]	59
TV, Radio Advertisement Purchase Procedures To Change [TASS, 25 Nov 91]	61
St. Petersburg, Russian TV in Dispute Over Equipment [Moscow Radio, 16 Nov 91]	61
Pickets Protest Transfer of St. Petersburg TV Assets	
[A. Molokov; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 21 Nov 91]	61
'Vid' Program Producer on Future Plans [A. Razbash; TRUD, 20 Nov 91]	61

## ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

Environment Minister Decries Wasteful 'Economic Mechanism'	
[N. Vorontsov; PRAVITELSTVENNIY VESTNIK No 31, Jul 91]	63
Aral Sea 'Catastrophe' Suffers Continued Neglect [G. Reznichenko; TRUD, 14 Nov 91]	64

## SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

Single 'USSR' Team To Participate in 1992 Olympics [S. Taranov; IZVESTIYA, 23 Nov 91]	66
Students Appeal to Yeltsin Over Funding [PRAVDA, 22 Nov 91]	66
All-Union 'Znaniye' Society To Change Name [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Nov 91]	67
New Organization Seeks To Improve Social Conditions [IZVESTIYA, 11 Nov 91]	67
First Shelter for Homeless To Be Opened in Moscow	
[O. Alekseyeva; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 20 Nov 91]	67
National Committee To Combat AIDS in RSFSR Urged [V. Proskurina; PRAVDA, 29 Oct 91]	68
Psychotherapy Introduced in Treatment of Alcoholics in RSFSR	
[A. Igorev; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 20 Nov 91]	69
Jews in Soviet Union Organizing Politically, Socially [HA'ARETZ, 1 Oct 91]	69
Decline in Children's Health Facilities Examined [A. Aleynikova; PRAVDA, 11 Nov 91]	70

**DER SPIEGEL Transcripts of Coup Leader  
Interrogations**

924B0053A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German  
No 41, 7 Oct 91 pp 198-205

[Unattributed article: "The Confessions of the Conspirators"]

[Text]

**Interrogation of Marshal Dmitriy Yazov, on 22 August:  
'I Condemn This Adventure'**

[Investigating judge] Liganov and Zichov are conducting the interrogation. We are questioning the former defense minister of the Soviet Union, Marshal Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov.

[Yazov] Sighs.

[Investigating judge] I can tell you that you are being interrogated because of your participation in the crime that we call high treason, conspiracy with the objective of seizing power, and abuse of your authority. I would now like to hear from you what you say to these charges.

[Yazov] I have a somewhat different idea of high treason and I do not wish to make any secret of that. There probably was treason against the president. But I have not betrayed my homeland and my country.

I have known Mr. Gorbachev for many years. We have worked together and we have solved many problems together: reduction of medium- and longer-range missiles and strategic offensive weapons. When decisions were made on military problems, we saw them in connection with our economy. The potential of our armed forces ought not to be diminished in the process.

[Investigating judge] A video camera of the Panasonic type is being used in this interrogation. We are interrogating the marshal at the sanitarium Senyesh in Solnechnogorsk Rayon near Moscow. We begin this interrogation at about 1120 on 22 August 1991.

[Yazov] I personally have a great deal of sympathy for Gorbachev. It took very serious reasons to make me stand up against the commander in chief of our armed forces. There were probably pent-up negative emotions in many, including myself. I attribute it to the fact that the standard of living of our people had declined, the economy had hit rock bottom, and the ethnic conflicts—the conflicts between the republics—were becoming more and more intense....

There were discussions in a certain circle of our party leadership. So the idea gradually developed that Mr. Gorbachev had really outlived his usefulness as an active statesman. Somehow one had the feeling that he is either tired or no longer appeared to be single-minded. His economic policy amounted to begging for loans and incurring debts but he did little for the domestic economy.

We spoke with Mikhail Sergeyevich about this in the Central Committee and in the sessions of the Supreme Soviet. But the course of getting a grasp on economic problems through foreign policy was continued. He and the government hardly dealt with the problems within the country. Our economic mechanism had become totally exhausted and had brought our country to the brink of ruin—that is what I wanted to say. The union treaty was supposed to be signed on 20 August.... I personally and many other comrades with whom I spoke were suddenly aware of the fact that inevitably this would also mean the disintegration of the union. All had voted for a Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and along comes a draft of the union treaty that speaks of sovereign states!

Our conviction was: This is not even a mistake but a purposeful effort to ensure that there is no more union but a confederation with republics having their own presidents.

[Question] We want to get back to the problem. You became defense minister not without the support of Mr. Gorbachev and you suddenly decided to remove him from power. You did swear an oath to the president, parliament, and the people. You have just outlined your motives briefly. Why have you become convinced that the president should be deprived of power and in an unconstitutional manner?

[Yazov] I never drew the conclusion that the president should be deprived of power. I see my guilt in this crime in the fact that it was only possible because I participated. I could have prevented it and I was probably obligated to inform the president about this. On Sunday the 18th, we decided that five people should fly to him to talk to him about his voluntary resignation from the post of president and that Vice President Yanayev should take over this function. Unfortunately I did not know Yanayev. In effect I had supported this without knowing the details. That is something that I must now regret very much, for it was probably a very gross error.

[Question] That sounds very naive for a statesman like a defense minister.

[Yazov] We had already met at various places and we often spoke about this. Most often participating were the comrades Kryuchkov, chairman of the KGB, Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (Baklanov was no longer Central Committee secretary but chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee), Boldin, secretary, no Boldin is not a secretary but a department head.

The situation in the country was discussed and the fact that the party is now falling apart, the economy disintegrating, we are going into debt, and the people are slowly getting poorer and poorer, so that someone must take responsibility for this and lead the people and the country. Then inevitably the conclusion was reached

that the president had to get the blame, because he had distanced himself from the party, someone said, he abandoned the Army....

[Question] Can you say specifically who said that?

[Yazov] No, but that was the talk. It all boiled down to the fact that Gorbachev had traveled a lot abroad in recent years and often we did not have any idea what important matters he discussed there. An example is Gorbachev's speech at the G-7 meeting (world economic summit of the Western industrial nations) in London. None of us knew what he spoke about there. Until that time, we had discussed everything at least in the Politburo or in the Presidential Council or Security Council.

[Question] Was it better in the old days when everything still came down from the top?

[Yazov] Yes, that may not be constructive but everything was decided in the collective. When only one person decides, then that is just the way it is.... Naturally we were not prepared to become more dependent upon the United States politically, economically, and militarily.

[Question] How did you reach the decision?

[Yazov] There was no conspiracy with a plan. We met on Saturday, not even a week ago.

[Question] Who issued the invitations?

[Yazov] Kryuchkov.

[Question] Where did you meet?

[Yazov] At a base in Moscow at the end of Lenin Prospect, to the left of a police traffic post. A street runs to the left.... At the end of the working day, Kryuchkov simply called up and said that we had to discuss something.

I went. Then came (Central Committee Secretary) Shenin, then Baklanov was there.... And then it was said: Why don't we drive down to Gorbachev and talk with him?

[Question] What is the hurry? Because the Union Treaty was about to be signed?

[Yazov] Certainly, because we were not satisfied with this draft and we knew that the state would fall apart.

I said that I would make an aircraft available and five men would fly from Chkalovskoye: Shenin, Varennikov (Yazov's deputy), Boldin, Plekhanov, and Baklanov (Yazov's deputy). Plekhanov is the man who knew the entire security system there. I already knew that Kryuchkov had instructed him to replace the entire security system there.

[Question] What was the objective?

[Yazov] To try to convince him. And if he did not agree, then decisive measures were to be taken.

[Question] Who was it that contrived all of that—fly down, convince him, then disconnect the communications and exchange the bodyguards?

[Yazov] I believe that was a collective decision. I was always skeptical about whether something like that should be done. I had my doubts.

When they came back, we sat in the Kremlin, in the office of Prime Minister Pavlov.

[Question] So it was you and Pavlov and who else? Was Yanayev (Gorbachev's deputy) present?

[Yazov] Yes, he came too, at around 0700 or 0800, after their return. They were back at around 2100.... The committee was formed when the people returned from Gorbachev—with rather sour faces. He had practically driven them away. In the discussion, he said: Well, you will have to decide yourselves what to do.

When they reported that they were practically finished and that the idea could no longer be implemented, it was clear that Yanayev had to sign a document: Because Gorbachev is not ill, we must make him out to be ill. It was clear to us that this original plan had fallen apart.

[Question] How did the State Committee for the Emergency Situation come about?

[Yazov] We sat in Pavlov's office. Yanayev arrived at about 0900. And then Lukyanov (president of parliament) flew in. He was called in from his vacation. Lukyanov said: I cannot become a member of any committee, for I am chairman of the Supreme Soviet. That is the legislative body that is over everything and everyone. The only thing that I can do is to issue a statement on a violation of the constitution, which would occur in any case with the signing of the union treaty. And then he left....

Yanayev was already rather drunk by this time, so in some way he was really quite merry.

[Question] And Kryuchkov, was he so drunk as well?

[Yazov] (Interior Minister) Pugo, Kryuchkov, and I. We said to Pugo: We sent people down to Gorbachev but he did not receive them for an hour. He had a physician with him. He was getting a shot or something. And if Gorbachev now agrees, Yanayev will exercise the function of president for a time.

[Question] And if he does not?

[Yazov] What you are now inferring, liquidation or something like that, we never talked about that.

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh also came toward 2300. He said: "If you write me in, then all foreign affairs are over." I was home in Bakovka at about midnight or half past. I got up around 0530 and then went to work."

[Question] Had you already issued any orders?

[Yazov] No. None in the evening as long as no documents were signed. The television center was no longer functional after 0600 in the morning. We merely sent our protective troops there around 0600 in the morning.

[Question] Why?

[Yazov] The establishment of the emergency committee was announced, for there might be people not in agreement.

[Question] Why, then, do such people run without fail to the television center? One probably would have to protect every enterprise.

[Yazov] We did not have enough men for that but we did have enough for banks and the most important points. The armed forces were sent into the city for the sole purpose of maintaining order so that everything would remain functional.

[Question] Was there not a desire to test the reaction of the populace, whether they would be afraid? Then the problem would have been solved?

[Yazov] No. It would be naive to think that two divisions in a city of 9 million would immediately frighten everyone.

[Question] From a purely psychological point of view, precisely this entry into the city caused the people to doubt whether Gorbachev was ill and the document real.

[Yazov] Our president is invincible and the move into the city was probably a mistake. There were false rumors: Your president was being misused and manipulated by someone; that may have led to our starting this entire action, this adventure.

[Question] You probably thought that the people would accept all of that, that they would support you without asking whether or not it was constitutional.

[Yazov] We had that in the back of our minds.

[Question] When the populace sees that something is going wrong there, that the president is not ill at all, and the press conference of Yanayev, for example, the person sitting there in front of the camera....

[Yazov] Of course you can put pressure on me in whatever way you want. After Yanayev held this press conference with his shaky hands—I know how Gorbachev can handle himself in front of the camera and people and how he can speak impromptu—it became clear to me that something was going on that cannot end well.

[Question] You already saw that you were in the midst of an affair that one had to get out of?

[Yazov] Yes, certainly, I had already made some preparations. Things were really going down. They said that we want to meet twice a day—we met once. And I did not even go the next morning.

[Question] You mean on the 21st?

[Yazov] Yes, yesterday. I began to withdraw my forces.

[Question] If after the press conference (of Yanayev) you saw that you had gone too far and committed a crime, why did you pursue it further? I mean the deployment of tanks in the night of the 20th to the 21st, that is, this curfew and the installation of a city commandant.

[Yazov] It happened this way and let us be frank—I always speak frankly: When the emergency was declared, the spirit in the people did not go far enough for a curfew to be declared immediately. It was not until a day later that this deputy, this Yanayev, imposed the curfew.

But when the emergency was declared and I installed (General) Kalinin as city commandant, he needed completely different forces and means, for an emergency and a curfew are two different things. So it happened that he was not able to order the curfew until the evening of the 20th. Additional forces are needed for this, especially in this rainy weather and the politicized state of the people.

[Question] Who could have recommended to Yanayev that he impose the curfew? Yanayev, after all, is not a military person. Let us be frank.

[Yazov] I am speaking frankly. You are trying after every question to urge me to be frank but I always speak frankly. He declared the emergency in Moscow and Kalinin, the commandant, imposed the curfew.

[Question] On whose recommendation?

[Yazov] On my recommendation.

[Question] Was it also to dispel the forces that were defending the White House? The formal reason would exist at 2300 and the people would have to go home.

[Yazov] But there were more than 70,000 people.

[Question] But tanks were moving through the city.

[Yazov] They were on the move but I forbade the employment of weapons. They were simply supposed to block the streets.

[Question] That situation is like gunpowder and matches. An accident would have been sufficient.

[Yazov] Who could have imagined that Molotov cocktails would be hurled down from above this underpass? A barricade of buses was erected there and they were also blocked from behind. Five or six armored personnel carriers were caught in the underpass as in a trap.

[Question] Were military units replaced—in front of the White House, for example? Perhaps for the reason that they were already in contact with the people and were no longer politically reliable?

[Yazov] There was a battalion from the Tula Division and its commander, the former chief of this division and

personal friend of Yeltsin, withdrew this battalion for stress relief, rest, and so on.

[Question] And who came in its place?

[Yazov] Another unit from the same division. After all, they could not be there all the time, for they also had to eat and sleep. A replacement was already planned. But when the second day began, I saw that they were bringing in busloads of vodka. An attempt was thereby being made to get the soldiers to desert. Well, it is particularly dangerous to have drunks in an armored vehicle.

[Question] When did you recognize that the putsch or this overthrow or coup....

[Yazov] How can one characterize this as a coup? We told Yanayev that this was some kind of a joke. No, in the end one should represent this as a joke. He said that Mikhail Gorbachev is a friend of his and when he is healthy again he will resume his functions to calm the people.

[Question] And you wanted to retreat and yesterday practically repented?

[Yazov] God yes, early in the morning I ordered the withdrawal of the troops and that one should thereby help dismantle the barricades so that we could put an end to this shame. I began the withdrawal action on my own and on my own initiative, for I knew that one cannot make such jokes with the people.

[Question] And now please tell us candidly: Was that planned in such a way that the people would accept it?

[Yazov] I believe that it would never have come to that. I tell you that frankly.

[Question] Once again the question: If the people accepted that, how would one deal with Gorbachev afterwards?

[Yazov] I believe that the communications would have been restored and he would have been returned to his function. Because those who took over his function were not competent to do so.

[Question] But a man whose honor was so slandered and who was then arrested with his family—how was he supposed to participate after that?

[Yazov] A proper question. But for me it is now a painful situation.

[Question] You should have thought the situation through better.

[Yazov] We did not think anything through either in the short or the long term.

[Question] If all of that had worked, would one not have had to think of some way to deal with Gorbachev?

[Yazov] No one thought about that. I was of the opinion that Gorbachev would have to come back.

[Question] So as to convince him?

[Yazov] I had not planned that but I should have reckoned with it.

[Question] How did you want to gain the sympathy of the people?

[Yazov] We had thought that some goods are available, somewhere in reserve. We had (Vice Premier) Shcherbakov come just for this. He said: what you want does not exist. The union republics have this thing, this other is absolutely unavailable, and this other thing is also lacking and we cannot get it. We were refused loans. In five days we will be howling like wolves.

[Question] What was the reason for Pavlov's illness?

[Yazov] I think it was alcohol abuse. Possibly he did this to stay out of the game. I saw him two or three times and he was absolutely plastered.

When he called me, I heard it in his voice when he said: "Arrest everyone." That was after he had conducted the meeting of the cabinet of ministers on the evening of the 19th.

[Question] Why was this started at all?

[Yazov] That is how it is with adventures. There was no plan and there were no preparations. And it is good that we had no plan and that it fell apart. Whatever happens now, we will put up with it, whether we are shot, hanged, or must suffer in some way. It is better than the disgrace that might have occurred otherwise.

Of the people that carried out the coup, no one was on duty. One was ill, another drunk....

[Investigating judge] The curtains are to be drawn now, that is a request. We probably ought to comply with them. That may be a security measure.

[Yazov] Does anyone really believe that someone would storm this place?

[Question] No one knows. But a provocation cannot be ruled out. Perhaps to free you?

[Yazov] They should have thought about that before.

[Question] How do you see your role now?

[Yazov] I would prefer to be swallowed up by the earth. I feel infinitely unhappy and I would like to ask Mrs. Gorbachev and Mikhail Sergeyevich for forgiveness. I am aware of my guilt with respect to the people. The only thing that one could do now is to do everything possible to ensure that no one in the armed forces will repeat such a stupid thing. I would like to say that this example should be a lesson for all of us.

[Question] I would like to believe that you are aware of the dramatic situation in which you have maneuvered the country....

[Yazov] I cannot even rule out that things were not the best with our national defense during this time either—when the president and commander in chief has no communications and no information and cannot give any.

[Question] Are the missile troops and everything else back in order now?

[Yazov] Yes, all of the codes are with the General Staff and the commander in chief of the missile troops and all of the hardware and facilities are in Gorbachev's hands after 1000 today. The missile troops, strategic and civilian air defense, and the navy—none of them had anything whatsoever to do with this adventure. They had no idea and were not in contact with us at all.

[Investigating judge] You now have the opportunity to direct your appeal to President Gorbachev.

[Yazov] I will have been in the armed forces for 50 years in November and I, old fool, took part in this adventure. I am now sorry about that and I realize the trauma that I caused you. And now, although it may be too late, I am sorry about everything that I have done and that our armed forces were in the streets of Moscow.

I know that you are a kind-hearted person and that possibly you will be understanding. I was in the war and was wounded twice. I want to ask that you not put me before the military court but simply retire me. I condemn this adventure. For the rest of my life I will regret what I did to you, our country, and our people.

**Interrogation of KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, on 22 August: 'He Had To Remain Alive'**

[Investigating judge] Would you please tell us in detail when, under what circumstances, and with whom it was decided to fly to the president in the Crimea?

[Kryuchkov] We wanted to tell Gorbachev frankly that in the time since his departure for his vacation we had come to the conclusion that nothing in the country is working. For example, the harvest was bad, including sugar beets. There was total irresponsibility and nothing was being delivered. And if no measures were taken now to stabilize our state, then we would soon expect a collapse.

We wanted to inform him. Then we wanted to hear Gorbachev's attitude and we thought that measures should be taken to stabilize the situation. They were tough measures that we wanted to propose but we saw no other way. We wanted to do everything possible to see that the workers had jobs and that fewer enterprises would be shut down. The situation appeared to us to be so critical that by September or October it would be too late. And we wanted to suggest to Gorbachev that he might step down for a time and if he could then return....

[Question] You wanted to suggest to him that he announce his resignation?

[Kryuchkov] That he temporarily delegate his authority to the vice president, Mr. Yanayev. But we knew that Gorbachev would return soon. He was supposed to be present for the signing of the union treaty....

According to Article 127, Point 7, he could voluntarily relinquish his authority to someone else.

[Question] So it was not a matter of an illness. Gorbachev refused to delegate his authority to anyone?

[Kryuchkov] He said, you can try it but it will probably not succeed. He also said that he did not feel well. But naturally today no one can say that he feels well.

[Question] Was (KGB General) Plekhanov supposed to strengthen the president's personal protection through his own people?

[Kryuchkov] We cut off communications so that we could establish order in our own way and we also strengthened the coastal defense.

[Question] When one listens to you now, that seems a little naive, as though some youngsters have come together to play a little game.

[Kryuchkov] This cutting off of communications and this removal from power were circumstances foreseen in the penal code.

[Question] In the event that Gorbachev might not agree....

[Kryuchkov] In this case, we were to discuss everything again in Moscow.

[Question] Who informed Gorbachev that the communications were to be cut off and his personal protection replaced?

[Kryuchkov] No, not replaced. Our agreement was that the protection was to be strengthened.... The site is not large.

[Question] Was anything specific said about isolating Gorbachev?

[Kryuchkov] I repeat, the site is not large and it would not have been complicated to isolate him.

[Question] Could he have gone to Moscow or Kiev if he had wanted to?

[Kryuchkov] No. Even if he had wanted to, he had no such possibility on the 19th and 20th.

[Question] Can we say directly that he was isolated?

[Kryuchkov] Of course.

[Question] Why, then, are we beating around the bush?

[Kryuchkov] Yes, during this time we blocked communications and isolated him. That is true: We restricted his freedom of movement to this site.



[Question] Who made this decision?

[Kryuchkov] All of us.

[Question] And what about your institution in particular? Did you issue the instructions for Plekhanov?

[Kryuchkov] Yes, I did that personally.

[Question] How were the communications cut off?

[Kryuchkov] I gave an order to the administrative chief.

[Question] When did you issue this order?

[Kryuchkov] On the 18th, in the evening.

[Question] To Mr. Anatoliy Georgevich Lyabeda. Was he already informed?

[Kryuchkov] No, he was not informed. We just said, cut off the communications. That was all.

[Question] Did he have to carry out this order?

[Kryuchkov] Naturally he had to do that. That is part of his job with us.

[Question] But it was a matter of a president, the commander in chief.

[Kryuchkov] But he had an order from me. Hence he had to carry it out.

[Question] According to regulations, he probably should have gone to the head of the Supreme Soviet or to other persons.

[Kryuchkov] No, my order is sufficient in such cases....

[Question] You said that you spoke with Gorbachev and explained the situation and that at first the discussion was rather harsh.

[Kryuchkov] We then asked him to declare an emergency and to come back after that. At first he reacted very tumultuously. He then calmed down but his position was that he would never agree. It was not a matter of depriving the president of all power. It is very important that it was not discussed in any conversation....

[Question] Do you mean physical elimination?

[Kryuchkov] Certainly not! What you are now saying, we never meant at all and did not discuss. It was not a matter of that. Gorbachev had to remain alive.

As for Yanayev, naturally we all had a very good idea that this could be for a very short time only. We also knew immediately that in the event of some sort of a confrontation we would have to resign immediately or pursue a completely different course.

[Question] Were there spoken or written orders to storm the White House? Was there any negotiating at all with them (Yeltsin's people)?

[Kryuchkov] Our emergency committee did not undertake any steps or a single action that was in any way directed against the Russian leadership and Russia. We realized that no power would be sufficient here.

[Question] Was Yeltsin's trip from Arkhangelskoye (his dacha) to Moscow hindered?

[Kryuchkov] In no way. We knew that he was going; true, we did not observe him but we were informed.

[Question] Were your armed troops used?

[Kryuchkov] We strengthened the protection of the Kremlin in Moscow. We did that on the 19th and on the night before the 19th we were simply too late. We were not prepared and we did not issue any orders that morning. Everything was delayed. What we wanted to do at 0400 on the 19th did not work. We did that later. You say that the people were against it and so on. There were two stages in the reaction of the people. The initial reaction was somehow trustworthy and raised hopes. That is, appeals to strike were not followed. Four mines did somehow go on strike, in Komi Republic and near Sverdlovsk and so on. The reaction in the country was much calmer than one might have thought.

On the next day, however, the situation worsened. And again not in industry, where it was only a matter of not striking, but in demonstrations. The largest was in Leningrad, for which there are reasons, and Moscow proved to be somewhat weaker in this sense. Overall there were about 160,000 demonstrators.

[Question] Did you in any way give a secret or verbal command for the arrest of the Russian leadership?

[Kryuchkov] No, there was nothing like that.

[Question] But you were called by the Russian leadership.

[Kryuchkov] And now I can tell you the answer that I gave. In the first place, we knew that a certain number of armed people were in the White House. I cannot give you this number now, you will know it. There were people there who had come out of good will and I believe that was the right approach. But there were also those who simply wanted to exploit the situation.

[Question] But the Russian Government, parliament—did they ask you to strengthen the protection?

[Kryuchkov] No, one must ask the police. We were not represented there. But we were called constantly: The assault should come immediately. I always said that they should go to bed and let others sleep as well....

[Question] People who wanted to protect the White House were standing around the building. Why should you have worries of this sort?

[Kryuchkov] Well, shots had been fired against these armored vehicles. If these shots had not been fired, then the tanks would not have fired back.

[Question] That was not the question. You are programming me in advance.

[Kryuchkov] You are programming me. I believe that it is better if we continue in the form of questions and answers.... All of the military hardware was withdrawn from Moscow on the 21st.

[Question] Why?

[Kryuchkov] Because we saw that it could come to a serious confrontation. And on the 21st we wanted to avoid an escalation in any case.

[Question] Was it not that you had already seen that your plan had totally collapsed?

[Kryuchkov] It had not totally collapsed. It was clearly shown once again that order is order and that one can establish order: All of the enterprises were operating. And the emergency proved to us that one did not have to declare an emergency anywhere, neither in Central Asia nor in the republics. The republics called us up and asked: Should we declare an emergency? My response was: If the situation is calm, you do not need to do that.

**Interrogation of Premier Valentin Pavlov, on 30 August 1991: 'There Was No Conspiracy'**

[Investigating judge] Valentin Sergeyevich, do you admit that you are guilty of the charges?

[Pavlov] No.

[Question] Why not? For what reason?

[Pavlov] First of all, because there was no conspiracy. In this respect, one cannot speak of whether or not it was criminal. If there was something like that anywhere, I never learned about it.

I never needed any more power than I already had. The president probably knows that I had a very strong desire even to relinquish this power.

After the price increases in April, on 22 April, when the anniversary of the death, that is, the birthday of Lenin was being celebrated, as is our custom, Gorbachev said to me: Soon I will probably be standing in Red Square with a poster in my hand saying "Down with Pavlov."

I responded by saying: And I will follow you with a poster saying "Thanks a Lot to My President." I repeatedly expressed by desire to resign in this jocular form and the president often said: I know that you want to get away from here.

On the other hand, I was not given any more power after the meeting of this committee than I already had....

If the president is not there, his functions are exercised by the vice president. When we were sending the president off on his vacation, he held Vice President Yanayev in the presence of many people: You remain here and look after things.

Because Yanayev was acting president anyway until the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, I remained obligated as prime minister to obey the commands of the acting president. Hence there is probably no violation of the constitution.

Yanayev also declared that he was taking over the functions only until the session of the Supreme Soviet or until the president returned. On Sunday evening, we spoke about convening the Supreme Soviet on Tuesday. We, Yanayev and others, presented the proposal to (President of Parliament) Lukyanov. His response was that purely technically that was not possible and that there would probably be a session on the 16th (of September). And then everything will be decided. All of us then said that if it is not possible on Tuesday, then perhaps on Wednesday. That is: When the committee was formed, we believed that it was necessary for only two or three days until the convening of the Supreme Soviet. And then that would automatically be legitimized. Either the committee remains in office or the Supreme Soviet says that another course should be taken.

During the meeting in which this committee was formed, I had a very powerful headache and very high blood pressure and I took some tablets. Valimethon or whatever they are called, that is the drug that I receive regularly and always have with me.

And during these rather heated discussions, we were given coffee with some alcohol. After a short time, I was doubtless no longer fully conscious. My bodyguard told me that they took me from the recovery room, where I lay on a sofa and that I, to put it mildly, could not move by myself. They carried me and put me in the car. I was simply unable to take part in the discussion or to make decisions. My only activity was that on Monday evening I was able to drive to the cabinet of ministers with the help of physicians. People can say what they like but my condition was in any case not the best and that is a fact. And I would like to point out that I heard nothing about any kind of use of troops, storming of the White House or something like that, or removal of the Russian leadership from power. If that was discussed anywhere, I was not aware of it at all.

[Question] To hear you, one comes to the conclusion that you completely reject any guilt.

[Pavlov] Possibly I am to blame.

[Question] Can you explain that please?

[Pavlov] In the meeting of the cabinet of ministers, I said that no confrontation, shutting down of production, bloodshed, or robbery in the streets and in the stores should be permitted. I could and should have taken a more active position. I could have joined the other side that defended the White House.

[Question] Then you would have been among the defenders of the White House?

[Pavlov] Probably. But on that day, I know from my physician, who tried to get me on my feet.... If you know about this, then you can imagine what a blood pressure of 200/100 really means.

Again, the only justification for me is the state of my health.

[Question] It is clear from your previous statements that you knew that the president had refused to yield to the pressure.

[Pavlov] The group that came back from the Crimea reported that the president is not able to do anything today. And he refused to sign anything. He is incapacitated and one cannot speak with him today. Those were the words they used.

They said, among other things, that they had to wait more than one hour before he received them and that they saw his family, who appeared very much in shock, much like the family of someone who is gravely ill. For physicians were with him and not until the doctors had gone did he...well, he was not really in shape. He chased away Plekhanov (commander of his bodyguard). He did not want to talk with him at all and he was in a rage. Plekhanov was forced simply to leave the room. And it was simply impossible to talk with him. He did not look like a normal person. And hence the conclusion was reached that he did not sign anything.

[Question] How should I assess your statement that you made last Friday: "It was reported that the president was categorically against signing any documents on the state of emergency."

[Pavlov] The people from the group said they were not able to speak with him at all. He was just not responsive. This is why we said that he is sick today.... The report stated that one cannot speak calmly with him at this time. Therefore they would have to make such decisions by themselves for a time. And then he would return on the 20th or 21st and everything would go smoothly again. That was the idea.

[Question] One of the participants said: Naturally with this trip we also revealed ourselves completely, all of those sitting here are in for it. We must now make a decision. Then the decision was made that if we have already come this far, we must proceed further and give full authority to Yanayev and so on. Is that the correct interpretation?

[Pavlov] Even in this situation, I could not help believing that Boldin was the head of the presidential apparatus. Nor was it the first time that the president had failed to react immediately. He had always waited until the second or third time before he was ready to make a decision. Eventually we learned of Boldin's decisions. And I had to believe Boldin when he said that one could not explain anything to the president.

[Question] That does not mean that one ought to deprive the president of power.

[Pavlov] That was not the decision we made.

[Question] How is that, when the emergency committee is formed and power shifts to Yanayev?

[Pavlov] When doctors say that he is not healthy and that he is incapacitated, what should I do then? People came who have always worked with the president and they say that he is just not able to act. He had us wait an hour, because doctors were with him and so on. He will probably be well again somehow and then we will tell him again. And now we must make the decision ourselves and take power. When he comes back, then....

[Question] What kind of decision, deprivation of power?

[Pavlov] We will perform our functions when the president is not there, when he is ill, or when he is absent....

[Question] You did not even try to call the president.

[Pavlov] In this case, I personally was not able, because after the middle of the meeting I was flat on my back and I did not take part. So I was unable to phone in purely physical terms.

[Question] Did you drink alcohol or coffee on that day?

[Pavlov] No, no.

[Question] Although your bodyguards say something else.

[Pavlov] Well, we did have coffee with a very respectable amount of alcohol. I now know that that was probably whiskey, because there was a whiskey bottle on the table and possibly I also took a swallow at some time.

[Question] If you had the opportunity to speak with Gorbachev, would you be able to look him in the eyes?

[Pavlov] I would probably ask forgiveness for what was done....

[Question] So was there an attempt to grab power?

[Pavlov] I am firmly convinced that no one intended to deprive the president of power. It is another matter that an attempt was made to convince the president that more resolute steps need to be taken at this time. No one believed that Yanayev intended to wrest power from the president.

#### **Former Procuracy Official Ilyukhin Defends His Actions**

924B0096A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
12 Nov 91 p 6

[Interview with Viktor Ilyukhin, former chief of the Administration for Supervision of Compliance With the Laws on State Security of the USSR Procuracy, by PRAVDA correspondent G. Ovcharenko; place and date not given: "I Knew What I Was Doing and Why I Was Doing It..."]

[Text] Just a few days ago many people envied the swift career of this man. After graduating from high school, he worked as a stevedore while studying by correspondence at the Saratov Law Institute; then, without skipping hardly any steps in the career ladder, at the age of 40 he was appointed chief of the Administration for Supervision of Compliance With the Laws on State Security of the USSR Procuracy—the equivalent of the rank of lieutenant general.

Today 42-year-old Victor Ilyukhin is starting everything from scratch, because he had dared to institute criminal proceedings against the USSR president. He was fired from the procuracy; newspapers branded his action as a far-reaching provocation; former colleagues are collecting compromising materials on him; and it is possible that criminal proceedings will be instituted against Ilyukhin for transgression against authority.

Does he now regret what he has done? This was the first question the PRAVDA correspondent asked V. Ilyukhin, the former chief of the Administration for Supervision of Compliance With the Laws on State Security of the USSR Procuracy.

[Ilyukhin] No. I knew what I was doing, why I was doing it, and what I could expect.

[Ovcharenko] Some newspapers reported, however, that relieving you from the job of member of the USSR Procuracy collegium was already in the works, and that instead of being fired, you decided to leave with a big bang, thereby seemingly saving yourself in the eyes of the public.

[Ilyukhin] That is an interesting twist, of course. First, before 6 November—when I was fired from the procuracy by the order of the procurator general—there had been no complaints indicating my illegal actions or not fulfilling my service duty. Moreover, my service record shows many acknowledgements of merit and monetary bonuses. I did have disagreements with the procurator general in regard to decisions on the fate of some criminal cases. But these are normal working relations, in the course of which a person defends his own point of view on one or another issue. Second, even as I was issuing the resolution to institute criminal proceedings against the USSR president, I was not thinking about leaving. Otherwise I would not have been busy to the last day developing principles for my administration's operations in the environment of renewed—or, if you wish, disintegrating—Union.

[Ovcharenko] There is an opinion that you would not have dared to take such a step—that there is somebody behind you, directing you.

[Ilyukhin] Total nonsense. Who would need to direct me?

[Ovcharenko] Ostensibly those who want to destabilize the situation in the country and bring it to a new putsch. And your candidacy had been selected because you ostensibly are not a principled man. For instance, you

had supported Gdlyan when he was in favor, but when his fortunes declined you spoke against him. The investigation of Oleg Kalugin's case is also being brought up.

[Ilyukhin] Yes, times do recur. As soon as one goes out of step with the others, all kinds of labels are immediately slapped on him, and he is accused of things that never happened. Still, I will answer the question, although I think that those who know me hardly have any doubts of my principled stance and my position.

First, the Kalugin affair: I had not investigated it and had not supervised it on the procuracy side. I can offer my personal opinion, however, on the basis of materials with which I am familiar. I do believe that in a number of publications Oleg Kalugin did indeed reveal state secrets.

Now about Gdlyan. No matter what kind of government we have and who is holding the power—"white" or "red," "blue" or "green"—I have said and will continue to say: There is a great deal of truth in the Gdlyan affair, but there is also a great lie there, and this lie canceled out, dissolved this truth. Yes, there are appropriated millions, and there are those justly convicted among the Uzbekistan leadership. No one can add or subtract anything here. But there is also an outrageous disregard for the law. During the last two years, our investigative organs and the courts, including the Supreme Court of the country, had completely exonerated and restored the rights of more than 130 citizens unlawfully detained and arrested on the basis of warrants issued by Gdlyan, Ivanov, and other investigators. These are innocent people; among them are elderly people, mothers of many children, and pregnant women, who spent between several months and two-three, or even seven, years in jail.

I would not have been an investigator and a procurator if I shied away from opening an investigation on these and many other facts.

[Ovcharenko] Nevertheless, the USSR procurator general closed the cases on O. Kalugin, T. Gdlyan, and N. Ivanov.

[Ilyukhin] Yes, but Nikolay Semenovitch did it more on the basis of political rather than legal motives. My opinion is that these cases have been closed prematurely. In any event, they should have been brought up to the court, and then the court would have publicly decided who was guilty and who was not. Then everything would have fallen into place, and there would not be current rumors and misinterpretations. For instance, it is not clear: If Gdlyan and Ivanov are not guilty before the law and their conscience is clear, why did N. Trubin not restore them to their job?

And, most importantly: What if the political situation changes again? Are we going to reopen criminal proceedings? I believe that this is where a lot of tragedies start in our country—when we bend the law to accommodate the situation. As long as it is done—and, as you can see, it is

still being done today—we will have arbitrariness, innocent victims, and disorder. Law, justice, and the procuracy should be above politics; they should only obey the law. There is much talk about it now, but as soon as the law touches upon the high echelon of power, it immediately ceases to apply.

[Ovcharenko] Let us go back to your action, its true motive.

[Ilyukhin] I will tell you at the outset that this action is not a decision made on the spur of the moment; it is the result of long and bitter deliberations. I will also tell you that I was not looking for personal gain in this. My career was already moving very nicely, and I think that had I not taken this step, it would have continued quite well in the future. But I simply could not—both as a citizen and as a jurist—watch calmly how the law is flouted on all levels. I can no longer watch the national leadership's contemptuous attitude towards the Constitution, and the law in general—it is all of this that has led in the final count to economic collapse, interethnic strife, and the disintegration of the Union, although the people, in whose name the president and his team are speaking and acting now, expressed their opinion unequivocally at the 17 March referendum in favor of preserving specifically the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. But the people were deceived. All of this prompted me to commit this act—foolhardy, as many believe.

[Ovcharenko] By the way, in his letter to PRAVDA V. Bakatin said that "theoretically, it was Ilyukhin's duty to see that the KGB organs act within the law. Nevertheless, he did not see anything illegal in the activities of the committee leadership during the putsch."

[Ilyukhin] I will now be accused of all sorts of things. That is all right, I will bear it out. I can reply to Vadim Viktorovich that supervising KGB's compliance with the law is only one of many lines in the activities of our department. As to the period of the putsch, I was not in Moscow at that time; when I returned, criminal proceedings had already been initiated against the putschists. This had been done by the USSR Procuracy, with the participation of staff members of my department. I sympathize with Vadim Viktorovich in that he has to stoop to such wholesale accusations in order to please somebody.

[Ovcharenko] Viktor Ivanovich, your resolution on the initiation of criminal proceedings against the USSR president was revoked by N. Trubin on the grounds that it was illegal. The national procurator general was supported in it by the chairman of the Interpublic Security Service, Vadim Bakatin. What were you counting on when you issued this resolution?

[Ilyukhin] On the USSR Constitution and the existing legislation—I have not deviated from them even by a millimeter. I am ready to prove it.

[Ovcharenko] Well, let us go over the points in N. Trubin's and V. Bakatin's statements, where it is says

that your resolution represents a "legally unsupportable manifestation of political extremism."

[Ilyukhin] All right. But I want to say at the outset that an accusation of political extremism is nothing but an attempt to move a very serious state problem from a legal realm to a political one.

[Ovcharenko] Let us then move right on to the substance of charges against you. It is said, for instance, that the president is immune, and therefore criminal proceedings cannot be initiated against him.

[Ilyukhin] I am not disputing article 127-6 of the USSR Constitution, and have not violated it. I also agree that the USSR president has rights that cannot be lesser than those of a USSR people's deputy. The all-Union legislation, however, does not provide for special procedures for initiating criminal proceedings against any one person, including people's deputies. In the case of USSR people's deputies, the exception is made only in regard to detention, arrest, and presentation of charges. Thus, I had a right to institute criminal proceedings; then it was up to the investigation to say whether I was right or not.

[Ovcharenko] Nevertheless, the chairman of the Interpublic Security Service believes that you may be charged with transgression of authority.

[Ilyukhin] Unfortunately, Vadim Viktorovich is not a jurist. Otherwise he would not be in a rush to make such a statement. By law he had no right to personally return my resolution to the procurator general. According to the current Criminal Process Code, he had to initiate proceedings in a case, and if he did not agree with me, he was to lodge a protest with a higher level procurator—in this case, the USSR procurator general. He would have considered the protest and, if in agreement, recalled the case. Then everything would have been done by the law. This way, however, a resolution of strictly legal issue is again replaced by arbitrary political actions.

[Ovcharenko] Your opponents maintain that the decision on granting independence to the Baltic republics was made by a collective organ—the USSR State Council, and therefore the USSR president cannot be held responsible for its decision.

[Ilyukhin] First, the very title of the USSR State Council's decision is illiterate from the legal point of view. According to Article 76 of the USSR Constitution, a Union republic is already a sovereign state and thus does not need to be granted independence. The decision should have been about the secession from the Union. This is about the form of the document.

Now about the substance. I understood—and understand—quite well what a collective organ is. However, the USSR president, by participating in the work of the State Council, in discussing the document, in its adoption, and so on, violated Article 127-3 of the USSR Constitution, which obligates him to serve as a guarantor

of rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens, take the necessary steps in order to protect the sovereignty of the USSR, and the security and territorial integrity of the country. Of the entire membership of the State Council, he is the only one vested with such constitutional duty. He has not carried it out. As a result, damage has been inflicted on USSR sovereignty; its territorial integrity is violated; the rights of the nonnative population in the Baltic republics are being violated; and there is an assault on the Soviet Army.

The enumerated attributes of a definition of a crime are the ones I listed in instituting the proceedings. As to the complete definition of a crime, and proof or absence of proof of criminal charges—these answers should have been provided by the investigation.

[Ovcharenko] V. Bakatin, however, maintains that the secession of the Baltic republics from the Union was legal. In that, he is referring to the referenda conducted there.

[Ilyukhin] I am amazed at Bakatin's ignorance. The population of the Baltic republics were not asked clearly and unequivocally whether they want or do not want to live in the Union. The referendum was substituted by an opinion poll, or a vote, for republic independence, which is not one and the same thing. Therefore, the USSR president was on a firm ground in not recognizing the legal validity of the acts of the parliaments of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. By the way, the president himself has not repealed these decrees; they remain in force. So how could he under these circumstances sign the decision of the State Council?

By the way, I am not disputing the sovereign right of the republics to secede from the Union. The point in question is different. A secession must be based on a strict expression of the will of the people, which has not taken place, and be implemented in accordance with the order established by law. This order, for V. Bakatin's information, is determined not by international law but by the law of each federative state. I will not dwell on Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia joining the USSR—there are many arguments involved there. But the fact that they were a part of the Union is fixed in the postwar constitutions of the USSR and of the republics. Therefore, the secession should be conducted not on the sly, but in a legal, civilized way.

First and foremost, we are talking here not about the procedure, but about defending the rights of hundreds of thousands of citizens of nonnative nationality, who were turned into second-class citizens and who were—despite the oath—forgotten by the president.

There is no need to argue with Bakatin and Trubin about the powers of the USSR State Council and Supreme Soviet. The law "On Organs of State Power and Administration in the USSR During the Transition Period" clearly says that the highest legislative organ of the country is the USSR Supreme Soviet. What is it that is

unclear here? It is its province, by the USSR Constitution and the USSR law "On the Procedure of Resolution of Issues Related to Secession of a Union Republic From the USSR," to make decisions on the Baltic republics.

[Ovcharenko] Viktor Ivanovich, does it not seem to you that you are a little late in instituting criminal proceedings? The secession of the Baltic republics from the Union and their independence has already been recognized by tens of countries; there is no way back. Who needs your demarche?

[Ilyukhin] I agree that there was a delay in instituting criminal proceedings. It is explainable, however. The first word here should have come from the USSR Committee for Constitutional Oversight. The committee stayed silent, contrary to our expectations. Then our administration undertook the task.

Now, about another side of the issue. Yes, we probably cannot return the Baltic republics into the bosom of the Union. But this situation may be repeated. Today not only the republics are talking about secession—former autonomies are declaring secession from the federation. I want to emphasize once again: I am not against the right of the nations for self-determination, but it must be done in a constitutional, legal way.

If the development of events follows the Baltic precedent, the legitimate rights, freedoms, and interests of thousands and hundreds of thousands of nonnatives will be again encroached upon. Thus, my resolution is also a certain warning. If it is understood correctly, I would consider my task accomplished—as a jurist and as a citizen.

[Ovcharenko] Viktor Ivanovich, had you notified the leadership of the USSR procuracy that you were preparing such a resolution?

[Ilyukhin] All normative acts issued in the country that are related to state security, sovereignties, and territorial integrity of the country are carefully studied in our department—otherwise it would be difficult to professionally carry out our responsibility in overseeing the observance of legality in this sphere. When we received the State Council's decision that for all practical purposes recognized the secession of the Baltic republics from the Union, and compared it with other documents, we saw that the State Council decision clearly contradicts the law on the procedure for republics' secession from the Union adopted by the national Supreme Soviet on 3 April 1990, the Constitution, and the current legislation. We prepared an appropriate expert opinion, and I wrote a memorandum on this subject to the procurator general of the country, in which I proposed to prepare documents for the national Supreme Soviet and the USSR president; I have not received any reply to this memorandum from Nikolay Semenovitch. Neither in writing, nor verbally.

[Ovcharenko] Viktor Ivanovich, what can you say about your swift dismissal from the procuracy?

[Ilyukhin] I think it is not quite legal. First, at least a formal internal investigation should have been conducted. Also: Up to the last moment, I remained a member of the USSR Procuracy's collegium. I was appointed to the collegium by the USSR Supreme Soviet; therefore, my dismissal should have been approved by it. This has not been done.

Also, I believe that N. Trubin is no longer a legitimate USSR procurator general. If you recall, the former USSR Supreme Soviet accepted his resignation, and it was supposed to be confirmed at the Fifth Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The issue was not considered; meanwhile, the congress was disbanded and ceased to function. The new USSR Supreme Soviet became the highest national legislative organ. At the same time, the USSR law "On Organs of State Power and Administration of the USSR During the Transition Period" (Article 7) says that until the new USSR Supreme Soviet commences work, the powers of the existing USSR Supreme Soviet are in force. By this provision in the law congress confirmed the powers of the preceding Supreme Soviet and the validity of its decisions. Therefore, it is my opinion that since the former USSR Supreme Soviet accepted N. Trubin's resignation, it is in effect immediately after the abovementioned law is published, that is, 6 September 1991.

#### IZVESTIYA Scores Ilyukhin's Legal Procedures

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Union Edition p 2

[Interview with V. Ilyukhin, former department chief of the USSR Procuracy, by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Rudnev, with comments by Doctor of Jurisprudence Aleksandr Larin, a specialist in the area of criminal process; place and date not given: "Impeachment, Soviet Style"]

[Text] The press continues to discuss the upheaval created by the initiation of criminal proceedings against the president of the country, Mikhail Gorbachev. In presenting opinions of various officials on this matter (IZVESTIYA, No. 265), we had not been able to locate the hero of the judicial scandal—USSR Procuracy department chief (now former) Viktor Ilyukhin; his telephones remained silent. When we found him, he referred to his interview in PRAVDA and expressed doubts about the expediency of an interview with an IZVESTIYA correspondent. Finally, V. Ilyukhin agreed to answer our questions.

[Rudnev] Viktor Ivanovich, let us leave politics to politicians. Let us talk about the professional: The decision on the Baltic republics—which you challenge—was taken by a collective organ. You have initiated criminal proceedings against Gorbachev personally. In the opinion of specialists in legal process, this is inadmissible.

[Ilyukhin] The USSR president has a duty to serve as a guarantor of rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens; to

take the necessary steps in order to protect the sovereignty of the USSR and the security and territorial integrity of the country. He is the only member of the State Council who is vested with such constitutional duty, which actually sets the president of the country apart from other officials. I believe that Gorbachev did not fulfill his duty and violated the law. As a result, damage was inflicted to USSR sovereignty.

[Rudnev] Forgive me, but your logic contains a typical example of legal error. Remember textbooks on criminal law: actions cannot be judged by the results without taking into account the intent. Of all people, the president is the one who has not given any grounds for accusing him of causing the disintegration of the Union. He advocates the opposite political line...

[Ilyukhin] You are judging by his words, and I am judging by his deeds. Who pushed him into discussing the Baltic issue at the State Council? He put his signature under the document—apparently voluntarily, not under duress. Here are have an intent!

#### Doctor of Jurisprudence Aleksandr Larin, a specialist in the area of criminal process, comments on our dialog.

[Larin] It is, alas, a paradoxical situation. It seems that in our country a people's judge or a deputy is better protected than the highest official in the country—the president. For instance, only the procurator general can initiate criminal proceedings against a national deputy or a member of the USSR Supreme Court. Filing criminal charges against these officials, members of the Supreme Court, or deputies, and their arrest is possible only upon approval of the Supreme Soviet. The law does not make such an exception from general rules for the president. So it turns out that the president and a street sweeper are equal before the criminal process in our country. Unfortunately, the constitutional norm on the president's immunity at this point appears to be an empty abstraction. I am convinced that this is a serious gap in our legislation that we need to take care of in the nearest future.

[Rudnev] So it looks like Ilyukhin simply took advantage of this gap?

[Larin] Looks like it.

**FROM THE EDITORS:** In the past, to initiate criminal proceedings, define the order of investigation, and direct the case to court against even a middle level bureaucrat—an executive committee chairman, for instance, or an oblast party committee secretary—numerous approvals along the chain of command were needed. Today we have another extreme: It looks like even a middle-level investigator can initiate criminal proceedings against the president of the country, and a rayon procurator can arrest the highest official in the country. Actually, at first sight the nature of such disparate legal approaches is rooted in the same phenomenon—our legal system so far has not been noted for its civilized ways.

We continue living the old way—the Soviet way.

### **Constitutional Committee Chairman on Union Process**

*PM0511163491 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 43, 27 Oct-3 Nov 91 p 8*

[Article by Sergey Alekseyev, chairman of the Committee for Constitutional Supervision: "The Next Step to Union"]

[Text] So, it has happened.

On October 18, 1991, eight sovereign Republics signed an economic agreement. The first step has been taken, making us hopeful that this process leads to—if not integration in the full sense of the term—then at least economic stabilization at last.

What next?

It is widely believed that for thorough political stabilization within the confines of the former Union there is a need to conclude the Union Treaty and then—as soon as possible—adopt the Constitution as the fundamental political and legal document which our ideas about a strong and unshakeable constitutional regime are associated with.

But let us take a closer look at the facts of history. Britain has no written Constitution as a single juridical document. Yet it has firm constitutional order.

There is no Constitution in the European Community either: it rests on the Treaty of Rome and other documents. But deeply rooted in the EC as well is a legal order not inferior to a constitutional one. In fact, the type of relations among its member-states has been drawing increasingly closer to that of a federation.

In the USSR there have been four (!) constitutions—those of 1918, 1924, 1936 and 1977: an alarming fact in itself. The last one, now in force, is not so bad and contains rather progressive provisions, including those incorporated in our time. Yet the country has no real constitutional order; it has never had.

What is the matter here? Does the trouble stem solely from the fact that all the four Soviet constitutions did not originally amount to rigid norms creating and limiting state authority—as the basic principles of legal order—but were merely propagandist-declarative documents? And why were all of them declarative?

I believe that the reason is due to the means used in creating the Constitution: whether it is written by life itself or compiled at a writing desk where basic formulas are "borrowed" from others' experience. It looks as if we are again ready to choose the second path as we hurry up with creating the All-Union Fundamental Law. Yet the logic of creating both the new Union and a firm constitutional system must be totally different.

The first step—fortunately, it has already been taken—is an agreement on the economic community. The second step must be on the Court. Not arbitration, as envisaged in the agreement, but precisely the Court of the Economic Community (later maybe the Court of the Union) capable of ensuring similar "playing rules" and thereby a juridically favourable (from the legal point of view) environment for multilateral cooperation.

Here, it is true, there is a need to overcome some stereotypes and ideas about the judiciary which we have inherited from the totalitarian system. After all, laws and courts exist even under a totalitarian regime. But only in a law-abiding state does the court turn from a body for "applying laws" into a "third authority" enjoying equal rights with the legislative and executive authorities. Moreover, it is one which is capable not only of acting in opposition to the latter two, but also of creating a legal order. And inasmuch as in practical terms the courts do this by deciding specific legal instances, this legal order organically fits into the life of society, accepted by all.

And what about the Union Constitution? One should presume that the time is not yet ripe for drafting the text. At present we would have to confine ourselves to overly-general formulations adding nothing to the Union Treaty, the conclusion of which is also still problematic. What will it set down? A far-from-established, amorphous state-vs-state entity gravitating towards a confederative (or even associated) instrument of an international type.

What is necessary is that real integrational processes commence on the basis of the economic community and the common market. And that these be given time to settle and acquire sufficiently definite forms. Then it would be possible to perceive the trends and look forward, creating Union institutions which would ensure stability for the new community of states and lay the constitutional foundations of its development for a long time to come.

The outlines of building the Union as a state-legal entity are determined by the logic of political life itself. They stand out in sufficiently bold relief:

- an economic agreement among the sovereign states which previously belonged to the USSR;

- the Court of the Economic Community (the Court of the Union, following the conclusion of the Union Treaty, which exercises solely the functions of a court of arbitration for states which are not parties to the political treaty);

- the Union Treaty and the Union bodies formed on its basis.

If developments unfold in keeping with the logic prompted by life, the politico-legal situation may be expected to stabilize after some—I believe, not very long—time.



**Alternative Names for New Union Assessed***924B0107A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Nov 91  
Union Edition p 1*

[Article by Stanislav Kondrashov: "My Address Is Not a Building and Not a Street... My Address Is...?"]

[Text] The new Union is still a long way from established *de facto* and *de jure*, but the name seems to have been definitely ratified at the State Soviet last Thursday. And they suggest that we get used to it: the Union of Sovereign States. Or the abbreviation USS. We can, of course, get used to it, but not right away. However, it is better all the same—before we get used to it—to think about a different name which would take into account the essence of the matter and generally accepted world practice.

In the proposed name, the Union of Sovereign States, there is one unnecessary extra word and no "tie to the region," the generally accepted reference to geographic location. This name does not have a distinctive character. It could belong to any association, union, or community of states in any region of the planet, or better yet throughout the entire world community. The USS is only a different name, we might assume, for the United Nations. Is the United Nations Organization not a unique type of Union of Sovereign States?!

The unnecessary word is "sovereign." A sovereign state is like oily oil or watery water. Each state is in fact a state exactly because it is sovereign. And if during the process of its formation it confirmed its sovereignty, if no more attacks are being made on it, then the need disappears for the emphatic phrase "Sovereign States," which is included in the name of their union. The inclusion of this word carries the zeal of the republics' struggle against the Center for their sovereignty and the solemnity of their victory. But is it necessary for the zeal of the moment to be present in what is intended to, and we hope will, last a long time?

The same element of ideologization, if you will, is found in the word "Sovereign" which was heard—and much more strongly!—in two words of the title of the former Union—"Soviet Socialist."

In giving a name to the new Union, we must certainly take into account how it is seen by other states and peoples. Taken out of the context of our political struggle and turned to the outside world, the proposed name seems to have a hidden claim to preeminence: here we are, sovereign states, but we still have to take a look at you since you do not certify yourself as the Sovereign Republic of India, or the Sovereign Kingdom of Sweden, or the Sovereign United States of America.

The second thing is the "tie to the region." From ancient times and even now the name of each country, empire, or interstate formation as a rule carried or carries a certain geographic marker. The only exception is that same United Nations, by virtue of its worldwide scope. The

USSR was an exception—with the first threatening gesture to unite the entire planet under the flags of the world proletarian revolution. Why should the Union of Sovereign States be yet another exception?

Take other unions, communities, or interstate organizations. Everywhere geography is in the names. The European Community, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of American States. The Organization of African Unity, the Arab League. Or the Swiss Confederation, the Federal Republic of Germany, the People's Republic of China, the Arab Republic of Egypt. There is no end to the examples. And since we no longer consider ourselves an exception to the general rule, why not take into account the time-honored custom of centuries and millennia?

It would be worthwhile to turn once again to the name which A. D. Sakharov proposed when he was working on the draft Constitution for the new Union, just before his death: "Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia (abbreviated European-Asian Union, Soviet Union)." Time and the will of the main participants in the political process have erased or omitted the word "Soviet" in this name, while instead of "Republics," by way of asserting sovereignty the emphasis is put on "States." So perhaps we will correct Sakharov's draft: Union of States of Europe and Asia. Or European-Asian Union. Abbreviated, the EAU. Or, in accordance with the type of formation proposed, let us call it the European-Asian Confederation—the EAC.

People will say: that is not the main question, thinking of what sign to hang out, when as yet there is no building and the construction design is not quite clear. Yes, it is not the main one, but it is an extremely important one politically, psychologically, and symbolically. One of those questions which demands high quality finishing touches.

In any case, instead of becoming accustomed to the clearly inadequate name for the Union, we, its citizens, must insist on a more precise and "literate" one.

**KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on Failure To  
Initial Union Treaty***PM2611171791 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 26 Nov 91 p 1*

[A. Pankratov article: "Victory Was Nigh"]

[Text] Yesterday the country's State Council failed to initial the Union Treaty.

I would not say that all Soviet people had been waiting for this day, but animation reigned in the lobbies of big-time politics. The country's president attempted once again—albeit symbolically!—to preserve the unified state. And, as his last speech in parliament before departing on a business trip indicated, he was hoping that the State Council would successfully initial the new draft of the Union Treaty. He seemed to have reached

agreement with Russia, which has comments on almost all the points in the document. None of the republics' top leaders seemed to have any objections to the fact that, if it does not happen now, in practice it will never happen. And nevertheless...

A great deal has changed in the kaleidoscope of political life in the space of a week. The confrontation between B. Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament has gone up a notch—the deputies once again “blackballed” their president's decree. The presidential race in the Ukraine is on the home stretch—the contenders are engaged in a tactical struggle and do not want to risk making unpopular (according to the logic of political intrigue) decisions. The tragic air crash in Karabakh, in which the flower of Azerbaijan's top leadership died, prevented the republic delegation from coming to Moscow (“Azerbaijan has all too many complaints about the Union Treaty,” Prime Minister G. Gasanov declared).

It must finally be admitted that /no plan for political union will withstand the powerful centrifugal forces today/ [passage between slantlines printed in boldface]. This is all the more dangerous in combination with the economic crisis. The only role that the uniting president can play here is to keep the process within a peaceful framework, gradually adapting it to the future European realities.

To judge from M. Gorbachev's news conference yesterday, it is not even a matter of new disagreements among the republics—the point is that the latter simply do not want to reach agreement. At such a time there cannot be a serious discussion of questions of the expediency of the post of chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet or the position of the vice president, nor can there be reaffirmation for the umpteenth time that there must be a two-chamber parliament and that the president must be elected by the people. The State Council must retain all power, the State Council declared yesterday. Only you wonder: Who is arguing with this?

While the Novo-Ogarevo labyrinth has once again reached a dead end, each of the former republics is trying to survive on its own. Currency is being printed, customs posts are being fenced off, borders are being drawn, and prices are rising. True, one thing is being forgotten in this turmoil of independence: No one, alas, will be able to start from scratch.

#### **Law Expert Points to Power Vacuum Caused by Collapse of Union Structures**

924B0087A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 12 Nov 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with Doctor of Jurisprudence Grigoriy Atamanchuk, by Valeriy Kachurin, under the rubric: “What Is the Union To Be”; place and date not given: “While We Are Dividing Power, Power Vacuum Reigns”]

[Text] “We have lost the ability for state governing on the all-Union level, but have not acquired it on a republic

level. This is where the tragedy lies,” is the opinion of Doctor of Jurisprudence Grigoriy Atamanchuk. “For me, for instance,” he told our correspondent, “it is still a mystery why the effort to get rid of the totalitarian system of governing has been replaced by a battle against the Union itself.”

[Atamanchuk] Since the times before Peter the Great, Russia has incorporated many nationalities. No matter how much we denounce the great empire for being, as they say, a prison of nations, still, all 130 nations have “survived” on the Union territory. They have retained their language and national traditions.

Moreover, the revival of national conscience in current conditions is an indication that these “repressed” people generally have been developing. Had Russia really been the “prison of nations,” it is doubtful that, being such small groups, many of these nationalities would have survived. Let alone be able to raise now the issue of their independence.

Therefore, in looking at the worsening interethnic relations, I am concerned not so much with objective reasons as I am with their subjective perception. Amazing things are happening. On the one hand, we seem to understand that we have lived within the framework of one state—both before and after the revolution; on the other—every nationality now strives to make itself stand alone, separate, gain an opportunity to freely and democratically solve the problems that concern it. What we do not notice is that the process of sovereignization is acquiring a spontaneous, unmanageable quality and is gradually destroying the whole. The breakdown of economic ties has already undermined our economy and the very ability of economic structures to function. It also became one of the underlying reasons for the worsening of interethnic relations.

[Kachurin] It seems that the country is being torn apart; a big pie is being divided—who will get more.

[Atamanchuk] As you recall, the issue of state sovereignty of a Union republic was first raised last year by Russia. Its Declaration of Sovereignty defined the functions belonging to the center, and the rest was being taken over by the republic. Redistribution of powers had started, but in practice it all boiled down to a battle between Russian legislators and the center.

This was not free of excesses. After all, even Russia, despite its territory and its colossal natural and labor resources, cannot ignore the deep-seated traditions of our common house. I will say more: The Union could only exist as long as Russia was its unifying source. By stepping aside, she thereby accelerated its disintegration. Meanwhile, somewhere ahead there looms a specter of the disintegration of Russia itself, since national minorities living on its territory are also clamoring for their sovereignty.

[Kachurin] How are we to live from now on? What forms of cooperation are to be chosen for the future? Russian

politicians cannot skirt these questions. It is not accidental that the republic's State Secretary Gennadiy Burbulis recently declared that Russia is the only legitimate successor to the USSR (as it turned out later, on its own territory). It is, however, much easier to declare successor rights than to realize them in practice.

[Atamanchuk] In my opinion, a fair diagnosis of the current situation was made by RSFSR Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy during his meeting with people's deputies in the "White House." "We are passing mountains of laws," he remarked, "but nobody complies with them, since there is no mechanism for governing the state and no control over their implementation." The republic is in a complete power vacuum; in this situation, it is unlikely that somebody will get seriously engaged in putting together a new union. The political struggle that has developed in our society may create unsurmountable obstacles to economic reforms and to Western aid.

I am especially concerned about the effectiveness of state governing. Look at what is going on in the "corridors of power": Something is being changed all the time—people, development programs, some sort of ideas, promises to improve the standard of living... But life is just not getting any better. And this will continue until we learn to distinguish to what extent some or the other program meets public needs. And, on the other hand, to what extent it is backed up by resources, and whether it is possible to realize it. Rutskoy is talking about control? Wonderful. Why not find out after a while what has really happened; why did this idea not work? The entire world puts management problems at the forefront. Except us. As a result, despite our colossal natural resources, despite huge production potential, despite rather talented and hardworking people our life is gray and poor.

[Kachurin] Perhaps, this is why we have somewhat lost the statehood, almost brought a great power to disintegration, and have squandered the resources...

[Atamanchuk] We have lost the ability for state governing on an all-Union level. At the same time, we have not acquired it on a republic level. This is where the tragedy lies. It is a seemingly good idea for the republics to take power into their own hands; quite often, however, they do not know what to do with it. We need to raise the quality of management, especially in Russia. Because the Russian nation was an underlying systemic factor in maintaining life functions on the territory of the former Union.

[Kachurin] It seems that the politicians are beginning to understand this. An economic treaty between the republics was signed recently...

[Atamanchuk] The interests of all nations objectively demand interaction. What needs to be done is to build new union relations on the basis of sovereignty—and to do it on a more democratic, equal-rights basis. Much depends here, in my opinion, on the position of large

republics. Once in a while they do display a sort of superiority, a condescending attitude towards small nations. From the very beginning we have to make the principles of equality, mutual respect, and mutual benefit a cornerstone of interethnic relations.

[Kachurin] Does it all not look like wishful thinking against the background of real events? There was so much commotion and talk around the Union treaty at the time, but who remembers it now?

[Atamanchuk] It would not hurt to remember, actually; the concept of the new Union treaty contained very fundamental principles. For instance, ensuring the equal rights of people; equality of rights and freedoms of an individual regardless of nationality; equality of nations regardless of their size, development level, and territory of habitation. All our 130 nationalities—both those who have a national, state, autonomous consolidation, and those who do not—all of them must have an equal opportunity to build their life in accordance with national traditions, beliefs, customs, and other values.

One more important principle—interdependence, inter-causality of rights and freedoms of individuals and nationalities. Some believe that national interests take a priority; others—of an individual. But one cannot sacrifice an individual for the sake of national interests and, vice versa, it is necessary to respect a nation as a sum of individuals who have a right to exist and develop.

Now that the sociopolitical situation in the country has fundamentally changed, we can only return to the search for new forms of union relations on this basis.

[Kachurin] But this is exactly what we, unfortunately, do not see. It seems that we are acting by a habitual formula: first we destroy, and then we start to build. Where may this "independence game" lead in the near future; what danger may result from the disintegration of the former Union republics?

[Atamanchuk] This is not a "game"; it is a serious and to a certain degree objective process. The destiny of each nation is a whole universe. We are living through a wave of national renewal that has been caused not only by the sad end of an unsuccessful historic experiment, but also by deeper processes. Also, perhaps, by the readiness of the nations that have started on a road of independent development.

These processes are taking place all over the world now. It appears to me somehow that they are caused by a change in the technology of human activities. We are making a transition to postindustrial information technologies of a more local nature. In principle, what stands in the way of small nations to support their own existence? Wherever there are people, their intelligence, and their labor—they can feed and clothe themselves. In the end, each republic will find some cooperative relationship with the rest of the world and will be able to support itself.

Of course, the fact that nations are gaining an opportunity to independently govern social processes on their territory is a positive phenomenon. In this, they realize their talent and their labor skills. But this does not have to lead to alienation, or worse, to a confrontation and the need to revise the borders. The entire history of humanity is to a certain degree a history of its integration.

[Kachurin] We know now that the Baltics have been recognized by the world community. Where is the guarantee that other republics will not follow?

[Atamanchuk] I am surprised when I hear some leaders say: The Baltics have separated, so what? Others are still with us. It even begat various new Union formulas. The point is that, if we use precise terminology, the Baltics have not separated from the USSR—they separated from other Union republics. From Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia. Therefore, when we say that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have become independent, it means that the USSR no longer exists in the form it used to. It is already, shall we say, a union of 12. Any republic, however, may be in a state of union with others, and this does not at all affect its sovereignty.

Since a certain time, the notion of a "center" has acquired currency here. It is as if it exists independently of republics and even above them. Yes, we have had an authoritarian, bureaucratic system of governing. But it was the same in relation to any republic. It existed at the top, permeated all republic structures, and went all the way to the local level—in short, it was universal. If we decided to destroy this system and replace it with a democratic one, it should have been done both at the Union, and the republic and local levels. For me, for instance, it remains a mystery why the effort to get rid of the totalitarian system of governing has been replaced by a struggle against the Union itself. The Union is the relationship between the nations that populate the country, while the authoritarian regime is the relationship between power structures. These are different things, different social phenomena. And now, when the totalitarian system has disintegrated, has fallen—thank God—there is no way for us to get around the question: Do we need a Union, and if yes, then what kind, in what form? Or perhaps, it is no more? Then let us start forming a new system of allied relations on the basis of democratic structures through multilateral agreements.

### USSR, Yugoslav Crisis Parallel Drawn

92UF0196A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Nov 91  
Union Edition p 6

[Letter from Professor G.A. Buznikov, member of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences: "Can We Take Advantage of the Yugoslav Experience?"]

[Text] Moscow—Not that long ago Yugoslav periodicals were full of articles on the fundamental difference between the Yugoslav model of socialism and the state socialism in the USSR and the East European countries,

on the progressive nature of this model and so forth. Soviet tourists did not read these articles but, glancing at the almost European abundance in Yugoslav stores and the absence of lines, reached the same conclusion.

People who knew Yugoslavia in somewhat greater depth realized that this abundance by no means testified to the promising nature of the Yugoslav socialist path and that it was brought about primarily by international factors. These people knew also that very tense interethnic relations had taken shape historically in Yugoslavia and that in having adopted the 1974 constitution, ruling circles of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had incorporated the timing mechanism of a monstrous delayed-action bomb. The first serious explosion occurred back in 1981 (Kosovo), and outright civil war is under way now. Uncritical use of the Yugoslav experience could have for us even more serious consequences—primarily on account of our dimensions and owing to the far worse initial state of the economy.

Nonetheless, since 1985 we have rapidly begun to repeat the Yugoslav mistakes. In the article "Will an Emergency Committee Win in Yugoslavia?" (IZVESTIYA No. 218, 12 September 1991) A. Ostalskiy believes that we have repeated them almost entirely. "But on 19 August we took a sideways step and three days later found ourselves in a situation never experienced by Yugoslavia." I am afraid that this is not the case. We have far from exhausted our possibilities in a repetition of the tragic Yugoslav mistakes and are continuing to road-test versions whose utter unsuitability has been revealed at the Yugoslav test range.

The Yugoslavs have in 1991 had their counterpart of our August days, more modest, of course—the March days (the successful demonstration of the students and the political opposition, although not without bloodshed, against the neocommunist government in Belgrade). This success has proven barren (thus far, at least) for the same reason that the victory over the Emergency Committee can do nothing for us either. The Serbs perceived the events in Croatia as a threat of a repetition of the genocide in respect of the Serbian minority. They remember how the "Independent State of Croatia" (1941-1945) wiped out on their territory approximately 750,000 Serbs. It is not surprising, therefore, that the political struggle against the communist authorities in Serbia has weakened abruptly and that the "defense of the Serbian nation" has moved to the forefront. Obviously, to the same extent our attention also will now be concentrated not only on the building of a postcommunist society and a normally functioning economy but also on interethnic conflicts. Communist leaders, as in Yugoslavia also, are repainting (or have repainted) themselves as national leaders. The danger of a new Emergency Committee (or emergency committees) will become considerably more real.

The article I have already cited contains factual inaccuracies also, incidentally. Thus the communists have remained in power not only in Serbia but in Montenegro

also. Not only Serbian generals have changed from communists into nationalists—practically all the Yugoslav leaders were quite recently communist leaders. Franjo Tudjman, former Tito general, political prisoner and present president of Croatia, has washed himself clean from his communist past, and others have moved straight from party chairs into republic and state chairs (once again a striking similarity with us).

It has to be said that the Yugoslavs also, in turn, are diligently repeating our mistakes, not from a disposition to emulation, of course, but as a consequence of objective factors. As a result the crisis in our countries has been developing very similarly since 19-21 August also. Hope is instilled merely by the fact that we, having analyzed all our mistakes, will find some solution similar, possibly, for both countries.

[Signed] Prof G.A. Buznikov, member of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Moscow.

#### **Yakovlev Speech to 'Rome Movement' Meeting**

924B0084A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 7 Nov 91 p 1, 2

[Introduction to and speech by academician Aleksandr Yakovlev at "Rome Movement" meeting in Moscow organized by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA: "And Who Are We in the Dissonance?"]

[Text] The Moscow meeting of participants in the "Rome Movement," which was organized by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, lasted several days. Well-known people, but different in terms of their political views and outlook and in terms of their ideas of democracy, power, the state and life in general, came to the lecture hall for debate. Such a dialogue, apparently, is possible and legitimate and pertinent. Listen:

Vladimir Maksimov, writer: The bitter truth is that the country is in the hands of a dictatorship of mob rule or the mob.

Leonid Plyushch, public figure: The common cause is preventing civil war in the USSR.

Aleksandr Tsipko, philosopher: Communism has gone, but we are left without a Fatherland, as it were, for the RSFSR has not become an independent state. People are very embittered, people are looking for a doctor....

Stanislav Shatalin, academician: Russia must be a state which accepts people and gives to people, not one which rejects some people.

Naum Korzhavin, poet: In the West a political scientist is synonymous with a simpleton. But I do not understand why here both intelligent and decent people call themselves political scientists.

*Aleksandr Yakovlev, academician: A reason for the demise of the Communist Party was political arrogance. This infection is dangerous for democracy also.*

*Our readers will find Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev's speech to the participants in the "Rome Movement" on page two.*

**Academician Aleksandr Yakovlev: "All Our Laws Are Like the Tsar Cannon, Which Has Never Been Fired, and the Tsar Bell, Which Has Never Rung"**

April 1985 is politically already infinitely far away from us, although in time we are physically only six years removed from it. The essence of renewal was from the very outset just one question: Will our country embark on the path of democratic development or not? This is the question today also.

However paradoxical it might seem, in many respects the practical turn toward democracy is now complicated to a far greater extent than before the start of the transformations. Whereas in the past powerful forces, entrenched party and state structures, ideological prejudices, and the frozen state of the public consciousness stood in the way of democracy, and all this seemed outwardly unshakable, a monolith, the monolith has now caved in. But at the same time new obstacles have appeared on the road to democracy. The objective state of society and the economy is now such that the question of transition to democratic development could be set aside for a long time, for years, if not decades.

What is the main reason, as I see it, for this state of affairs? It is primarily the political self-admiration of the democrats with all the brakes off.

The second reason is the incompetence of the executive authorities. It remains a fact that our system had no need of professionalism, had no need of competence, it rejected them. And if competent, professional people did appear in the wide world, for all that, this was merely a God-given talent, as they say.... As far as the bulk of people is concerned, they, being ingrained in the state system, could not and did not have the opportunity for real, genuine self-realization. But, then, today also incompetent people are once again being promoted to the structures of power on the basis of a democratic election, seemingly. Who is to blame here? Competent people should, most likely, be selected by another method....

The third thing which, evidently, is impeding our development today is that the masses have recognized freedom, but not democracy. For democracy is the arrangement which incorporates also elements of compulsion—through the law, elements of self-limitation, and so forth. It is this which the masses have yet to recognize for various reasons, owing to a varying state of affairs, owing to people's mentality, and so forth. A wide field has thus been opened for the anarchic behavior of part of the population.

It has to be acknowledged that all our laws are like the Tsar Cannon, which has never been fired, and the Tsar Bell, which has never rung.

Little more than six months ago I was saying and writing publicly that we did not have democracy as yet. And analyzing the traps into which it could fall. I greatly regret that all this has proven correct by and large. These misgivings are being justified today also. This is particularly clear following the failure of the conspiracy of the putschists, when democracy had to take power into its own hands.

What is harming democracy? It is the rapture at a victory which has not yet been won. Despite all the tension and the tragic character of the days of 19-21 August, the putsch was not, for all that, the powerful performance of reactionaries which it could prove to be. After all, you will agree, the central squares of Moscow cannot be identified with the whole country. The outcome of the struggle against the Stalinist model of social arrangement will be decided not in Moscow but in the country as a whole, in the economy and in day-to-day living.... That rapture at success which engenders the illusion that no one ever needs political allies for anything is short-sighted.

Yes, democracy has shown that it does not respect itself and, consequently, should not, in turn, expect respect from the masses.

A reason for the demise of the Communist Party was political arrogance. This infection is dangerous for democracy, and it will be simply disastrous for it, I believe, if this arrogance is not wiped out....

What further, in my view, is impeding society's democratic development? Primarily the attempts at the self-assertion of some by counterposing themselves to others, not by way of their own creative actions. This was immediately very much a weak spot of the fledgling democracy, but since the practical disappearance of the CPSU the phenomenon has assumed simply painful proportions. Mutual squabbles, self-admiration, and a readiness to be rashly disparaging of others, disregard for actions and professionalism, a new burgeoning of a love for extremes, a burgeoning of the thinking of the "either or" category, a dividing up of the population.... This is what we are observing daily in dangerously large proportions. This is also, in my view, where the sharply increased predisposition toward rectilinearly populist decisions, a propensity for self-assertion in defiance of professionalism, competence, and the law comes from—thus today is the road toward socioeconomic catastrophe being paved. What republic does not have this currently? What region? What party?

I am seriously worried by rash anticommunism also. Yes, I agree, the ideology of communism has shown its utter groundlessness, incompetence, and erroneousness, particularly in connection with the choice of historical path of development for such a great state as Russia. But in ideology struggle should, in my view, be conducted on the basis of debate.... As far, however, as a settling of scores and incitement of hatred are concerned, this is not democracy but that same primitive neo-bolshevism

thanks to which the potential for democracy's self-annihilation is accumulated.

Communism, on the contrary, may be discerned in the ideology of law-making also. There is little that has been done in practice to underpin democracy with an economic foundation, and this has contributed to a local strengthening of the administrative, totalitarian system.

The democratic game of patience is laid out today only, perhaps, in Moscow and St. Petersburg and a few other large cities. But communist feudalism and national-bolshevism has in certain republics become even stronger than it was before. For it has become unchecked. We have meanwhile strayed a long way away from the practical realization of human rights and from the democratic principles with which we were accustomed to operate or think.

How, for all that, to cross-breed two such opposite principles as democracy and the reality in which we have lived? We need to move forward, probably, by way of practical actions, and only thus. Real renewal will set in when man occupies a place at the center of everything. But in the six years of perestroika, despite all the claims of advocacy journalism, man has not been put at the center, and as he was demeaned, so does he continue to be. Just as he would go to the state cap in hand, not the state to him, so does he today still.

I believe that the decisive factor which will put man in a normal position is a normal economy. It is usually called a market economy, I will simply call it a normal economy—when a man has normal conditions for self-realization.

Can the situation be coped with? I do not know. I would like to believe that harmony will save us. But at the same time I have an inner doubt also: how to achieve real harmony between, say, a people, republics, and regions with entirely different socioeconomic conditions of development, with a different understanding of democracy, with different, sometimes opposite, traditions? One wonders.... and, frankly, one is nagged by doubts as to whether it is possible to combine many extremes at all—at this stage of historical development. On the other hand, denying such a possibility is, most likely, immoral also—particularly after all that we have lived through together, particularly from the economic viewpoint, when under present conditions the normal development of the democratic process is coming up against economic ruin.

In my view, democracy and its leaders must today emphatically retire from the "stage" and begin to work by the sweat of their brow.... Begin to sow and gather in the grain and ensure a normal life for people, that is, to act, to create. The fire cannot be put out by mass meetings and gatherings.

The main thing is that democracy must, and as quickly as possible, afford people economic freedom. Not partial, full. There is no stopping half-way, this spells

failure. It is time to decide the question of property, and the sooner, the better. I am simply astounded at the inertia of the Russian Congress, which has declined to resolve the question of land.

We need a strong executive, but one which stands on guard for the interests of creation, not the interests of destruction.

We will not, I believe, create either socialism or capitalism—nor should we be creating them. Let us build our own society, a democratic, open, and peaceful society of accord.

By its very turbulent stream democracy has brought to social life not only that which is good but also much in the way of self-admiration, national egotism, new bureaucratism, and new culturelessness. This should evidently come to be replaced, it would seem to me, by pragmatism and a healthy rationalism. I believe that the period of romantic notions concerning perestroika is coming to an end. And subsequently? Events may remain in the democratic channel provided that a tough executive mode is controlled by the law and legislation. How to combine this—a toughening of the executive and the law and democracy? A question, of course, of will-power and of the wisdom of the authorities and of cautiousness and of boldness, there are many constituent factors here—policy-forming, economy-forming, culture-forming.

We all bear responsibility for the present state of society, and it is time, I believe, to call a truce. Yes, we need, for all that, in my view, to draw a line beneath the hatred which has been inculcated for 70 years; we need to tell ourselves: That's it, enough. Enough of great changes, enough of hatred, enough of intolerance, enough of seeking culprits. Unless we draw this line today, we will not hold our ground in the history of our country.

**4 November State Council Session Summarized**  
*924B0084B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
*in Russian 7 Nov 91 p 2*

[Unattributed roundup: "What Was Discussed at the State Council Meeting"]

[Text]

#### **Fate of the Union**

The people firmly advocated the preservation and renewal of the Union at the 17 March referendum. Recent polls confirm that this resolve remains unshaken. According to a recent survey, 78.2 percent of those polled in Alma-Ata supported the Union, as did 72.6 percent in Moscow, 67.9 percent in Krasnoyarsk, and 55 percent in Kiev.

Comments of the republics on the updated draft Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States have now been received. After they had been recorded, it was decided to

discuss the draft paragraph by paragraph at a meeting of the State Council in Novo-Ogarevo on 14 November.

The representatives of the Ukraine and Azerbaijan stated at the meeting of the State Council these states' intention of joining the eight republics which signed the Economic Community Treaty. The leadership of Moldova made a similar statement.

#### **Radical Reforms in the Economy**

M.S. Gorbachev made a positive evaluation of the program of measures to accelerate the reforms announced by the president of Russia. The need also for the closest cooperation between the participants in the Economic Community in implementing the reforms was expressed here. This is a fundamental issue since no one republic, including the RSFSR, could escape catastrophic consequences were it to act alone.

#### **Measures To Provide the Country With Food**

Stocks of wheat for food are sufficient for a long time, the forage grain situation is more complex. The question of U.S. agricultural credit has been resolved. The Canadian Government has expressed a readiness to supply an additional quantity of grain. A great deal of work will have to be done on organizing the shipment of agricultural produce. An operational group including representatives of the Interstate Economic Committee and the republics and of transport and financial departments was formed by an order of the president.

#### **Liquidation of Union Ministries and Departments**

More than 70 ministries and departments, whose functions will be transferred to the jurisdiction of the organs of power and administration of the sovereign states, are to be liquidated. Interrepublic bodies (departments), which will perform coordinating functions, in the main, are being formed within the framework of the Interstate Economic Committee.

The sectors of the national economy which require a single system of management constitute an exception. This applies, in particular, to power engineering in general and nuclear power in particular and to railroad transport and air traffic.

#### **The Armed Forces of the Union**

It was emphasized at the State Council meeting that the Armed Forces should be united and cannot be an object of partitioning, as a result of which their capacity for defending the country would in fact be irreversibly undermined. Our disarmament obligations also presuppose control of the Army and Navy on the part of a single Defense Ministry and General Staff.

The proposal concerning the formation of an advisory committee of defense ministers of the sovereign states and entrusting to it the formulation of common approaches to military policy and the organizational



development of the Armed Forces and their support and control was submitted for the State Council's consideration and was adopted.

The participants in the meeting agreed with the opinion of the president of the USSR that the functions performed by the Defense Council should belong to the State Council. It was confirmed once again that a treaty on collective defense and security should be concluded.

#### Foreign Ministry of the Union

The Congress of People's Deputies has, together with presidential authority, the Supreme Soviet, the State Council and the Interstate Economic Committee, decreed the activity of four organs of Union administration led by the president and the State Council, namely, the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the security authorities.

Our country, as the successor of the USSR, needs a concerted foreign policy which integrates the interests of the sovereign states. This is essential primarily in order to ensure compliance with commitments in respect of all treaties and agreements bearing the signature of the USSR.

Instructions were given concerning the elaboration in the next few days even of a concept for the conversion of the system of bodies in charge of our relations and cooperation with foreign states.

#### Alimzhanov on Role of New Parliament

924B0084C Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 44, 6 Nov 91 p 2

[Interview with writer Anuar Alimzhanov, member of the USSR Soviet of the Republics, by Zh. Vasilyeva, under the rubric: "Our Man in Parliament"; place and date not given: "Harmony and Once More Harmony"]

[Text] LITERATURNAYA GAZETA information. Born in 1930. Author of the novels *Makhambet's Arrow*, *Souvenir From Otrar*, *Teacher's Return*, *The Courier*, *People's Road*.... Winner of the J. Nehru International Prize and the Abay State Prize of Kazakhstan. As of 1955 he was for almost 13 years LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent for Central Asia and Kazakhstan. In 1970 he was elected first secretary of the Kazakhstan Writers Union. From 1979 to 1983 he was a secretary of the USSR Writers Union. Member of the USSR Writers Union Board. Up to 29 October 1991 he headed the Kazakh Copyright Agency and the Kazakh Committee for the Defense of Peace. A people's deputy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republics.

[Vasilyeva] Anuarbek Tulyrbekovich, your evaluation of the tasks which confront the Soviet of the Republics?

[Alimzhanov] Kazakhs say: "Real men do not unite without having found out where they stand." The task of our soviet is to contribute to clarifying the positions of

the seven republics which signed the Economic Community Treaty. All positions: political, financial, economic. Only by having clarified them is it possible to move toward consensus, which should be both the goal and the principle of our work.

[Vasilyeva] Do you consider yourself a politician?

[Alimzhanov] In the sense in which a person involved in public diplomacy may consider himself such. I have been lucky. A great deal can be learned from such artists as Mukhtar Auezov, Mirzo Tursun-zade, Berdy Kerbayev, Kamil Yashen, Aybek and Aaly Tokombayev (I had the good fortune to become acquainted with them largely thanks to my work on LITERATURNAYA GAZETA). I am not even referring to literary skill now. These people combined within themselves encyclopedic knowledge with the wisdom in whose light the world is perceived as a single whole.

[Vasilyeva] But now politics and its passions will require you to sacrifice literature itself?

[Alimzhanov] I hope not, for all that. I have almost always combined work with service. I am now finishing work on the story *The Test*. Another tale—*Cognition*—is being published in the journal ZHULDUZ. A short documentary book on Mustafa Chokay is being prepared for publication in Alma-Ata. People once disappeared forever just for mentioning his name. He was the first president of the Kokand Republic, a person of wide learning. He drew up one of the first plans for a confederation of republics and defended in his works the rights not only of the Central Asian peoples but the peoples of the Transcaucasus and the Ukraine also. It is these democratic traditions of the mutual support of the republics which I would like to continue and develop in the work of the present parliament.

#### Yeltsin Adviser Discusses Return of Shevardnadze

AU2611160091 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian  
22 Nov 91 p 3

[Telephone interview with Sergey Shakh-ray, adviser to RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin, by Szerdahelyi; place and date not given: "New Power Struggle Is Not Expected in Moscow—Yeltsin's Role Cannot Be Disputed"]

[Text] The sudden return of Eduard Shevardnadze as a foreign affairs minister poses the question of whether the center is preparing to suppress the Russian leadership by concentrating its own powers. Sergey Shakh-ray, one of Boris Yeltsin's closest advisers, answered NEPSZAVA's questions. The telephone interview was made prior to Yeltsin's visit to Bonn.

[Szerdahelyi] The Western half of the world unequivocally welcomed Shevardnadze's return. How did Yeltsin feel about the appointment?



[Shakhray] I believe that the many who think that Shevardnadze's return has been in the air ever since the August coup are wrong. For example, our advisory body was definitely surprised by this plan, which we had naturally been informed about well in advance. Shevardnadze will probably remain one of the most surprising figures in Soviet history. It is hard to predict his decisions.

[Szerdahelyi] I am sorry, but you did not answer my question!

[Shakhray] Naturally, Yeltsin welcomed Shevardnadze's appointment and he had earlier indicated this to Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev, of course, did not officially seek Yeltsin's opinion, but we know that there are informal channels, too.

[Szerdahelyi] Can we view this appointment as the beginning of a new power struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin?

[Shakhray] The situation is not that complicated. Gorbachev's policy is very simple. As the leader of a currently very unstable union, he does all he can to remain popular and trustworthy in the eyes of foreigners. Shevardnadze, a recognized foreign affairs minister of perestroika, definitely fits this image. All this does not mean, though, that Yeltsin can be pushed into the background by a Moscow center. Yeltsin clearly explained that Russia wished to play a decisive and leading role in the transformation, and the other republics wishing to join in would have to take account of these wishes. All this has little to do with a power struggle, however, because, since the coup, the world has known that Gorbachev would not have gotten very far without Yeltsin. This is also shown by the fact that the Yeltsin-Gorbachev relationship is completely balanced and they do not have any great differences of principle in fundamental issues.

[Szerdahelyi] Nevertheless, the Moscow press writes about the dictatorship of Yeltsin. What is the reason for that?

[Shakhray] Simply, it is hard to digest the radical reform efforts. Yeltsin is trying to do what Gorbachev had experimented with, namely, develop a new kind of market policy out of a destroyed economy. If he cannot succeed, then no one else will, either, no matter who the foreign affairs minister of the country or the union may be....

**Shevardnadze on Resignation, USSR's Prospects**  
92UF0154A Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN  
in Russian No 10, Oct 91 [Signed to press 23 Sep 91]  
pp 5-14

[Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze, former USSR minister of foreign affairs, conducted by B. Pyadyshev, MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN editor in chief, under the rubric: "The Arcade:" "The Choice of Eduard Shevardnadze"; date, place, and occasion not specified]

[Text] One may speak of the "phenomenon of Eduard Shevardnadze."

In the post of minister of foreign affairs he followed his own course persistently and with imagination, and so the pulse of perestroika, which had faded away in other spheres of our life, continued to beat in foreign policy. He became a prestigious leader of the world diplomatic community, although he did not have as many trump cards as, say, Baker, Genscher, or de Michelis.

Eduard Shevardnadze clearly made his choice. His dramatic resignation in December of last year was a shock, but the warning about the threat of dictatorship proved prophetic. He has no less influence behind the walls of the USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] than that which came from the official head of the diplomatic service. His firm position in the August days added new attractive features to the image of one of the most honored politicians in the country.

In the "Arcade" section, Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze talks with the editor in chief of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN.

**'I now have the right to talk about this...'**

[Pyadyshev] If Eduard Shevardnadze had remained in the main office No. 708 in the MID building on Smolenskiy Square, what public stand would he have taken in relation to the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]? What words would he have used to address his associates in the Ministry and the Soviet ambassadors and diplomats in embassies abroad?

[Shevardnadze] My mode of action since autumn of last year and my statement of resignation give me the right to say that if I had been in the office of minister of foreign affairs, I probably would have tried to remain true to my views and principles. I would not have just refused to join the GKChP; I would have appealed to the people, found a way to do that. The newspapers were closed, there was no access to television; Kravchenko was very protective, so to speak, and closed all channels. But, all the same, through the foreign press and other channels I found the opportunity to address the people about the threat of a coup, about the dangerous consequences of this coup. I think I now have the right to talk about this, since my actions before my resignation and after it and the very fact of that resignation and what followed allow me to tell about it now.

I would have given instructions and directions to Soviet ambassadors with due regard for this.

[Pyadyshev] The behavior and mode of action of some of our ambassadors, who while carrying out instructions which came to the embassies from the Center on 19-20 August did not venture to describe the GKChP's actions as anticonstitutional to the leaders of the countries where they served, compel us to think about the eternal dilemma of people who work for the state: professional duty or a civic stand?

[Shevardnadze] You know, Boris Dmitriyevich, that is a very difficult question. I would say that what I said about my possible reaction was the exception and not everyone could act in the same way. You remember how the President reacted to my statement. And all the subsequent events confirmed that statement and confirmed that the warning had its foundation. And then many people, including the highest leaders, explained all this away by saying that it was an outburst of emotion, it was said by a tired person, overworked and so on. There is no junta, there is no putsch. I do not want to offend anyone, but a certain thoughtlessness in evaluating everything that happened after my statement prevented our ministers and ambassadors from thinking critically and preparing themselves responsibly for certain unusual and I would say extreme situations. Consequently even the ministries and ambassadors proved to be disoriented from the very beginning. No one told them about the serious threat and the serious danger. When the coup happened, you see which key figures carried it out: the vice president, the second person of our country, the country's prime minister, and very close comrades in arms of the President—the minister of defense, the chairman of the KGB, the minister of internal affairs, and so on and so forth. It was difficult for any ambassador to believe that it was not sanctioned by the President. Consequently there was hesitation, uncertainty, and ambiguity even at the Ministry itself and among the ambassadors. So if we in the Center made a mistake in choosing the vice president and ministers and brought in people who were essentially traitors, what kind of complaints can we have against ambassadors or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? If we ourselves did not understand these key figures. That is my position. I would not want to dump the blame on ambassadors. Some reacted quickly. Some were more cautious and waited it out; most likely they were correct to do so. I would not accuse those who hurried a bit.

[Pyadyshev] When your statement of resignation was made in December of last year, the idea came out that one of the reasons for such a decision was personal disagreements with the President. Later "both sides" demonstrated this quite transparently. At what moment did disagreements emerge and opinions diverge from the President's?

[Shevardnadze] I had no special problems with the President for all the years beginning in 1985. There were naturally debates and disputes, especially since many members of the leadership participated in shaping important political decisions. But all the same mutual understanding in shaping the foreign policy course and positions on different negotiations predominated between the President and myself. But certain trends that put me on guard emerged in recent times. In particular, in negotiations on conventional weapons. What happened with the transfer of an enormous amount of equipment over the Urals caused a complex situation with partners in negotiations. In the interests of honesty, order, and trust, we should have informed

them. It turned out that I personally, as minister of foreign affairs, was confronted with an accomplished fact. In principle it looked like manipulation, cunning, and dishonesty on our part. That alarmed people, and in a serious way. I talked about that to Mikhail Sergeyevich and others.

The transfer of a large number of tanks, armored troop carriers, and equipment to the navy occurred at a stage where it certainly should not have been done. There were very sharp debates about that with Baker and other partners with whom business relations were being established. The same thing is true of the planes which were repainted and transferred. And all this was revealed after the agreement was signed in Paris.

Incidentally, when I found out about it I immediately wrote a special memorandum to the President and stated my arguments. I said that the problems of negotiations must certainly not be approached so peremptorily and irresponsibly, since a new atmosphere, a new situation was being created and partner relations were being formed. We ourselves proposed that military confrontation be ended, and that demands new approaches—more honesty, order, openness, and frankness. In my memorandum I substantiated the idea that all this contradicted our principles.

[Pyadyshev] Was there any reaction?

[Shevardnadze] There was a reaction. The memorandum was given to Marshal Akhromeyev. Correspondingly, actions on his part followed. Akhromeyev, of course, substantiated the version from the Ministry of Defense position. The President then called me and said that I was not quite right and that nothing terrible was happening. I cannot say that I accepted that without emotion, without offense. We were talking about a very fundamental issue—how and what our positions would be later. Would we be guided by new principles which would substantially help us reach important, major decisions? Or would we use cunning and manipulation, as in the good old times? Who was deceiving whom? It seemed to me that we had put an end to that rotten old practice, but here I failed completely, I will say directly. That has some significance. As a result we did not win anything at all, but lost.

[Pyadyshev] Several issues ago MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN published an interview with De Marco, foreign affairs minister of Malta and the chairman of the last, 45th session of the UN General Assembly. It was said of your speech at the session, as conjecture naturally, that the final words sounded like a farewell to your colleagues and the ministers of other states with whom you had spent five General Assembly sessions. Were you in fact thinking about retiring even in September 1990?

[Shevardnadze] You know, I did have such an idea.

The question of the events in Tbilisi was studied at the Congress of People's Deputies. In general I cannot reconcile myself to dishonesty. In politics we did a great

deal to establish morality and ethics. I cannot reconcile myself to any other approach.

So that was how things stood. First we all drew the conclusion that there would be a report by Sobchak, who headed the parliamentary commission to study the facts. Sobchak even agreed with all the points which were fixed in the report. The decision was made that discussion would not be opened. The resolution, the evaluations, and all the rest were adopted. I was also consulted and I supported this approach. Sobchak finished the report and suddenly Lukyanov announced that the co-report of the military procurator Katusev would have the floor. That was a complete surprise to me. I became suspicious. I promised the people then when they refused to strike and went off to school, I promised them an absolutely objective and fair investigation.

This immediately made me suspicious. We had agreed that no one would speak. Katusev came out, and it was like an indictment of the people. And then there really was emotion, outbursts of emotion and insult, since everything that he said contradicted what had in fact happened there and what Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak had said on behalf of the commission. We all gave explanations, including Gorbachev and the members of the Politburo. That caused a stormy reaction. I demanded that Lukyanov give me the floor. A delegation left the hall, and not just one delegation. I remember that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin stood up and all the intelligentsia members stood up as a sign of protest against this report. It turned out I did not get the floor. So I got up and left the congress and in the evening dictated a letter to Mikhail Sergeyevich. He called several times and then we met. The conflict was settled somehow. The resolution adopted was a fairly good one. But then I had misgivings: something strange was happening in the country when agreement was reached at such a level, agreement was reached with the republic, with everyone, with the military, and so on. Why was that necessary? I considered it a provocation. A challenge by the reactionaries. This provocative report was met with intense applause and the support of a significant part of the hall, including members of the government. It was after that that I began to reflect on whom I was dealing with.

As for the speech at the General Assembly session which you mentioned, there were certainly some elements there. When my assistants and I put together this report, on a short vacation, the idea was there somewhere, that this was the last speech.

[Pyadyshev] How do you feel about a person being accused of being an "enemy of the people"?

[Shevardnadze] I cannot reconcile myself to the use of troops against the people. I cannot. This was, you remember, in relation to Tbilisi and any other incident where troops were used, especially Army troops. I reacted very morbidly to the military equipment around when the Congress of People's Deputies met. I compared what happened in Tbilisi in the first days of September

with the events in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989, when the commander of the Transcaucasus Military District made the decision to use troops; this time it was the elected government and done in a democratic way. That is much worse, it is a blow against all democracy. It is essentially treachery covered by the interests of democracy and humanism. This government did not have the right to fire on its own people. As for this evaluation that I am an "enemy of the republic" and an "enemy of the people," such labels have been pinned on many figures of literature and art and politicians. Yesterday I remembered that, that is quite good company.

[Pyadyshev] The prominent sculptor Z. Tsereteli proved to be in the company of the people whom President Gamsakhurdia declared to be "enemies of the people."

[Shevardnadze] Yes, Tsereteli. There are people who cannot live without the image of the enemy, and if there is an enemy it means he must be shot and killed or put in prison. Communists used to have this psychology: if a real threat did not even exist, we invented it. When an "enemy" is sought now, in conditions of democratization, it is a crime.

#### The Military, the KGB, and the Party Apparatus

[Pyadyshev] In September of last year we flew to New York for the 45th session of the UN General Assembly. You visited "the team" in our compartment several times. The evening before our flight back to the Kremlin, a meeting was held where the top military men were uncompromising on a number of issues which if not resolved would make progress toward a treaty on reduction of conventional arms and, hence, the Paris meeting of CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] heads of state problematical. It was obvious that you were upset with the position of the generals and marshals.

How did your relations with the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the military-industrial complex take shape and, in a broader sense, what about relations between the diplomats and military circles?

[Shevardnadze] Perhaps one example will make you understand how relations were. The delegation receives directives in the established manner. By the final phase of negotiations the directives did not provide a resolution of the main question: aviation and so on. The commission which Zaykov headed helped me a great deal. Some of these issues were not resolved at this commission, but I had an understanding that when I went to the negotiations with Baker and other partners, I would send the information from there and state my position. The commission assembles promptly and if possible makes decisions. On this occasion I had an understanding with Mikhail Sergeyevich. I told him nothing would come of what I was taking with me. There was no resolution. We agreed that I would send a telegram and Zaykov would report to him, and if his intervention was needed, he would then help.

We were seeking resolutions on five or six key positions. I sent a telegram from there that this old position was not suitable, that it would not work and there would be no solution, and we had a vital interest in achieving this treaty and achieving reductions on a parity basis. I proposed that if no other instructions came, I would make the decision. That is how I acted on certain key points and I acted quite boldly.

You can see these telegrams. I wrote that I considered this variant undoubtedly the correct one, the one which conformed to our national interests and the interests of security, and that the matter had to be resolved in that way. That was how the question regarding this particular situation stood. As for relations with the military department, there were no simple relations. A certain narrow-mindedness, you might say, in the people that worked with us always struck me. I do not want to offend anyone. For example, Akhromeyev and I worked together on the treaty and he helped very often, and so on. But there were others who did not understand the general trend, that we could not remain a militarized state. We would not survive, we would destroy the country. Enormous expenses, a gigantic army, gigantic scale, and we were supposed to show initiative so that reduction of weapons and armed forces and, correspondingly, expenditures would occur on a reciprocal basis. They did not understand this, the most important thing. There were always disputes: why should we reduce by, say, 10 or 16 units more. The point was to stop the arms race. The Americans were in fact ahead of us in certain types. But if we did not conclude the agreement, it would be impossible to stop them. So we sometimes figured, let them maintain some superiority, since guarantees of security are also being preserved in our country. But many military colleagues do not understand this. That was why there were disputes and debates. So that was the situation; the commission which Zaykov headed tried, even though some controversy is useful, to find a common language. Often it did not work out. But that created marked tension. When people were present it was noticeable that not everything was harmonious, not everything was smooth.

[Pyadyshev] I remember that at one of the meetings of the USSR MID Collegium which you were conducting, the issue of the fate of two young diplomats from our embassy in a West European country who had been involved in unauthorized business matters was being discussed. The first diplomat was punished. The second proved to be a "neighbor," from the KGB. His bosses reproved him slightly and he continued his service "under cover" of the embassy. The question now arises of the overloading of different departments and representations with associates of the Committee. This affects the MID to the greatest degree. To what degree, in your opinion, is this harmful to foreign policy affairs?

[Shevardnadze] This issue has always disturbed me. I thought about it a great deal, pondered it, and sought a solution. As for particular cases, I can confess that sometimes I perhaps did not show the proper high

principles. As for the global problem, I pondered it a great deal and constructed a plan; the essential moment had to be chosen to hold a preliminary discussion, in principle, of the issue with our partners, especially Baker.

It is no secret. They have intelligence officers under cover of the embassy. And so do we. Who has more is another question. The proportions which we now have in our corps are intolerable. This is certainly a survival of the past, a structure of the past. We must put things in order here. I considered talking about this with Baker, but making it a special meeting such as we had in Baikal, for example. The situation itself was appropriate there for discussing issues which in earlier times were not even thought about. I wanted to pose the issue. This is creating an atmosphere of suspicion in our country now. We have opened cities and enterprises and we are now monitoring and the Americans are monitoring what used to be highly classified. And so what, the world did not come crashing down. Everything is going along normally.

If we say that we are not enemies and will not fight, why can we not clarify this situation now? Let us be an example to the world. Fine, you need intelligence and you need information, things diplomats cannot do. We also need it. Then let us come to an agreement. Everything is known, the Americans know by heart who is working as a diplomat and who represents the Committee for State Security. Personally. We also know everything—that is an intelligence officer and that is a diplomat. It is a game, perhaps. We have reached an altogether new turn of the spiral. Let us try this as an experiment and open not safes but some files. Let us open them and say to each other honestly: here are five people—they are intelligence officers. Intelligence officers to obtain information, to reduce the degree of risk. That was my attempt and today too I want to pose this issue.

Look at all the trouble with the English. The matter led to a rupture in 1971 and later. I have also had very serious trouble. There was very serious trouble with the Americans. I think that the time has come to talk seriously about it. Perhaps this is even a problem for the UN Security Council. Everyone wants to have this information. We must also think about this information and its volume and orientation. The press has now become so open and so skilled that it and television penetrate all areas. What are many people doing? They subscribe to the very latest issues and send reports. We need some closed information, but not such large volumes of it. Some convention can be prepared on conditions of openness. Do we need this intelligence at all? I would pose this problem for debate, for discussion, if we are speaking of a new world and of building a new world order. I know that it will arouse an intense negative reaction now. Attacks will start again, but let them.

[Pyadyshev] What do you think, has the number of intelligence associates in the MID central apparatus and abroad increased in the last five years?

[Shevardnadze] I cannot talk about an increase. But in any case it has not decreased. This question has not been posed. As for the central apparat I have no idea who is there, because if a qualified person worked in the central apparat, I viewed him as a professional diplomat. Whether he worked for the KGB or for some other department I do not know. I have never met any associate who represented state security there and did not fill the requirements of the post he occupied in practical terms. But at embassies I found out right away. When the minister arrives, the head of the residence naturally comes and gives a report. But the rest, even the minor ones, I found out about. You talk with a person and it is immediately clear that he is not from the diplomatic service.

[Pyadyshev] There is one more category of people who work in the diplomatic service. It is now already clear that the practice, formerly elevated to a supposed virtue, of appointing party figures, who often had made a mess of their former jobs, to be ambassadors did quite a bit of damage, especially in relations with the socialist countries. Until recent days, as one can see, efforts to "tailor" important bureaucrats from the party and state apparats to be diplomats continued. This causes a sharp reaction from the public—from sarcasm to indignation. Ultimately the shadow falls on the diplomatic service. So, will the diplomatic service be unable to stand on its own feet if it is filled with professional diplomats only?

[Shevardnadze] Generally any state practices this. For example, in the United States there is no shortage of this type of diplomat. An ambassador has now come to Moscow who has never been involved in diplomacy. He is a politician, an important businessman, and he knows economics well. I think that they made the correct choice. It is now precisely these problems which are becoming paramount, problems of business, problems of investments. So what should we do now, condemn this decision?

Here is another matter. Before my tenure, and especially in the first year when I still did not know everything and did not understand everything, it was bad. To illustrate, the ambassador in socialist countries has to be a party worker. There is no doubt here that party workers must be sent. It is another matter when people are given jobs after they retire or have been removed. When this was done on a large scale, only secretaries of obkoms and central committees of republics were sent to the socialist countries; it did harm. Not because they failed to notice certain processes. This information came, it was not for nothing that there were intelligence officers, and the ambassadors too sent information.

But that is not the point. We apparently came to the conclusion that professionalism was not needed here. These are almost like our Union republics, let the man sit there and work. And these people, many of them in any case, were in the habit of giving commands, managing things, and giving instructions. Not very often, not always. But they automatically transferred this practice

and these habits which they acquired here in our country when they managed major party organizations and ministries to diplomacy.

For example, they rarely visited the ministries of foreign affairs in the country they were in. But many of them were at the general secretaries' offices almost every day, and everything else was secondary. This confirmed great power status.

**'It will be a different civilization...'**

[Pyadyshev] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, since you have a firm reputation as a man who can fairly accurately predict future events, let us try to imagine that you and I meet in 10 years, in the year 2001. What kind of country and society will we have? Use, in particular, the decisions adopted at the September Congress of People's Deputies as a basis.

[Shevardnadze] It will be a different civilization, that is what I think. And not just here, in our country; I am thinking of the present alliance. An essentially new civilization on the whole, on a world scale. I have no doubt that the new world order will be decisively strengthened. The world will become manageable. This is possible if only we can raise the authority of the United Nations higher and higher.

As for the Soviet Union, there will naturally be no return to the old. I think that a unified economic space, a unified military-strategic space, and a unified democratic space will take shape. I have in mind republics which will join and ones which will not join the Union. For some regions the Union is a necessary component of progress and we can speak of a unified space throughout its territory.

Coordinated activity on the international arena will also be preserved, I am sure. And that is altogether sufficient for a good community. I do not attach fundamental significance to the name, whether it is a union or a community.

I think that the basic documents were adopted at the Congress of 5 September—this is already a good basis for us to build a new community, a new Union, together in the foreseeable future.

The process of formation of the sovereignty and independence of states and republics is accompanied in our country by many, many emotions, an emotional overload. There is a great deal of euphoria and naivete now. But the time will pass, let us assume, and we will be convinced that people are thinking differently. They understand that it is impossible to live without integration. Integration is the command of the times, the rule of mankind's development in present conditions. This new trend will become the definitive one. I think that it will be a different world in the 21st century and, as you specified, in the year 2001. But what kind of country ours will be—socialism, capitalism, or something else—and what the name will be, we again want to devise

something standard. It will be a synthesis of everything accumulated by mankind and human civilization, all that is progressive and all positive experience. All the republics, or the whole country in its entirety should take from capitalism everything that is reasonable—market relations. We came to this late. Where will we get it? From the most developed countries, of course. It is enormous unique experience. Or property relations. We used to fear them, but we are now convinced that they are most essential to the development of mankind, and there is much more.

The world will be different. There will be fewer secrets of any kind. If there are fewer secrets, then we can skillfully exchange the wealth which has been accumulated in each country. It includes enormous intellectual potential and achievements in science and technology. Essentially we are entering a new revolution in the area of equipment and technology, without borders, in a unified space of knowledge and achievements. I do not think that this is from the realm of fantasy.

**'I do not predict the disappearance of the Center.'**

[Pyadyshev] What will become of foreign policy?

[Shevardnadze] I do not predict the disappearance of the Center. It will be preserved. To a large degree the Center will be involved in coordinating and correlating fundamental issues, including those in the field of foreign policy.

Speaking of the role of the United Nations, when all republics become UN members, must we lose our position in the Security Council (SC)? The SC's role as a guarantor of stability in the world will grow. Mechanisms will be created, you know my views on this score, and the Union will certainly maintain its position on the Security Council as a permanent SC member. The most important problems and everything related to stability will be resolved in the Security Council. The republics themselves will have an interest in coordinating their efforts, or not coordinating measures through the Union's foreign policy department.

I think that we must think seriously about having foreign economic and foreign policy activity coordinated from one Center. I do not know whether this will be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or something else, a committee or something else. But all problems, economic and political, are so intertwined that it is difficult to distinguish what is politics and what is economics. So I believe that the coordinating function of the Center will become more substantial and necessary for the republics.

[Pyadyshev] We are now a unique country. Not only is there no multiparty system, there is virtually no one strong party. That can perhaps not be found in any proper country of the world. The CPSU has collapsed and other parties have not managed to stand on their own feet. But what kind of political life is there without

a party? How do you think the process of formation of a multiparty system will go and what are the prospects of your Movement?

[Shevardnadze] I think that we are now undergoing a fairly dangerous period of development of all society. Because the CPSU is actually not functioning, we now face the problem of filling this space. For better or worse, and it was often very bad, all the same the CPSU was a guarantor of stability of society. It is right and proper that the process of departization is underway. It is also right that the CPSU, if it is going to exist, will be put in the appropriate framework. But the lack of any mechanisms, of any strong political mechanisms which guarantee stability, still disturbs me.

In this regard we are laying great hopes on the Democratic Reform Movement. Without ruling out that even in this stage we will begin to create a party. We must define ourselves. A party is needed. I mean election campaigns, election of the president and other organs. Here and in the republics and regions a party is needed, but certainly within the framework of the Movement. The Movement must be preserved. This form will allow us to cooperate with all parties and democratic forces here and locally. We will talk in more detail at the congress.

[Pyadyshev] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, are you not nostalgic for practical foreign policy activities and for the world diplomatic community in which you were so deeply involved?

[Shevardnadze] The position which I now hold, I mean our Movement and the Foreign Policy Association, allows me to be very actively involved with all my colleagues. Active work in the Movement and the party allows me to associate not only with diplomats but also with altogether new people who represent the political parties of different regions of the country. It is very interesting work.

Speaking of nostalgia, it is not nostalgia for a post or position in society. That is not an issue for me.

There is a desire to continue these contacts, these genuinely unique relations which took shape. It is a large circle of people who are very responsible and very interesting. Among them are many unique people. Preserving these ties in the interests of building a new world order is what I dream about. For now it is working out.

There have been so many phone calls in these difficult days! I have gotten the impression that I was on Smolenskiy Square. Baker, Genscher, Prime Minister Major, Dumas, and many others. Support. Schultz sent a telegram when he felt that cruel things could happen here. He wrote, you can count on a very respectable position at Stanford University with housing and everything else provided. It was all very touching. We were different people. Back several years ago we seemed like potential enemies in the military sense, and now there are unique relations.

Baker and his wife called from Wyoming at night, very, very late. They talked with me and my wife. I think about this a lot, how to preserve this for our children and the future generation.

[Pyadyshev] A spontaneous movement arose on Smolenskiy Square for you to return to the MID. How did you react to that?

[Shevardnadze] I am very touched and moved by this attitude of the collective, a collective which I love very much and consider amazingly talented.

I simply love this collective which never let me down—everyone who works there. So I cannot remain indifferent. Naturally, when such an appeal came, I did not give an unequivocal answer, although I used to say that there could be no talk of returning. I have some hesitation. I told the delegation that I cannot say anything definite, I have to think everything through. To me it is a serious step, so take into account that there are no guarantees and no promises.

I interpreted the appointment of Boris Dmitriyevich Pankin as a good thing, since I have known him for a long time. But now the situation is complicated, so he will have difficulties. If you take a person's potential, general worldview, and work experience in the country, the Union organs, the press, and diplomatic area, they all help him to be a good minister. If only the domestic situation allows him to develop and work with the collective.

Incidentally, I very much question the validity of the evaluation of Bessmertnyy's work, of what I would call the unpardonable treatment he received. Whether there were complaints against the minister is another matter, I cannot say. I found nothing in his behavior which would refuse him the right to work in the collective. He acted skillfully and did not join that Committee, although the results of his refusal may be very costly to him. Those are simply my feelings. I respect both the one and the other.

I have the deepest respect for the collective. Yesterday an altogether inexperienced man came, and thanks to this collective he managed to accomplish a great deal, a very great deal. They are not visible right now; it is the type of work where they sit and create and provide ideas and proposals. But then either a minister or a president or someone else utilizes their work. Very often we forget that those thoughts and ideas are theirs. If the new thinking, so to speak, is accepted throughout the whole world, it is to the enormous credit of this collective.

[Pyadyshev] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, you were the godfather to the journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN in its new form. At the very end of 1987 the CPSU Central Committee Politburo satisfied the request of Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko (at that time the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet) to discharge him from the duties of editor in

chief of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN which he had fulfilled for 30 years. The direction of the journal and its content changed.

[Shevardnadze] I follow the journal. I cannot say that I read all the articles, but I follow it quite closely. I believe that now the journal is up to world standards. The depth of ideas, the originality, the study of problems in all their diversity are at a good level. The journal may be considered a landmark in the present situation, in foreign policy and international affairs. I know that the journal is very respected in foreign countries, especially recently. I have been told this in many universities of the United States and the Western countries. That is wonderful.

It is difficult for me to give any advice. But the problems of the Union and the republics and foreign policy are very urgent now. In connection with this, in addition to all those issues which are properly covered, it is precisely this problem which I would make paramount. To help make sure that this process goes forward painlessly. To prevent a situation of confrontation arising between the ministries of foreign affairs of the Union (or any other organ which is formed) and of the republics and between the Center and the sovereign component parts. The treatment of those republics which do not join the new formation is very important. These are domestic problems, it is true, but we can hardly enter the large international arena skillfully without resolving these issues.

And write a bit more about the Association and the Movement.

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### **Soviet Diplomats 'Rightly Fear for Their Future'**

PM0511162991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 5 Nov 91 p 1

[A. Vasilyev report: "Who Rules on Smolensk Square?"]

[Text] A session of the USSR Foreign Ministry Collegium opened at 1000 hours yesterday in the ministry. Boris Pankin, chief of the foreign policy department, delivered a report. According to eyewitness accounts he was noticeably animated and during the 40-minute speech drank several glasses of Narzan [mineral water]. There was something to be concerned about: The USSR Foreign Ministry's future, and that also means our foreign policy's future, is on the agenda.

There is a plan for the Foreign Ministry to be reorganized: The institution of the Council of Foreign Ministers, made up of the chiefs of the republics' foreign policy departments, is to be strengthened and USSR Foreign Ministry personnel cut by one-third—that is, only 2,000-2,500 of the 3,000-plus staff will remain; certain subdivisions of the ministry are to be designated economically accountable organizations (evidently this fate awaits the



consular administration); and the republics' representation in embassies is to be strengthened. A specific example: The candidacy of Andrey Kolosovskiy, RSFSR deputy foreign minister, is being considered for the post of minister-counselor in Washington, where he will protect Russia's interests.

This very plan was due to be considered by the State Council which took place yesterday. There was an understanding to that effect with the Russian leadership. However, while USSR Foreign Minister Pankin was in Madrid at the Near East peace conference, a meeting of representatives of certain republics which had been requested to consider Boris Yeltsin's plan was convened on Staraya Ploshchad, where the RSFSR Foreign Ministry is now located. Conceptually it does not differ from the foregoing. The difference is merely one of figures: Yeltsin proposes to cut the USSR Foreign Ministry by a factor of 10.

In this connection Pankin's speech yesterday contained a reproach directed at RSFSR Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev that the "Russians" broke the previous understanding and, without waiting for the Council of Foreign Ministers session, went to the State Council with their concept. Pankin also reproached his subordinates for their downbeat, panicky mood. However, he did this more because of his position than his conscience: In a situation when a power struggle is going on, many diplomats quite rightly fear for their future.

#### **Constitutional Democratic Party Chairman States Party's Aims**

924B0113A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
30 Nov 91 p 2

[Interview with M. Astafyev, chairman of the Constitutional Democratic Party and RSFSR people's deputy, by B. Nikiforova under the rubric: "In the Parties, Movements:" "The Mistake of Mr. Milyukov"]

[Text] In June of this year the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), also known as the People's Freedom Party (PFP), held its congress. The party is said to have been revived since it considers itself the successor of the party of the same name that existed in Russia from 1905 to 1917. Does this mean that its ideas, goals, and objectives remain, as before, in defense of the interests of the major property owners and entrepreneurs—that is, the bourgeoisie? Our correspondent discusses this subject in the following interview with CDP/PFP Central Committee Chairman and RSFSR People's Deputy M. Astafyev.

[Correspondent] Mikhail Georgiyevich, in view of the diversity of present-day parties, was it necessary to revive a party that went out of existence more than six decades ago?

[M. Astafyev] Yes, it was; it is, and it will be in future. The idea of Russian patriotism must be embodied in our laws and be given a proper place in our public life. Only a prosperous people can bring about a thriving Russia.

Our party stands for Russia remaining Russia but becoming democratic in form. The CDP/PFP was reborn within the framework of the "Democratic Russia" movement. At first we tied our hopes with theirs, and we were cofounders of the movement with them. Our Constitutional Democratic Party is even committed to the name "Democratic Russia." I myself have endorsed it. But we have developed radically different views with respect to the national state structure of Russia. Yu. Afanasyev, cochairman of "Democratic Russia," came out against the "Popular Consensus" bloc, which was established with the participation of the CDP/PFP.

But that is not the main thing. It is very important for us to work out a tactical plan and to determine who our allies are on the basis of past experience. Let us remember that there were 750 Constitutional Democrats, or Cadets, in the whole of Russia, but the fraction in the State Duma had the biggest and most decisive influence. In the third Duma, for example, there were 52 Constitutional Democrats as opposed to 13 Social Democrats. (The Bolsheviks boycotted the elections to this Duma—V. N.) What names they were: Milyukov, Verdanskiy, Gessen, Nabokov, Struve.... These patriots, these members of the intelligensia, went down to defeat because, while on the lookout for enemies to the right, they failed to detect the dangers to the left! Their lack of foresight, along with too little tactical experience, cost them dearly.

[Correspondent] And where do your main differences with "Democratic Russia" lie?

[M. Astafyev] To bring about the rebirth of Russia, they want to systematically transfer Western experience without taking into consideration the particular characteristics or unique qualities of the people, their historic traditions and experience. Whereas we intend to take only that which is viable here and can be assimilated. They have decided that Russia should become a national potpourri or patchwork quilt with frontiers and customs checks. Whereas we stand for a unified, strong, and democratic state; for only a state of this kind can ensure human rights and freedoms. That is why we continue to be called state democrats.

We are committed federalists. We believe that in the situation that exists today, the best option for the various ethnic groups on the territory of the former USSR is a federation made up of Belorussia, the Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan, while maintaining friendly and active relations with the other former republics. It is our deepest conviction that a break between Russia and the Ukraine might turn out to be a tragedy for the whole of Europe. In order to forestall this, the leaders of Russia and the Ukraine must relinquish some of their sovereignty as well as their national pride and seek a means of achieving joint federation in the future.



[Correspondent] It is common knowledge policy is implemented in terms of economics. What is the economic orientation of the CDP&FP?

[M. Astafyev] Socially, we are market oriented. Free enterprise is most fully in keeping with the interests of a free society. But this system presupposes a division between political and economic power. It protects freedom more reliably and in all respects more progressively than does a rigidly centralized and planned economy. Basic to a socially oriented market economy is the right of private ownership of the means of production and of free competition. The state sector must assure the protection of only the most vitally important areas of the economy, such as, for example, power engineering and communications; and it must also serve to stimulate types of activity in which the private sector has little interest or incentive to participate. The state should restrict itself to indirect methods of economic regulation (such as regulation of bank rates, taxes, and import-export duties).

Our credo is: Leave to the state only those things that private enterprise cannot do for itself. Moreover, it is necessary to begin to carry out the announced reforms. Otherwise, this so-called "humane" delay becomes a torture. Why does this happen? Because many of our leaders upon whom everything depends show indecisiveness, as if they wished to spare people suffering—while, in fact, achieving just the opposite. The economy will start to move only after the hands of those committed to free enterprise are untied.

[Correspondent] You mean, the success of reform is tied in your judgment to the market and private enterprise?

[M. Astafyev] Yes. The party will support any business—small-scale, medium, or big. We oppose restrictions of free enterprise and business. Let there be more owners of property. Let there be more millionaires.

[Correspondent] You have written that your objective is "the creation and development of a constitutional system which provides political and economic freedom, based upon the unconditional preeminence of human and civil rights." According to your own statements, however, you uphold the rights and freedoms of one class of private entrepreneurs. Yet not everyone can become rich. What happens to the others—the ones who directly create the material and spiritual values of society? And how does all this tie in with the official designation of the party as "democratic" (or belonging to the people)?

[M. Astafyev] We are opposed to the shameless oppression of the working people. Nor do we condone extreme forms of exploiting the hired labor of people; for this destabilizes society without helping the state to prosper. People who work in the labor market must have their own rights and be protected. But an entrepreneur will always live better than a worker. That is the meaning of life among the classes—rising to the top.

[Correspondent] What about the fund established in the name of Petr Struve?

[M. Astafyev] It is to provide support to entrepreneurs, to publicize the Cadets' historical legacy, and it will be used eventually to finance teaching institutions as well. But not in the near future. For the present, the fund is just getting established. The membership initiation fee is 500 rubles per person and 10,000 rubles for a collective membership. These funds cannot be spent on trifles. They must be used to support the party, because membership dues as of now are miniscule—representing one percent of income.

[Correspondent] Along what lines are intraparty activities organized?

[M. Astafyev] Party groups are created according to place of residence and profession. Then there are local organizations (city and rayon) as well as regional (oblast) organizations. The party is managed by a Central Committee, which meets in plenary sessions three times a year. The ties between organizations are loose. Only the decisions of a party congress are binding upon everyone. Failure to comply with them is incompatible with party membership.

[Correspondent] That is the same historical principle adhered to by the Cadets: freedom with responsibility.

[M. Astafyev] Yes. Within the framework of the party rules and constitution, the party continues to be liberal-conservative. It upholds personal freedom, civil rights, and broad-based self-government. It was, and continues to be, the party of strong statehood and enlightened patriotism.

### **PRAVDA Deplores Anticommunist 'Witch-Hunt'**

*PM0111142591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
26 Oct 91 p 2*

[Albert Petrushov "Pamphlet:" "Dark Days"]

[Excerpts] We must have an innate flaw that compels us to follow bad examples. This inevitably brings to mind the well known saying: No one has ever learned anything from history. Indeed, let us consider what is happening at the moment to the CPSU. Choice abuse of the CPSU is the watchword in the press, radio, and television. When it is rattled off by philistines and hysterical anticommunists, that is understandable. It is quite another matter when our "congressmen" indulge in this kind of mockery.

Not so long ago prominent democrats were nobly indignant at the very mention of the need for trials of certain representatives of the administrative edict system who plunged the country into the slough of stagnation. It cannot be done, it would, they said, be like Stalin's trials in the thirties. But, alas, in no time at all, their democracy soared to such a height that we are all now witnessing Russian Supreme Soviet "hearings" about the

role of CPSU and Russian Communist Party organizational structures in the coup d'etat. As yet only "organizational structures." But, as is well known, appetite grows as you eat. It was no accident that on the very first day of the "hearings" they began to collect deputies' signatures for an appeal to Yeltsin to "disband" CPSU organizational structures. And the most strident parliamentarians do not conceal the fact that a special law banning communist activities in the country is a possibility.

So the word the "freethinkers" have been pussyfooting around for several perestroika years has been uttered. The most logical thinkers among the deputies are suggesting that they not confine themselves to half-measures, but call for an examination not only of the CPSU's involvement in the 19-21 August events, but of its responsibility for the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship in the country. [passage omitted]

In beginning the "witch-hunt" were our parliamentarians not forgetting that they were chosen by the people? Did the people empower them to take it out on the communists? That I do not believe! Soviet people have kept silent so far because they have painful memories of the bloodshed in the civil war and the Great Patriotic War. Through their silence the people are warning the "strident" and the "benighted" not to hamper work, not to darken life, not to poison it with enmity. I am sure they are ashamed of the stupidity of those who repeat over and over the same old motifs.

#### **Western Media's 'Sensational' Treatment of CPSU Finances Faulted**

924B0088A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 12 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Oskin, under rubric: "Today's Sensation:" "A Game According to the Rules, Albeit an Illegal One"]

[Text] Sometimes one is simply astonished by a Westerner's naivete. Certain completely obvious, everyday phenomena and events in our Homeland evoke in him an absolutely inadequate, unpredictable reaction. And that is what has happened also with the revelations of the "secret files of the CPSU Central Committee."

For all of us it is rather natural that the CPSU, in a completely natural and consistent manner, used the ruble, petroleum, and weapons to help all its friends abroad. And this was in complete conformity with logic: the closer and more sincere the friend, the more he will receive, and, conversely, the farther away and particularly the more Eurocommunist he is, the less and less he will receive...

With the publication in our press of the "secret files of the CPSU Central Committee," the Western press has begun printing a large number of sensationalistic articles about Soviet financial injections administered to the fraternal Communist and workers' parties. The most

acute reaction occurred in France. That is not surprising, because, as becomes obvious from the published documents, one of the prominent figures in the FKP [French Communist Party], Gaston Plissonier, not simply received for his party amounts of money in seven digits, but also was a transfer link for the Dominican CP [Communist Party], the Reunion CP, the Guadeloupe CP, the Martinique CP, etc., etc.

The uproar has shifted from the pages of the press to the parliament, where deputies to the National Assembly from the largest rightist parties demanded the carrying out of a special investigation of the methods used to finance the political parties. It was also proposed that a hearing be given to a Soviet journalist. Oil was poured on the fire by the *QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS* newspaper, which, in an article by Jean (Motaldo), informed the public that, after World War II, the French CP had received several billion francs from the CPSU.

The French CP leadership issued a series of denials, in response to which the spiteful French journalists remarked that HUMANITE this year has a tremendous deficit—22 million francs—which arose, in their opinion, after the cessation of the financial aid from the CPSU.

The reaction to the sensational report was less nervous in other countries than it was in France. The Finnish newspaper *HELSINGIN SANOMAT* admitted that the monetary aid given by the CPSU to foreign parties, including the Finnish one, was "a typical and generally known secret." The former head of the Finnish CP, Aarne Saari, who headed it in 1966-1982, confirmed the fact that his party had received financial support for many years from the CPSU and other fraternal parties. He also added that the "cash office of the CPSU international aid" for many years had been headed by CPSU Central Committee secretary V. Ponomarev. The volumes of the financial aid to the Finnish "classmates" had been many millions of marks for many years.

A calm, rational reaction was also demonstrated by the Italian Communists. From the legal point of view, their position is apparently the most irreproachable. After admitting the fact that financial aid had been received from the CPSU for many years, a representative of the Italian CP recalled that, since the end of the 1970's, with the arrival of E. Berlinguer to the leadership of the Italian CP and the break with the CPSU, all kinds of aid from Moscow was discontinued. And that aid had been considerable: according to certain estimates, in 1969 it constituted approximately 15 billion lire. Nevertheless certain structures in Italy that remained in "our" positions continued to receive annually hundreds of thousands of dollars for publication purposes and other types of activity. In each such instance of the transferring of monetary sums, a decision was made by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. It is said that only 25 people in the USSR knew about these operations.

The volume of the fraternal aid was great. At the 25th CPSU Congress, for example, 103 delegations from Communist and workers' parties were present. If one deducts from that number the representatives of the ruling parties from the socialist camp and the socialist-oriented countries, to which the aid proceeded completely legally along open channels, there remain approximately 60-70 addresses that required secret financial support. That list, of course, was adjusted, but the basic consumers—from the Danish CP to the Egyptian CP—remained stable.

The aid, naturally, proved to be given in different ways. In certain instances special couriers with diplomatic passports carried the money in suitcases. In other instances considerable amounts of money were transferred to the accounts of middlemen in third countries.

Certain Western companies and intermediate associations, when carrying out transactions with Soviet organizations and ministries, transferred "commission fees" to local Communist parties. In other instances Soviet enterprises, in accordance with the "highest" instructions, did not transfer their proceeds to the USSR, but instead transferred them to their "classmates." The money, specifically earmarked, was sent to the funds for newspapers and magazines, was deposited in party cash offices in the form of charitable lump-sum payments, etc. In addition, the CPSU kept in its hands a completely legal and civilized means of providing aiding one's friends—subscriptions to newspapers. Without that important source, many leading Western Communist publications would have given up the ghost long ago, although a large part of the printing run of those newspapers in the USSR, as is well known, went "under the knife."

Apart from all of this, the aid showed up in the form of organizing all kinds of courses and seminars, and by on-site personnel training at AON [Academy of Social Sciences, under CPSU Central Committee], VPSH [Higher Party School], and many other "prestigious" educational institutions. Plus the trips across the country. Plus vacations in the Crimea with their families. Plus medical treatment at the 4th Administration of Minzdrav [Ministry of Health]. Plus, plus, and more plus...

Need one add to this that other countries in the socialist camp carried out the same policy, except on a smaller scale, but always in close coordination with the CPSU Central Committee and its international departments.

None of this reveals anything new for a Soviet citizen, just as it is no surprise to anyone that considerable amounts of money were deposited by us to all kinds of "progressive" international organizations, the name of which is legion. And everyone knows of the large number of symposia, festivals, and forums, for which the USSR paid traveling and hotel expenses for a tremendous army of "progressive" delegates and representatives of progressive organizations. And they all "sang" in chorus,

using the score we gave to them... This is an area that can reveal a Klondike of sensational information!

A naive Westerner cannot understand that, in the past, everything in the USSR was decided by the CPSU Central Committee. I propose publishing at some time the minutes of one of the sessions of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. It would become clear from those minutes that not only aid to the parties, but also agricultural operations, the development of new weapons, the awarding of literary prizes and state decorations, the appointments to elected jobs—everything was decided there. And it was done with the formulation: "The Council of Ministers is to be instructed to allocate x million rubles...", "The KGB proposal is to be adopted...", "The Authors' Union is to be authorized to conduct a congress...", etc. Therefore, when naive Westerners speak about the "black CPSU funds," they demonstrate in this manner their complete lack of understanding of the absurd situation that existed in our country until recently. Our entire country was the "black fund of the CPSU Central Committee." The party extracted from that fund as much as it wanted, in the manner that it wanted, for whatever purpose it wanted...

Incidentally, not everyone in the West is as naive as the French parliamentarians. Former CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] director William Colby has stated that he, at least, had known everything about the financing of Western Communist parties by the Soviets. He even mentioned an approximately amount of money—as much as \$50 million for one major party. But even the CIA did not remain indebted. It also withdrew money from America's "black funds."

"We could not allow Italy to remain in the Communists' hands," W. Colby stated. "Because we were providing aid to the Christian-Democratic Party. And that was not all: our money was being distributed among all the parties in the center. If we had not done that, the centrist governments would have been suppressed. We had only one bias: we would not finance rightist forces, monarchists, or fascists. We were convinced that a real skirmish was in progress in Italy between the leftists and the center, rather than between the leftists and the rightists."

Recently, in an interview given to the Italian PANORAMA magazine, he admitted, "Sometimes I myself would drive around Rome in my Fiat, which was crammed full of 'Greens,' and would give money to them..." (the "Greens" being Christian Democrats who were the opponents of the Communists).

Those were the rules for the game played during the era of confrontation and the Cold War. And both warring sides followed its rules. This is understandable. When playing football, one should not give the appearance that one is playing table tennis, much less get confused about what ball to use.

That is why, in my opinion, we should not convert the aid provided by the CPSU to foreign parties into a "Polichinelle [Pulchinello] sensation." It is definitely

time to reveal the true state of affairs. As the expression goes, there is not a lot of truth nowadays. But why become hysterical, gentlemen?...

### **CPSU Financing of European CP's Detailed**

924B0063A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 42, Oct 91 p 3

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY publishes CPSU document on financing European CP's: "CPSU Used State Budget To Finance Its Friends Abroad: Ivashko, Falin, and Hard Currency"]

[Text] Scandals are raging in a number of European countries over the financing of local Communist parties from the CPSU budget. How this was done will become clear from an excerpt from a secret official memorandum sent to CPSU Central Committee Deputy General Secretary V. Ivashko in February 1991. We call readers' attention to the language of the document.

#### **On Past Due Debts to Firms of Friendly Parties**

According to data of the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity, receipts of freely convertible currency in January of this year from the export of goods amounted to 1.4 billion rubles, as against total payments abroad of 2.9 billion rubles, including 2.1 billion rubles in payments on the foreign debt. In February and March, the shortfall of hard currency for servicing the foreign debt will increase by another 1.2 billion rubles.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the country has an enormous past-due debt to foreign firms for goods already supplied to the USSR. This sum stands at nearly 3 billion hard-currency rubles.

Against the backdrop of total indebtedness, total past-due payments to firms of friendly parties are relatively small—about 60.4 million rubles. Of this sum, operations effected by the Foreign Trade Publishing Foreign Trade Association account for 6.6 million rubles; by the International Book Foreign Trade Association, 350,000 rubles; and by the Miscellaneous Exports Foreign Trade Association, 53.4 million rubles.

#### **Options for Resolving This Matter**

As of this time, intergovernmental and interbank agreements have been signed with Japan, France, Italy, Austria, Britain, and Greece or agreement in principle has been reached with them and negotiations are under way on providing the USSR with credits earmarked for payment of past-due debt in the amount of 1.211 billion rubles.

The aforementioned countries also include firms of our friends. In this way, there is a possibility of paying past-due debts with regard to them.

Practical realization of this possibility requires a priority approach to payments on the part of the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity at the direction of the Cabinet of Ministers.

As regards other countries where there are also firms of our friends to which we are in debt (the FRG, Switzerland, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, the United States, Cyprus, Malta, San Marino, and others), there are no similar credit agreements.

A source of payments on our debts to this group of firms could be a portion of the hard-currency resources of "unattached" hard-currency credits from Saudi Arabia (1 billion rubles) and South Korea (563.3 million rubles), with which agreements in principle have been reached on providing us with credits of this type.

The need to urgently resolve matters with respect to firms of our friends is predetermined by the fact that their difficult financial situations and the threat of bankruptcy are upsetting the mechanism for financing the friendly parties themselves and creating a real threat to their continued existence.

A memorandum to Comrade M.S. Gorbachev of June 22, 1990, emphasized that if we now fail to meet our financial obligations to firms of friends, the CPSU will be confronted with the need to look for resources to support friendly parties from the party budget.

Attempts to resolve this matter at the department level are failing to produce proper results.

In our opinion, a political decision by the CPSU Central Committee is required on this matter, with a direct approach to Comrade V. Pavlov.

We ask you to look into this.

Chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department (V. Falin). Chief of the CPSU Central Committee Department of Socioeconomic Policy (V. Vlasov). February 19, 1991.

#### **Information on Payments to Firms of Friends**

In accordance with the USSR Council of Ministers directive of July 11, 1990, PP-28612, the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity made payments on past-due debts to firms of friends. In August and September 1990, the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity paid the following firms:

	in millions of rubles
IT Comercio (Portugal)—Miscellaneous Export Foreign Trade Association	4.4
Metalcim (Portugal)—Light Industry Export Foreign Trade Association	0.3
Numerica (Portugal)—Timber Export Foreign Trade Association	0.6
Globus (Austria)—Foreign Trade Publishing Foreign Trade Association	0.8
Land og Folk (Denmark)—	0.3
OPF (France)—	0.3
Plamben (FRG)—	0.1
Total	6.8

At present, according to reports from Soviet foreign trade associations, total past-due debts to firms of friends stand at:

Foreign Trade Publishing Foreign Trade Association	
Internat. Trading (Japan)	0.5
OPF (France)	0.4
Teti Editore, Editore Riuniti, Ampilcare Piazza, Keilon (Italy)	1.9
Globus (Austria)	2.2
Pergamon Press (Britain)	0.5
Drunhaus [?] Norden, Dyastim [?], Locher [?], Barch Intern. [?] (FRG)	0.4
Koopi [?](Switzerland)	0.1
Avante (Portugal)	0.2
Land og Folk (Denmark)	0.3
Bog-Tryk (Sweden)	0.1
Total	6.6

International Book Foreign Trade Association	
People's Daily World (US)	0.1
Unita (Italy)	0.05
Morning Star (Britain)	0.1
Rizospastis (Greece)	0.1
Total	0.35

Miscellaneous Exports Foreign Trade Association	
Kraus (Austria)	24.6
Papadopoulos (Greece)	3.7
Filias (Greece)	0.2
Agapnu (Greece)	2.0
Fidas (Greece)	1.5
Omega (Greece)	0.3
Rekor (Greece)	0.5
Vek (Greece)	0.3
Delta (Cyprus)	2.7
Kosmos (Cyprus)	0.2
Frey [?] (Malta)	0.9
Farudzhya [?] (Malta)	0.7
Dzharmal [?] (Malta)	0.4

Miscellaneous Exports Foreign Trade Association (Continued)

Borteks [?] (Malta)	1.9
Sport Trend (Malta)	0.4
Imperial Prod. (Malta)	2.9
Andernea [?] (Malta)	0.3
Viska [?] (Malta)	0.5
Inteks Hosery (Malta)	0.5
IT Comercio (Portugal)	1.3
Chechea [?] (Portugal)	2.2
Amorim (Portugal)	0.5
Planco (Portugal)	0.5
Faeda (San Marino)	0.2
Tess (Sweden)	0.4
Sea of Japan (Japan)	3.8
Total	53.4
Total for all firms of friends	60.35

**CPSU Files on Opposition Rumored**

924B0043A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 9 Oct 91 p 1

[Article by Yuriy Petrov: "Secret Lists for the Administrative Elite"]

[Text] Who started this canard can hardly be ascertained now. But it is making the rounds of the newspapers and resonating from screens and on various air waves. Its essence is as simple as an informer's denunciation: the communists were preparing a "night of the long knives" for the democrats. Proof? Certainly. When the CPSU Central Committee buildings were sealed up, files were discovered in one department on all the new political parties and organizations. And those lists contained, allegedly, the names of the leaders of the new parties and movements and their addresses and even their 'phone numbers. So on "D" night take these papers and....

And it is now rare for some distinguished speaker not to transparently hint from rostrums, accompanying the hint with the appropriate quiver in his voice, that he also was on those lists.... And therefore while he is still alive, as it were, bestow on him the halo, if not of a martyr, then of an officially listed candidate for same.

It has a very emotional effect on some people. The mention of telephone numbers and addresses is very persuasive.

I also was affected when I had possession of these lists. Take the following lines, for example.

**Anticommunist League.** A radical-democratic group in Magadan. Founded in 1989 by several members of the radical wing of the "Promotion of Perestroyka" Society. Leaders—Viktor Gridasov and Valdimir Saldusov. Main program demand—the CPSU to be put on trial. In 1990 members of the Anticommunist League in numbers

ranging from six to 20 picketed the obkom building for about two months, collecting signatures for the nationalization of CPSU property.

**Strength**—approximately 15 persons. Number to call: 685000, Viktor Gridasov, 1a, 19 Proletarskaya, Magadan; Vladimir Leonidovich Saldusov, Apt. 20, 36 pl. Gorkogo.

Is this not a target for today's administrative elite? So this is where our friends the free-thinkers live: take them at midnight, before the cock crows thrice, while they are nice and warm—they'll learn what it is to encroach on CPSU property.

Perhaps the address is somewhat closer. In the oldest capital, say. After all, not only the Bolsheviks, even a fool knows that the "night of the long knives" was to have begun not in Magadan but in the center. And what Moscow addresses does this file obligingly offer? Well, what about this—one of a hundred.

**Party of Urban and Rural Proprietors (PGSKh).** The organizing committee of the PGSKh was formed on 10 October 1988 in Moscow on the initiative of "Memorial" activist Valeriy Fadeyev. Aside from V. Fadeyev, the organizing committee includes Sergey Kuzmichev and three or four others. By the end of 1989 the number of members of the PGSKh had grown to 10, then it diminished. In 1990 V. Fadeyev, leader of the PGSKh, became a people's deputy of the Moscow City Soviet from the "Democratic Russia" bloc—since then S. Kuz'michev has usually spoken on the party's behalf (this was how the file originally wrote S. Kuzmichev, without the soft sign, but subsequently, with the soft sign—Ed.). In the summer of 1990 the PGSKh joined the Center Bloc as an observer, in the fall, the "Civic Harmony" Social and Political Council. Number to call: 361-22-53. Nikolay Ivanovich Voronov (responsible for international relations).

Now, dear reader, have I convinced you? Are there still doubters? You have seen these lists? Very well.

And for how much did you see them, my friends?

Just so—for 107 rubles (one hundred and seven) and 50 kopeks.

Sure, published in an edition of 950 copies. By the POSTFACTUM Agency. In Printing Works No. 8 of the USSR State Committee for the Press. And this file is called **"Dictionary of the Opposition. New Political Parties and Organizations of Russia."** And it appeared quite openly in 1991. And, as the publication information says, is available by subscription. "The dictionary contains a description of more than 100 all-Union, interpublic, Russian, national, regional and other parties..." Gleb Pavlovskiy, editor of the publication, says in the foreword.

"And what has the CPSU Central Committee got to do with this?" the alert reader asks.

Nothing. Were there, perhaps, fools wasting time on the compilation of lists which could be obtained by subscription? For 107.50 rubles. And in order to subsequently classify them? They had a somewhat more important purpose—how to throw out General Secretary M. Gorbachev and, subsequently, USSR President M. Gorbachev. And they did, indeed, classify this mission.

Because the further things progressed, the more distinctly Gorbachev realized that perestroyka was not being impeded by the democrats and radicals but that all progressive changes were being blocked by the party upper stratum. The reforms were being successfully blocked also by the "brakes at the middle level," which were refusing to give full rein to the work force and enterprising people both in town and in country. They did not want them to become real owners. And they were doing this "legally," relying on the Brezhnev "developed socialism" constitution.

And the more this was understood by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and president of the USSR, the more firmly he concluded that only the immediate signing of the Union treaty would knock from the hands of the exalted partocracy the "legitimate" grounds for blocking each and everything. Only the realization of the Novo-Ogarevo agreements, according to which the republics will acquire real independence and self-sufficiency, and the center will lose almost everything, would save the country from catastrophe.

And they realized this also. And made haste....

So let us be a little more serious, comrades and gentlemen.

**SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Tofalars**

92UN0077A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 36,  
Sep 91 p 19

[Ethnographic dictionary entry edited by Dr. of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr. of Historical Sciences U.B. Simchenko: Tofalars

[Text] Self-designation **Tubalar**, which means "Tuvinian." The older name of the Tofalars was **Karagas**. According to the 1989 census, there are no more than 731 Tofalars. The Tofalar language is related to the Tuva-Todzhin and is part of the Turkic linguistic family.

The Tofalars are actually part of the Tuva-Todzhin who moved from Tuva to the Eastern Esayans along the upper reaches of the Uda, Biryus, Kan, Gutara, Iya, and other tributaries of the Ob.

The origin of the Tofalars is related to the general processes of the origins of the Tuva people. Initially, the Tofalars were part of the Tuva-Todzhin who appeared north of Tuva. It was only in the last three centuries, when that ethnic group was divided into two parts, that the differences in their languages and culture, which are apparent today, appeared.

The Todzhin found themselves separated from the Tofalars in the second half of the 17th century, when Tuva was ruled by the Dzhungar state. As of then the Todzhin shared the fate of the remaining part of the Tuvinians, being ruled by various khannates and the Chinese empire, while the Tofalars fell under Russian influence.

Starting with the 17th century, the Tofalars were considered part of Russia's population which paid its taxes in sable furs. The tax rate was felt to be quite high, although it was significantly lower than the official tax rate which the Russian population paid to the state. With the coming of the Russians in Tofalar land, so did Buryat families which also established barter relations with the Tofa hunters. The traditional occupation of the Tofas was hunting in the forests. The Tofas were outstanding reindeer breeders. The Tofalars hunted for meat and furs.

The Tofalars became very skillful in working with horns, bones, wood, birch bark, and hides. They made utensils, pipes, skis, and saddle frames, which they sold. The making of birch-bark "candles," which were extensively used in mining work, was particularly important.

The Tofalars were famous for being tireless walkers, who could cover huge distances quickly. In the winter their hunters would walk on their skis for an entire week in hunting fur game. In the summer they crossed treacherous rivers in frail shuttles and rafts which they made on the spot. The reindeer they rode were irreplaceable helpers in taiga tracking.

Usually the Tofalars set up small nomad living areas of three to five tents. The only items they purchased were teapots and cauldrons. Everything else was made by the people themselves—wood and birch-bark utensils, etc. The traditional clothing was made of reindeer skins, for the winter, and reindeer hide treated as suede or elkskin suede for the summer. They also used cloth and Russian fabrics and Buryat felt.

Store-bought bread has been a main staple in Tofalar food. Hunting provided their meat. They ate fish only in summer, when they could catch it in open waters. They drank exclusively reindeer milk or milk for which traded something else. The Tofalars have preserved a number of vestiges of patriarchal-tribal way of life.

The Tofalars professed a multiplicity of traditional cults and remain shamanists to this day.

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**SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Tuvin**

924B0030A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 37,  
11 Sep 91 p 19

[Ethnographic dictionary entry edited by Dr. of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr. of Historical Sciences U.B. Simchenko: Tuvin]

[Text] There has been no single self-designation for the Tuvin. The concept of **Tuvin** appeared following the founding of the Tuva People's Republic, in 1921. The people designated themselves by the names of their families. According to the 1989 population census, there are 206,629 Tuvins. The Tuvinian language belongs to the Turkic family of languages. The Tuvins account for the majority of the population of the autonomous republic which is within the RSFSR. Their origins are quite disparate. They include families whose ancestors were Turkic, Mongol, Samoyed, and Keto-speaking. The predominant elements were the Turkic-speaking families and the Turkic language.

The Tuvins have a great deal in common with the Khakass and the Altay. Some Tuvins are Todzhin reindeer breeders who settled in Irkutsk Oblast and became known as Tofalars.

Tuva is an area with an exceptional variety in natural zones. It includes dry steppes, which are superbly suitable for nomad cattle breeding, and forest-covered mountainous northern areas where hunting and reindeer breeding are widespread.

Between the end of the 16th and the end of the 17th centuries the Tuvins were ruled by the Altyn Khans, after which the son and heir of the first Altyn Khan, Sholoy-Ombo-Erdeni with his subjects fell under Russian rule. He personally, as well as his descendants, constantly violated the oath of loyalty given to Russia, and the Tuvins, who kept rebelling against Russian rule, fell under the power of the Dzhungar state ruled by the



Oyrat princes. The Dzhungar, who were the West Mongolian khans, ruled until 1755, when Tuva was conquered by the Manchurian-Daytsin Chinese Dynasty. In addition to constant material difficulties, the ordinary Tuvian population also suffered from the constant oppression of Chinese merchants and administrators who came to Tuva.

Russians began to settle in Tuva in the first half of the 19th century. In 1911, after the Chinese Revolution, when Mongolia acquired its independence, the Chinese officials were no longer in power and Tuva was freed after a long period of slavery. The working people defeated the administrative apparatus which ran the country for Imperial China. A situation appeared in which the ruling Noyon tried to merge with feudal Mongolia, while the working people, the peasants, saw the adoption of Russian citizenship a way to their liberation.

Tuva's Amban-Noyon turned to Russia with the request to bring in troops and establish a protectorate for the Tuvins. In 1914 the tsarist government assigned a special "commissar" in charge of Uryankhay Kray affairs for the

purpose of granting Russian citizenship to the Tuvins. In 1917 this process was interrupted by the February Revolution; in 1918 a civil war broke out in Tuva, which lasted four years. The People's Republic of Tuva was proclaimed in 1921. In 1944 it was made part of the USSR.

Nomad cattle breeding has long been the basis of Tuva's economy. Agriculture was most primitive. Tents and portable cone-shaped dwellings made of bark were used in this nomad way of life. The Tuvins developed outstanding skills in stone cutting, hide tanning, and making a variety of utensils and other items out of wood. In the north the Tuvins extensively picked wild plants. They collected the roots of Rhagadiolus, which is highly nutritive, as well as Siberian red lilies and the stems of the ramson plant. They stocked substantial quantities of the first two. Furthermore, they also collected cedar nuts and a number of medicinal plants used in Tibetan medicine.

Along with the spreading of Lamaism in Tuva, the population practiced numerous cults and shamanism.

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### KGB Staffer Discusses Intelligence Directorate, Its Leadership

924B0086A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 41, 13 Oct 91 p 16

[Interview with KGB staffer by Nataliya Gevorkyan;  
first paragraph MOSCOW NEWS comment]

[Text] He visited me twice with an interval of nearly two years. I know nothing about him save that he is a KGB intelligence officer. I'm not surprised at his desire to remain incognito—he is not the first and, I think, not the last to ask not to be identified. But why, even after the change of leadership in the KGB, do employees of this department prefer to confide in journalists rather than their new bosses? I want to make one thing clear—the specific character of the agency my interlocutor works for makes it impossible for me to verify the facts. But the committee's new leadership is in a position to do that. They are welcome to question the facts.

[Question] It looks as if intelligence emerged unsullied from the August events. Is that true?

[Answer] I can say for sure that it took no practical part in the putsch. On the other hand, I am convinced that all of Kryuchkov's deputies, including Shebarshin, the intelligence chief, as well as the chief of the security service—Directorate "K," the chief of Directorate "R" (operations planning and analysis—N.G.), and many of Shebarshin's close aides in the intelligence service must have known about the impending events. Moreover, as far as I know Orlov, Kryuchkov's former deputy in intelligence, until recently head of intelligence training, and his deputies quickly compiled a paper in support of the Emergency Committee. It will hardly be possible to find this document. After all, for nearly 24 hours Shebarshin was Acting Chairman of the KGB; after this, I'm afraid, many documents will be missing.

[Question] You clearly do not sympathize with Shebarshin...

[Answer] It is not a case of sympathy or antipathy. I am puzzled by Shebarshin, although in the course of the years I might have realized that many of those under Kryuchkov were to be found wanting in terms of operations planning and research. Intelligence took no part in the August events. But neither should it be forgotten that the document read by Kryuchkov about the so-called agents of influence was drafted by the 1st Main Directorate headed by Shebarshin. Only quite recently, in an interview with the newspaper DEN, Shebarshin himself said that "in many respects we owe the current eruption of ethnic strife... to Radio Liberty and the Central Intelligence Agency which stood behind it..."

[Question] And you believe that if developments had taken a turn in favour of Emergency Committee people, then...

[Answer] Then intelligence would have had to provide materials (rather compromising materials) to back up the

idea about a ramified network of agents of influence, facts about the sale of the motherland, the activities of the CIA, and other far-fetched notions. Incidentally, of late intelligence has been charged with the task of discrediting contacts with our compatriots living abroad. The purpose is to make believe that these colonies are being actively used by the FBI for recruiting agents. The conclusion: contacts with them must be limited.

[Question] But in IZVESTIA the other day one of the intelligence leaders, who gave his name as Vyacheslav Ivanovich, spoke very highly of Shebarshin as a professional.

[Answer] He and Shebarshin have known each other since their student days, when both secretly collaborated with the KGB. In general it's a vicious practice to use squealers subsequently for security purposes or to check future security people through whistle blowing. It must be stopped.

Kryuchkov's policy of selecting personnel puzzled many of my colleagues. Standing close to him were people who had been involved in projects that proved major failures. This is true of Titov (former chief of counter-intelligence), Grushko (former First Vice-Chairman of the Committee) and Shebarshin. If the new leadership reconsiders investigation of traitors who have and have not been shot, all the characters around them will be revealed in their true light. And it will become clear how high-ranking intelligence leaders were able to evade a blow through the efforts of Kryuchkov and his predecessors. This happened to Titov and Grushko in the case of Gordievsky. It is not accidental that a version is being circulated in the KGB to the effect that Oleg Gordievsky was simply given an opportunity to go into hiding so that previous acts of treachery should not be continued, with responsibility borne by the whole British Department. I think that if questions on how Gordievsky disappeared were put to Boyarov, former deputy chief of the 2nd Main Directorate and later chief of the customs service, and Raschepov, former chief of the 7th Directorate, we might understand it all a bit better...

[Question] I've already heard this theory. Could you give me a bit more detail?

[Answer] When Gordievsky came from London to Moscow on a business mission in the mid-1970s, he was summoned by General Golubev and Colonel Budanov (he writes about this in his book)—both from the security service. A summons to see such people would alert even someone quite innocent. But a summons issued to a person suspected of collaborating with a foreign intelligence service is at best professional incompetence. It is said that one of them warned Gordievsky and did everything possible for control over him to be slackened. Most likely this could be done by Budanov, who knew Gordievsky from his work in Britain. It's interesting that after Gordievsky's defection Budanov was promoted and sent as Titov's deputy to Germany, quickly becoming a general...

[Question] And do you have professional claims to make in respect of Shebarshin, too?

[Answer] Shebarshin started his career at the Foreign Ministry and worked as personal secretary of our ambassador to Pakistan. He came into Kryuchkov's field of vision, being the deputy fixed-post spy in India, where the political situation was difficult at the time. The leadership of the network of fixed-post spies was unable to size it up correctly. As a result, the country's leadership was led into error. On a recommendation from our agents in India we gave up Indira Gandhi as a bad job after her first resignation—we ignored her, did not invite her to the embassy, and refused to support her. Shebarshin's boss in India was General Yakov Prokopyevich, one of the authors of the gamble which involved sending troops to Afghanistan and creating a large-scale ramified KGB mission in that country. Subsequently Shebarshin would appoint his son, with no merits in the intelligence service to his credit, to a post usually held by a general. Even before that the whole of intelligence personnel watched in bewilderment as father and son worked in the same corridor. On a proposal from the same Yakov Prokopyevich, Shebarshin was sent to the spy network in Iran. He had an excellent chance to display his erudition, which is undeniable, in that difficult country. While he was there there erupted one of the biggest scandals in the recent history of our intelligence. One of his subordinates by name of Kuzichkin was recruited by British intelligence. Notwithstanding the available proof, Shebarshin continued to give him responsible missions, so that valuable agents were revealed and then—as a chain reaction—many Iranians died and a large number of innocent people were executed.

It was as follows. The recruited Kuzichkin disclosed a valuable network of local agents. The British, who had a stake in complicating relations between Iran and the USSR, smuggled this information to the Iranians. The result was the rout of the Tudeh party. It has been rumoured that by his arrogant and unwise behaviour Shebarshin prodded Kuzichkin towards betrayal. Be that as it may, Kuzichkin simply disappeared. It is known that Shebarshin did not respond to this at once, did his best to defend him, and rejected the idea that he might have been recruited by the British. Shebarshin also misinformed the leadership, persuading them that most likely Kuzichkin had been killed. Later Kuzichkin reappeared, alive and in sound health, in Britain. This whole story is well known in the Committee. For an agent Shebarshin committed a number of unforgivable errors.

Even before this he showed serious lapses. Already, on a spy mission in Pakistan, he was unable to get an insight into his source and the situation. To avoid his arrest, Shebarshin had to be urgently recalled. Following that, he stayed some time at HQ, charged with analysis of cases. A similar story, incidentally, was also true of Titov, when he exposed our valuable agent Treholt.

[Question] Which didn't hinder either Shebarshin or Titov until recently from being among those closest to Kryuchkov.

[Answer] As far as Vyacheslav Ivanovich (whom you mentioned in the beginning) is concerned, he headed a city network of agents in a country of little importance. Then he worked in Pakistan. I haven't heard anything about him achieving outstanding success. Not so long ago, evidently to buttress his prestige, he spread rumours about his close contacts with Dzasokhov and Primakov, hinting at special relations with them. After all, he worked as a deputy, as Shebarshin also did once, at the analytical subdivision. Much can be said about both by General Konstantin Ivanovich, an honest person who was against Kryuchkov's personnel policy, against awarding and promoting former party functionaries, and against corruption. As a result Kryuchkov declared him an intriguer.

[Question] Somehow what you say gives me an unpleasant impression.

[Answer] We can dispense with illusions. The inadequate leadership has managed to spoil a good many things. Unless Bakatin gives the boot to Kryuchkov and Shebarshin's people, beginning with deputy department heads and higher, we shall have no results to boast about. And for the kind of intelligence that we have today I wouldn't give a kopeck, to say nothing of the huge sums in foreign currency it absorbs. Had I been in Bakatin's shoes, I would discuss the theme of intelligence with the generals and colonels who had once been driven out by Kryuchkov... I would analyze operational efficiency and financial matters at such points as Vienna, Geneva, Brussels, London, New York, Delhi, Tokyo and Paris.

Let them take a look at who has lately gone to work in spy network in countries which we have been promoting friendly relations with—to see whether there are no exposed and incompetent intelligence people among them. I bear in mind Japan, France, the United States, Britain, Turkey and especially South Korea (where, according to the latest information, exposed and low-profile intelligence people, primarily the chief, have already left or are preparing to do so).

Intelligence must not be underestimated. Let us recall how objectionable leaders were discredited under Kryuchkov and Shebarshin. Bakatin could ask Yuri Anatolyevich and Yuli Nikolayevich about this. And if they become conscience-stricken they will tell you how the fuss arose around Yeltsin's first trip to the USA, how articles appeared in the press... Both continue working at the 1st Main Directorate.

[Question] Is there a person in intelligence today who could head the service and whom you would treat with respect?

[Answer] Yes, there is. Although I believe that this must be a civilian who has never in his life had any secret collaboration with the KGB. It would be better if this

were an Interior Ministry official who could modify the criteria of the intelligence's information work. There is a need to give up the system of time-serving, the instant, superficial and unauthentic information provided by Kryuchkov and his entourage. Intelligence must deal with problem information and be instrumental in working out long-term orientations predicated on our country's political and economic interests.

[Question] Maybe Primakov's candidature is really quite suitable?

[Answer] He would be suitable due to his understanding of the problems involved and his prestige abroad. But I believe his contacts in the Committee with people like Vyacheslav Ivanovich, Kirpichenko (deputy chief of intelligence) and Solomatin (former deputy chief of the 1st Main Directorate) will create difficulties for him in objectively selecting personnel, independent decision-making and organizing routine operational work.

[Question] If you went to see Bakatin instead of me, this discussion would be more useful...

[Answer] Intriguers eager to square accounts are already flocking to see him. I wouldn't like to be amongst them. I have no doubts about his good intentions, but I am afraid that the absence of professionalism and detailed knowledge of operational work, personnel, the atmosphere and situation in intelligence will be a hindrance for him.

It has also occurred to me that an attempt may be made to manipulate him. What do you think he should do?

In addition to what I have said before, if I were him, I would take a look at what kind of people from the party apparat hold key posts. The attitude towards them has always been negative in the Committee. Moreover, many have furthered this by their own activities. Rank-and-file personnel were bewildered by the activities, for example, of N. Nazarov and A. Pechko, secretaries of the intelligence party committee. If young agents who worked abroad informed them of our people's financial and other abuses in other countries, it is they themselves that suffered, as a rule, not those who practised the abuse. You understand, even young boys who come to us get a crippled mentality because they have seen abuses and impunity. Incidentally, Suplatov and Ageyev, former secretaries of the party committee, also preferred not to react...

[Question] You mentioned youth, I would like to return to the beginning of our conversation—to Orlov who until recently headed the intelligence training establishment. To my mind, the question of who trains intelligence personnel, and how, is of no small importance.

[Answer] His leadership in intelligence once came to the conclusion about the inadvisability of using him abroad. He was patently below the mark. After some time he became secretary of the party committee and deputy chief of the intelligence in charge of personnel. To

believe hearsay, Orlov became kindred with Yemakhonov, former First Vice-Chairman of the KGB. He was sent as an agent to a large country. And there something incredible in intelligence history occurred. After a year or a year and a half of work he was recalled from that country on the ambassador's insistence—for political immaturity and operational incompetence. The master spy being kicked out of the country at the ambassador's request—it's all wrong... And it is this bankrupt spy that headed the training establishment.

The country needs intelligence and there is a need to think about its future and that of the honest guys who work in it. I have spoken a lot about the past, but only because decent people will simply not be able to work in the KGB if we don't get rid of our legacy and the fear that everything will continue as before.

[When this material was ready for print it was reported that Yevgeny Primakov had been appointed chief of intelligence and Bakatin's first deputy.]

#### **'Top Secret' Program Interviews Former KGB Agent**

*LD2411131791 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 23 Nov 91*

[Interview with former KGB agent Mikhail Petrovich Lyubimov by "Top Secret" presenter Artem Borovik in the "Top Secret" studios; date not given; from the "Top Secret" program—recorded]

[Text] [Borovik] I would like to introduce you to Mikhail Petrovich Lyubimov, a constant contributor to the newspaper SOVERSHENNO SEKRETNNO [TOP SECRET] and a person who recently wrote the novel: "I Ad Sledoval Za Nim" ["And Hell Followed Him"] about the KGB. This book created a big stir in our country. He is also a person who for over 20 years worked in the KGB, in its first chief directorate; in other words, in intelligence, foreign intelligence. [Video shows Borovik in studio with Lyubimov]

You were resident in Copenhagen and in London for a time. Oleg Gordiyevskiy was your deputy for a while. Mikhail Petrovich, I have just one question for you. People who would otherwise have qualified as traitors and have been sentenced to capital punishment are now presenting themselves as heroes and as people who were attempting to break down a criminal regime. They are placing themselves in the same category as human rights defenders and dissidents of the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's. Do you regard these people as heroes, or do you have a different attitude toward them?

[Lyubimov] I think that they cannot be numbered among the human rights defenders and campaigners for democracy. In their place, I would not even begin to attempt place myself in the same category with those outstanding people who were imprisoned and who sacrificed themselves.

[Borovik] But they were also trying to bring about the downfall of what they term a criminal regime. Perhaps they did more tangible damage to it.

[Lyubimov] I seriously doubt whether they did more tangible damage. We must look at the actual circumstances of their recruitment; not at what they are claiming, but at how it was in reality. We are well aware that individuals are motivated by self-gain and other circumstances. That is very obvious. It is another matter whether they are so willing to offer themselves. At the same time, I do not deny that among them there are seriously ideologically committed individuals.

Nevertheless, espionage is a dirty phenomenon. One should not grab and wave the banner of democracy and consider that working for foreign intelligence is something of great value. One can struggle wonderfully well against a regime without relying on foreign intelligence. This has been proven by the examples of Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, Orlov, and many, many others.

[Borovik] What do you think should be done? There are many people still in prison—people who have betrayed the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. What do you propose?

[Lyubimov] First of all, I propose that the cases of all those still in prison be reviewed.

[Borovik] And that they be pardoned?

[Lyubimov] No, I do not mean that. They need to be viewed publicly. Perhaps some of the cases were fabricated. Perhaps there is too little proof. One needs to take a fresh look at all of this, make the process open, invite journalists, and deliver a verdict involving the public. The best solution, in my view, would be a major political gesture made both by Western governments and by our own government; that is, we would release all of their spies who are imprisoned in our country and they would release all of ours.

Incidentally, there are many more such people in Western prisons than there are in our own. It seems to me that this would be a very noble gesture which would to some extent help do away with the spy mania that still exists in our countries.

[Borovik] Mikhail Petrovich, I can understand when there are calls for the release of prisoners of war. Surely you are not prepared to put these people on a par with people who have been captured as a result of combat actions?

[Lyubimov] Yes, I am, generally speaking. As I see it, there was the Cold War and a very strong confrontation. Now the governments have been reconciled and a process of rapprochement is under way. People were carrying out the will of their governments. What are we saying? Now the governments are embracing each other, while these people are in prison serving out their sentences. Is this just?

[Borovik] Is it just then to accuse Thatcher and Gorbachev of everything and to promote these people to the rank of martyrs?

[Lyubimov] [laughs] No. I am not proposing promoting anyone to anything. I simply want all of them to be released so that society might now feel at ease and understand that the Cold war between East and West is over. We should no longer recruit agents in the West, and the West should not recruit agents here. That is my idea. It would help to consolidate our relations with the West.

[Borovik] Well, it only remains for society now to ponder your advice. Mikhail Petrovich, thank you very much. I hope that this will not be your last visit to our "Top Secret" studio. Thank you.

[Lyubimov] Thank you.

### **Tizyakov Accused of Corruption in Running Missile Plant**

*92UM0167A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Nov 91 p 2*

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Correspondent V. Sanatin, Yekaterinburg: "Paper Intermediate Range Missiles Catch Up With Tizyakov at Matrosskaya Tishina"]

[Text] I have learned from confidential sources at Sverdlovsk UKGB [Administration of the State Security Committee] that A. Tizyakov, one of the coauthors of the August putsch, was not only an experienced political plotter but also an experienced swindler in the economic sphere.

No, the former director of the plant imeni Kalinin did not sell intermediate range missiles on the black market. The former director simply... added missiles to the inventory on paper.

I cite a document: "After 20 missiles that had been manufactured in 1984 had been remarked, the customer paid 326,000 rubles each for them, according to certificates No. 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, and 24 dated February 28, 1985 and No. 64 dated March 30, 1985, and also accounts No. 40 dated March 1, 1985, No. 41 dated February 28, 1985, No. 43 and 44 dated February 28, 1985 and No. 71 from March 1, 1985. Throughout the first stage. And in April 1985 during the second stage, they were presented and paid for and once again entered into the inventory of the enterprise and military mission."

Here I catch my breath. I am stunned by the "profit" of the swindle—R6,520,000. For 20 paper missiles!

But I am even more stunned by the accuracy of the KGB document: "Entered into the inventory of the enterprise and military mission." What does this suggest? The fact that Tizyakov entered into secret deals and agreements with the military long before the putsch and that is obviously why he ended up among those chosen.

The financial affairs of putsch participant Starodubtsev are already well known. The organs prefer not to dwell at great length upon Tizyakov. It is a pity that trivial swindlers and lovers of the "green snake" intended to bring discipline and order to the country. But it is twice the pity when you know that this document has already been lying for a long time on the desk of Russian State Security Service Chief V. Ivanenko. It is lying there and not going anywhere.

One can only guess why Ivanenko is silent. This document did not get to Moscow from the hands of the official leadership of Sverdlovsk UKGB. This document, like a visual aid on the spinelessness of law enforcement organs, was sent to the commission that had arrived from Moscow, from Ivanenko, to investigate the opposition of 64 that had developed in Sverdlovsk UKGB. The commission was in Sverdlovsk in January, long before the putsch. And long enough before the putsch it could have said who was who, beginning with Tizyakov. But obviously it was more important for the commission to investigate the democratic opposition in the monolithic ranks of the secret department. The KGB opposition was later summoned to Kryuchkov and reeducated. And they modestly forgot about the Tizyakov affair....

Right now it would not be a sin to ask Sverdlovsk UKGB Chairman E. Boytsitskiy why Directorate Agent V. Berdnikov, who dug up the affair with the missiles, was initially removed from the staff and later terminated. According to the unofficial calculations of the democratic opposition which also did not destroy Sverdlovsk UKGB, they have submitted reports on the dismissals of 47 agents during the last six months.

I think that the most important KGB investigations that are being shelved by the leadership are increasingly finding their way into the major press for this reason alone. If secrets of the most secret state department are simply fermenting among the bushes and basements—this means one thing: the department as before is serving a narrow clan. Dozens of agents are suffering from the duplicity of the situation: they would like to serve the people but they have to clean house on the sly and clean the "boss's" kennel. And when you have walked on the "boss's" floor—leave.

"... We are seeing a dual entry of 9M82 items in the inventories for 1984-1985 which may be categorized by Article 152 (annotation) of the RSFSR Criminal Code on accounting entries and other distortions when fulfilling plans... the obviousness of the advisability of dismantling finished items for those being assembled for research work at 'Novator' SM [expansion unknown] Design Bureau indicates the premeditated violation of financial discipline at the level of SPO [Scientific Production Organization] 'MEIK' [expansion unknown], 'Novator' SM Design Bureau, USSR Ministry of Defense VP [expansion unknown] 1219 when the customer paid for items."

A. Tizyakov was this 'innovator.' Sverdlovsk KGB agents have known this for five years and have hidden this for five years. Besides former Agent V. Berdnikov, the document was signed by KGB Agent V. Yeroshenko who still works in the organs at this time and who has just been transferred from the Urals to Kazakhstan. "I concur with the conclusions," wrote V. Yeroshenko, former USSR UKGB subunit chief for Sverdlovsk Oblast, on May 26, 1986.

Five years have passed, Mister law enforcers! What whales have taken a bath with impunity in state finances. How proudly they swam past the eyes and ears of the KGB and past the naked and disrobed people, heaven knows whom the people believed would protect their national wealth....

#### **Trubin, IZVESTIYA Comment on OMON Deputy Chief Parfenov's Deportation**

924B0085A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Nov 91  
Union Edition p 3

[Statement by Nikolay Trubin, USSR procurator general, and excerpts from the diary of OMON Officer Sergey Parfenov, followed by editorial comment: "How Sergey Parfenov Was Arrested and Taken Out of the USSR"]

[Text] In its issues No. 248 and 258 IZVESTIYA expressed its opinion regarding the arrest and extradition of Sergey Parfenov, former Riga OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] member, who was transported from USSR territory under the escort of Latvian guards. In a conversation with our correspondent, Jasep Ancans, Latvian deputy procurator general, promised to issue an official statement presenting the grounds for Parfenov's arrest and deportation. IZVESTIYA was planning to print it, accompanied by a legal commentary. However, the editors have never received this statement.

Today we are publishing two documents: a statement by USSR Procurator General N. Trubin, containing a legal analysis of the events, and the arrested man's diary, which he sent to IZVESTIYA.

No, our newspaper has not changed its attitude toward the Riga OMON. We publish excerpts from Sergey Parfenov's prison diary not because we consider this diary a human document of high quality. In our opinion, the author's attempt to present himself as a romantic figure will not evoke sympathy among the readers. Something else is at issue here. OMON has been, to an equal degree, both an instrument and a victim of a system of complete lawlessness. This does not remove personal responsibility from those who permitted themselves to be used in provocations against Latvia and Lithuania; who burned custom posts and humiliated and beat up people; and who by their actions incited enmity between the peoples and contributed to the disintegration of the Union. OMON soldiers deliberately chose to serve the forces of lawlessness and arbitrariness, and they have to answer for their actions.

Our task, however, is not only to make sure that the law is observed even in regard to those who violate it. Society cannot feel itself safe if the actions of those who carried out the provocations end up being the sole item at the center of attention in the investigation and trial. The hasty willingness to extradite OMON members, even at the cost of humiliation for Russia, makes one think that there may be a desire to either distance oneself from, or buy off cohorts when they are no longer needed. Neither the Russian, nor the Latvian state should accept the simplified approach to this matter that is being offered to them by overly zealous servants of Themis [Greek god of justice].

#### Statement by the USSR Procurator General

Lately the mass media has been widely discussing the issue of the extradition of USSR citizen S. Parfenov to the authorities of the Latvian Republic. In this connection, the USSR Procuracy has conducted a legal analysis of this juridical fact.

The actions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Procuracy of the Latvian Republic have been found to be illegal and in contradiction of both internal legislation and the norms of international law. The USSR Law on USSR Citizenship has established: A USSR citizen cannot be extradited to a foreign state.

The state independence of the Latvian Republic was recognized on 8 August 91 by a special ukase of the RSFSR president, and ratified on 6 September 1991 by a resolution of the USSR State Council: "On the Recognition of Independence of the Latvian Republic." Since then, the Latvian Republic has been a foreign state in relation to the USSR and the RSFSR, which requires that relations between them must be based on interstate agreements... For its part, Russia has defined the basis of its interstate relations with the Latvian Republic by signing a respective treaty with it. Article 8 of this treaty stipulates that "reciprocal extradition of criminals is regulated by a special agreement between the parties." However, such an agreement has not been signed yet, and the treaty itself has not been ratified by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and is not yet in effect...

...Under these circumstances, the arrest and removal of a USSR citizen from RSFSR territory should be regarded as a gross violation of USSR and RSFSR sovereignty and of the constitutional rights of their citizens. In this situation, all measures envisaged by the law should be applied to have S. Parfenov returned.

If the Latvian Republic Procuracy has in its possession materials regarding Parfenov's criminal activities, they may be submitted to the RSFSR Procuracy to determine the issue of his culpability, as is done in such cases in civilized countries when not otherwise stipulated by interstate agreements.

[signed] Nikolay Trubin

#### From the Prison Diary

...Well, I have calmed down somewhat and subsided. Now I can describe my tribulations. So, Riga, Investigative Detention Facility No. 1, cell 452. Solitary. How did it all happen?

8 October. Surgut... There were 10 OMON people working here at the Administration of Internal Affairs. Just recently the guys and I returned from a raid along the Ob. There is complete lawlessness and a cult of cruelty there. It turns out that there are still places in Russia, at the end of the 20th century, where even the militia cannot tread...

In the morning, we were again preparing for a raid. As usual, were busy resolving "selfish" issues: the boat, fuel, and food. I was running around in the OBKhSS [Department for Combating Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation]. Sometime during the lunch hour we got "invaluable" instructions from the chief of the Administration of Internal Affairs, Colonel Khismatulin: take the group and position it near the prison camp. In case of mass unrest, he said. I had no objections, of course. My group, however, looked like a gang: My guys had come in that morning, some dressed in uniforms, some in street clothes. I myself was wearing sweat pants, a sweater and undershirt, and a fatigue jacket—I was prepared to load the equipment for the raid.

In short, we were brought to the prison camp without equipment, without uniforms, weapons, or special equipment. I thought at that point: Something is wrong here. But I chalked it off to the stupidity of local bosses. How can 10 people without weapons, shields, and special equipment contain the "zone"?

At about 1800 hours an order came on the field radio: I and Lieutenant Colonel Kleshchinskiy, Administration of Internal Affairs representative, are summoned to the Administration of Internal Affairs chief. All right. We arrived at the Administration of Internal Affairs in a car specially sent to fetch us, and went up to the second floor. A local lieutenant colonel came out of the reception area and literally dragged Kleshchinskiy into the corridor, saying: "This is an urgent matter!" I went to reception alone and started to wait for Kleshchinskiy. Only now do I recall that there were, I think, three people in the reception area, including the secretary, and all of them had a sort of frightened, intrigued look. Khismatulin came out of his office and went to his deputy's office, snapping as he went: "Come in." When I went in, the chief was sitting at the table. Silently. There were some other people in the office, but I did not realize the significance of their presence. I was burning with the desire to tell the chief what I thought of him. Because of him, the group had not been able to do normal work for two days. If he did not need us, I wanted to say, we would immediately move to Tyumen. God, at that time I still thought we were needed in Tyumen!

I quickly approached the table, standing practically next to it. And then I felt my hands being twisted behind my back. Not very powerfully. Honestly, I thought it was a joke...

The chief somehow suddenly turned pale. I said, half-lying on the table: "Enough joking," and felt handcuffs lock on my hands. Then I understood: a trap. But it was too late. I thought: If they are taking me right here in the Administration of Internal Affairs, it means that Russia has been informed, Moscow has given a "green light." It is better not to resist any more, I decided, that is what they are waiting for. Am imposing man with glasses appeared from somewhere on the left; I remembered meeting him somewhere. Do not remember who he is. Khismatulin quickly extricated himself from behind the desk and left the room.

There were several young guys and this one, with glasses, left in the room. I asked: "Who are you?" "We are from Latvia." And they showed me an arrest warrant. I looked at the articles and cringed: 102-1, 72, and 63. All right, exceeding the given authority, but what about banditry and sabotage?..

This was the moment when I came close to hysterics. We had been assured on all levels, from Deputy Minister Karpochev of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, to General Bashatin, chief of the Tyumen Oblast Administration of Internal Affairs, and including Latvian Prime Minister Godmanis. There was the Union—and there were its orders. Now it is independent Latvia. Just leave, we had been told, and everything will be settled. I had honestly complied with their terms. I had stopped the war, there is not anybody's blood on my hands. And now... Such a betrayal...

Two in the group had handguns, and one also had an automatic weapon. Should I soak them? I was sitting on a chair. The one with the automatic weapon was standing on my left. I could easily reach his groin with my foot. His mate, with a handgun in his hand, was sitting a little further away and more to the right—after hitting the first one with my foot I could try to reach the other one to deliver a blow to the temple with my left foot. I made a quick appraisal: It should work. At least one would end up on disability. Their chief (it turned out it was Colonel Lebedev) was sitting in a chair. I decided I would figure out what to do with him later.

But I did not "pee" on them. I remembered my children, my wife, my guys. I realized: During a "war" nobody cares about my family and children... The guys. Nine big strong men. I am not saying that I was a tsar and a god to them, but I did earn their respect. I could not guarantee that they would not try to avenge the death of their commander when they learned that he had been "worked over." When these guys are in "combat" mode, only victory or death can stop them. They would not win here, but they could take over the Administration of Internal Affairs building and hold it to the death...

I asked Lebedev: "Are you going to arrest my guys?" He said that I was the only one they were taking. This decided everything...

I was taken to the street through the back door of the Administration of Internal Affairs. I was transported out with such an honor guard that I even felt flattered. They activated the Administration of Internal Affairs special assault team. When the guys saw who they were told to escort, their eyes nearly popped out. The bus came. The local escorts were looking out the windows (although they were covered), or straight ahead, or studied their feet. Only the "rangers" from the Latvian Republic watched me unflinchingly.

They led me through the entire airport lounge in handcuffs. And one puppy hid his automatic gun under his arm so unprofessionally that it only attracted more attention to him and the weapon. I asked him: put your "shredder" away, I am not going to make trouble, I promise. They did not believe me... Boarded the aircraft through a separate entrance. It was clear to me just from the way the militia was treating the escorts that the highest Ministry of Internal Affairs structures had been activated. Those on duty were almost tiptoeing, climbing out of their skin to send off the dangerous cargo faster. The report that we were on our way and the information on ground arrangements was transmitted directly from the aircraft.

We landed in Domodedovo. Lebedev went to his department and soon returned. Announced happily that the car had gotten on its way 30 minutes before. From his conversation with the escorts I deduced that they had already been on this assignment for a week. They had stayed for several days in the Latvian Republic representation in Moscow. I even remember the address: 3 Chaplygin Street. We were taken to Sheremetyevo in a white Volga. From the driver's conversation with Lebedev I established that the car was from the motor pool, belonged to the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs...

There were no tickets for Riga available; the chief of transportation militia helped acquire them. The rest of the trip went without particular adventure.

So here it is, Riga Investigative Detention Facility No. 1. Our group had been summoned here on alert a few times, and it was here that we had brought people under arrest. And now here I was myself as a prisoner...

I sat down on the bed, head in my hands, and started thinking. To be honest, I thought about suicide. But then realized: This should have been done earlier. Now it would only be a sign of weakness.

They brought me supper—soupy potato mush, boiled fish, tea without sugar... Promised to provide a sheepskin coat to replace the confiscated fatigue jacket...

It was mostly a sleepless night. The cell was damp, and the air in it stale...



**10 October.** I do not know what time I woke up. The light is on round the clock, of course. I got up and exercised to the point of exhaustion. Cannot get very far in this gymnasium, of course...

After breakfast—half a loaf of black bread, a quarter of a white bagette, two spoons of sugar, a mug of tea, and again something liquid made of potatoes—I was taken to the interrogation... The investigator was Vilma Eduardovna Upmace. A trim, neatly dressed elderly lady. Puffed like a steam engine, though. I was made familiar with the charges. I tried to find out in what way my banditry had manifested, and what kind of sabotage I had committed. It turned out that this poor, unhappy investigator Upmace, a former "distinguished jurist of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic," had been nearly forced to sign a warrant with such articles. Who? Deputy Procurator General Ancans. I tried to ask: What about this highly promoted justice, democracy, and impartiality? Did not get any answer. We talked for a long time, about everything and nothing in particular. And then it came out in the conversation—"Medininkai." That tragedy at the Lithuanian border post. Those poor customs guards shot to death. And a question: Where was I at that time? Then I understood: They want to "hang" these bodies in Medininkai on us, the Riga OMON. And here right away Upmace lets this revelation "slip out." She disliked very much, she said, going to the prison to conduct interrogations—only went to those who admit their guilt. Then, she said, one could talk about release on one's own recognizance. Perhaps, this is no pressure? Maybe I simply misunderstood something. But to suggest something like this to a desperate man is to push him into self-incrimination!

All right, the conversation continued. I brought up the negotiations between Chairman of the Council of Ministers Godmanis, Minister of Internal Affairs Vansis, and OMON Commander Mlynnik. We had been promised: Those not guilty of bloodshed (and we said we were not) would be left alone. Upmace made big eyes and said that she did not know anything about it. Promised to find out...

**12 October.** Called for interrogation again. This time Upmace was alone. Last time I refused to have a lawyer present at interrogations. When a lawyer starts yelling at a defendant, and he is not surprised that the warrant contains two extra articles (in a category that could lead to the death penalty!), none of which are even mentioned in the charges, then, as Ozerov used to say, "we do not need this kind of hockey." We talked for a long time—it was almost dusk when I left the investigator's office. Again, mostly talked about small stuff: biography, OMON service, and such.

Upon returning to my cell, I discovered an issue of NEATKARIGA ZINJA, with an article "Arrest." About me. With all the details. It was only yesterday that Upmace kept assuring me that in the interests of the investigation they were not going to release any information to the press...

They brought another newspaper—about our life in Tyumen. It was all mixed up: half truth, half lies...

The boys had decided: This was it. We were not fighting wars anymore. Both the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Latvian Republic Government promised: Do not get into anything from 21 August on, and everything will be fine. You will get out in an orderly and dignified way, and you will have a normal life and normal jobs. The group has never broken its word. We forgot that we were dealing with Politics. They play by their own rules.

It looked like somebody was very upset that the OMON did not want to fight wars anymore.

Our goal was to preserve the Detachment and to start normal work. Seemed like we got a start—in Tyumen. If the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs believed that the entire 100 people would start sobbing at the sight of Tyumen and would confess in unison that they had been dreaming about living there all their lives, they were wrong. We told the boys: Look around and do what you think is best, you are free people. We did not try to detain anybody, or get rid of anybody (actually, this is not true, we did get rid of two or three drunkards, and 12-15 people left on their own, four of them in a rather ugly way). Nevertheless, the detachment started living a normal life. Many called their families in. I was also expecting mine to come...

After the interrogation, I was taken back to the cell. There was soup and gruel waiting there. I ate the soup. Told myself: 'Have to!' As for the gruel... This was more than I could force myself to do... Then I was taken for a walk—in the inner yard, under the open sky, the top of the yard covered with three layers of metal mesh. I was walking, filling my lungs to the limit, sang songs, loudly recited verse...

**13 October.** Unless I am mistaken, I will only see the investigator on Tuesday.

**15 October.** I think today is Tuesday. I will check with the guard on duty. Perhaps, I have miscalculated...

**17 October.** The main happening these days is that I have not been called for interrogation anymore. Complete isolation. An old and rather reliable trick. To leave a person alone in four walls, make him feel the constant pressure of these walls, leave him alone with his thoughts... Just say "yes," sign everything they want you to sign. Then this nightmare will be over. You will be allowed to go home..."

#### From the Editors

We do not want to interfere with the investigation in any way—it has to sort things out in detail on its own. If Sergey Parfenov, deputy commander of the former Riga OMON, is guilty, he should be punished. This is beyond argument. Another matter is to observe all necessary legal formalities.

In principle, a state does not extradite its citizens to another state, with the exception of extraordinary cases stipulated by bilateral agreement. For instance, airplane hijacking. The Latvian authorities know this very well. Of course, this is an extremely exceptional case. There are no legal procedures envisaged for it. Therefore, the extradition of the citizen from one state to another state is clearly illegal.

Is a legal solution possible that would pacify public passions on both sides? Yes. The Russian authorities could pass a special act on the procedure, vesting the court with appropriate powers. After this, the court, with the participation of both sides, would deliberate as to whether there are grounds to institute criminal proceedings. If yes, it then would decide: either to put the accused on trial here, or to extradite. The final decision on extradition, however, would be made only by the highest state authority or, at its direction, the organs of justice. There are probably other possible procedures, but in any case they must be legal.

Had these legal norms been observed, the Parfenov affair would not have produced such reverberations. The statements of the USSR Procuracy and the RSFSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which contain a principled appraisal of the events, give reason to believe that the legal norms, previously violated, will be restored. This will be fair, whether Parfenov is guilty or not. In a democratic society, the law applies to everybody, including, of course, also those who are suspected of crime.

#### **Inquiry Into 1954 Disappearance of Labor Leader Requested**

*LD2211150791 Moscow TASS in English 1227 GMT  
22 Nov 91*

[Text] Moscow November 22 TASS—Vadim Bakatin, chairman of the Interrepublican Security Service (Former KGB) was officially asked to clear up the fate of Aleksandr Trushnovic, a leader of the National Labour Union, TASS learned today from Moscow "POSEV" editors.

"POSEV" claims Trushnovic was "kidnapped by Soviet secret services in Berlin on April 13, 1954". He has not been heard of since.

The National Labour Union and "POSEV" were strictly banned in the Soviet Union in the Brezhnev years and were labelled "Slanders of the Soviet way of life".

The official request was addressed to Bakatin by an independent public organisation bearing the name of Aleksandr Trushnovic. Its representatives said they see nothing now that can impede any investigation into Trushnovic's mysterious disappearance.

#### **Draft Law on Economic Amnesty Hit**

*924A0164A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 6 Nov 91 p 2*

[Article by Natalya Kozlova: "Swindling With a Spelling Error, or for Whom the New Law Is Being Written?"]

[Text] The draft law of the USSR "On the Amnesty of Persons Convicted of Economic Crimes and Abuse of Official Position," the text of which came into the editors possession, misspells the word "swindling" throughout. But this is trifling! The important thing is that this long-awaited draft has finally been produced.

It is, of course, a matter for the specialists to analyze the law thoroughly and in its entirety. Nevertheless, it is worth even for a nonprofessional to point out certain provisions. Article 92 is summarily being excluded from the Criminal Code, albeit temporarily. It defines as a crime misappropriation, embezzlement, and theft by means of abuse. As I understand it, the new law is supposed to help entrepreneurship to flourish. What these articles have to do with an entrepreneur is not known. There is something else, however, that we learn from the text. It is easier to show it by an example. A worker stealing a box of booze worth several tens of rubles from his factory is subject to criminal charges. At the same time, a foreman or a director sending out boxcars of the same booze "on the side" is not liable at all under the new law.

The further we go, the more interesting it becomes. Bribery now becomes completely unpunishable. Extort as much as you want, and take as much as you can. For instance, for "your own" business. Or for services. No responsibility. Is that not great? Only let us not forget for whom it is great.

I remember having to write sometime in the past about a certain post office manager. She used to, as they now say, "privatize" pensions of deceased or hospitalized pensioners. Although the pensions are not all that much, when you collect a little from many, quite a substantial sum accumulates. Under the new law her actions—theft by means of abuse—are not punishable. And this is not all. The money, which the manager had to return—not quite willingly—now belongs to her in its entirety. According to the draft of the new law. Just imagine how wonderful it looks: Not only is it prohibited to confiscate the money that does not belong to swindlers, but, on top of that, if by chance one such person had not been put in jail before the new law went into effect, the entire amount has to be returned. The law does not say anything, however, about apologies and a blue-edged platter. An oversight. It should also envisage the procedure for returning the money. Except, judging by everything, platters would not suffice anymore. The size of filched sums sometimes is so substantial that it may be a good time to start producing blue-edged boxcars.

Let us go on reading. Producing defective goods is no longer punishable now. Hurrah! Let a defective reactor

explode, a shoddily made pipe burst—so what? Even death resulting from such defective products is not a reason for initiating criminal proceedings. So you and many others may have tried a certain food product and did not survive, or became disabled for the rest of your life—this does not bother anybody.

In general, the terminology of the law is quite strange. It uses only one term: "economic specialist." Frankly, I am put off by such terminology. The only place I had encountered it was in a zone. There, they used this language: a pickpocket, an economic specialist... But this is not even the main point. There is an attempt to almost completely remove from our law all (!) economic crimes. Ostensibly on a temporary basis at first. Although we know that the most permanent thing is the temporary one. What is there to say: Again, we have found ourselves "ahead of the entire planet." This is not an exaggeration. There, abroad, all services diligently protect the life and

health of the consumer. We have poorly protected it in the past. Now we will not protect it at all. Americans, for instance, even have a term "commercial bribe." It weighs in quite heavy on the scales of justice. And the abuse of official position is punishable, too.

Generally such a massive assault on the entire chapter of our code inspires some contemplation. For whom, and in the interests of what group, will this law be passed if it goes through in its current form? I do not think that among the 10,000 prisoners subject to proposed amnesty the majority is comprised of exactly those people for whose sake we have been waiting for this law.

Something else. Amnesty means forgiving. The authors of the draft, however, propose to remove all convictions from amnestees' records. From all of them. En masse. What remains to do is to invite the author to the curtain. He deserves the applause.

### **INTERFAX Rated First by Foreign Correspondents**

*LD0311021291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2135 GMT 2 Nov 91*

[Text] [Video shows V. Glusner showing journalists at work with computers and fax machines]

[Glusner] Ratings, ratings. This time they concern us journalists. The public opinion study center run by Tatyana Zaslavskaya has polled 136 correspondents belonging to the major foreign agencies, magazines, and television and radio stations, asking them which Soviet agency's work best comes up to world standards. The result outstripped all expectations—61 percent of respondents named INTERFAX.

[Video shows interview in office with M.V. Komissar, director of Interfax] [Komissar] Well, that is very nice, but this is no easy matter. It is not easy to hold on to that position. We constantly have to remember the competition. We constantly have to raise the demands we make of ourselves and of our staff if we are to retain our lead.

[Glusner] Everyone knows you had no shortage of difficulties in setting yourselves up as an agency.

[Komissar] We did indeed have some very tricky moments. We were one of the first to emerge. And the party structure which ruled the country then could not allow something in the ideological or mass media field to function without controls. [Video shows more shots of journalists at work]

[Glusner] But now all the difficulties are past. INTERFAX has opened up as a company in the United States, so now its subscribers include senators, congressmen, and businessmen from American firms. And what does INTERFAX have to regale us with today?

[Unidentified correspondent] Well, as always, fresh and up-to-the-minute information.

### **BBC Official on Plan for Broadcasting From Moscow**

*LD2011213291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0430 GMT 19 Nov 91*

[Studio interview with Alexander Levich, head of BBC Russian service, by program presenter Mikhail Osokin on 19 November in Moscow; from the "Utro" program—live or recorded]

[Text] [Osokin] Alexander Levich, one of the heads of the BBC Russian service, is our guest today. True, he is only in Moscow on a visit, so to speak, but in essence his section intends to give itself a quite serious base here. The fact is that the BBC is starting direct broadcasting on our Russian airwaves for the first time. So I will ask Alexander to tell us more details about this project.

[Levich] This is a quite interesting matter, of course. A Western radio station broadcasting in Russian will be going out live on air here for the first time.

[Osokin] This will be a live relay from London with the signal (?being transmitted)?

[Levich] Yes, the signal comes from London to a satellite, it is picked up on a dish here, and from the dish special decoding equipment puts it out directly on local...

[Osokin, interrupting] On the medium waves, yes? This will be the news?

[Levich] On medium waves.

[Osokin] When do you plan to begin broadcasting?

[Levich] From 1 February, or sooner if our technical people can get the equipment delivered more quickly.

[Osokin] What do you plan to broadcast?

[Levich] We will have a special program for Radio Rossii listeners. A Radio Rossii staff member will be with us in London on a permanent basis for several months; they will take turns, and he will be directly involved in working on this program. His participation is very important for us as well, of course, because this will be a special current affairs program that will include news and some comment, and commentaries on events of the week.

[Osokin] From what you say, I understand that this is the first time we have seen such a practice here. Do you do similar things in other countries? With live transmissions on a country's airwaves?

[Levich] Yes, Mikhail, we do this in virtually all the countries of Eastern Europe; we also do it in many countries in Western Europe. We have such a program in Poland, for instance; the Polish central radio service picks up our signal and every evening for an hour, or two—I don't recall—it is transmitted live in Poland. We have the same thing in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a similar agreement has been signed in Bulgaria, too, as far as I recall.

[Osokin] As I understand it, you view the planned broadcasts by your radio station live on the Russian airwaves as just the first step. What else do you plan?

[Levich] We are now having serious negotiations here in Moscow for our English broadcasts, that is, the World Service, but in English, that is, to have the signal on medium waves, which would allow many Muscovites and residents of Moscow oblast—for the time being to begin with—to listen to our World Service in English, live with good reception.

[Osokin] An interesting point: Are you ready, in turn, to accept our broadcasts in English on your airwaves?

[Levich] This is a very complicated question. The fact of the matter is that in our country the BBC as such does not have the right to allocate frequencies. For some reason this is done by the Home Office in our country. So, since the situation is somewhat different and everything here has somehow been concentrated in the hands of Gosteleradio, it was much easier to avoid this difficulty. In Great Britain, strange as it may seem, the situation concerning this matter is more complicated.

[Osokin] It's clear that you cannot answer that question. Today, as it happens, I was saying that literally a few days ago Russian President Yeltsin, Moscow's Mayor Popov, and St. Petersburg's Mayor Sobchak had expressed serious dissatisfaction at broadcasts by Radio Liberty. They even sent a special protest message saying that Liberty was not giving proper coverage to events in the country. Have you no apprehensions with regard to similar comments about yourselves?

[Levich] I hope not. The fact is that the BBC has always been distinguished from many other radio stations, I would hope, by its editorial approach and its standpoint. The fact of the matter is that the BBC has always striven first to provide a balanced approach to any problem, and second, to provide an objective approach to any problem. In addition, there is one very substantial element: The BBC is the British radio broadcasting corporation, to put it bluntly. It is not an emigre radio station, and we strive to avoid the situation where people can give personal opinions and positions on the BBC's airwaves.

[Osokin] My final question: The influence and the influx of the U.S. mass media has been noticeable of late in the Soviet Union. A lot of films are appearing, there are many programs, and so on. Can I assume that they are somewhat concerned about this in London, and that the BBC's increased activity on our information market is also connected with this?

[Levich] Mikhail, this problem exists in Great Britain, too. U.S. productions very often appear on cinema and television screens—U.S. mass production, if I can call it that. This problem is of concern to many people in Great Britain as well, because it is considered that sometimes these productions are not of high enough quality. We console ourselves with the hope that the material which the BBC produces avoids this lowering of our production standards.

[Osokin] Thank you, Alexander.

[Levich] Thank you, Mikhail.

### Creation of RUS-YEVROPA News Agency Reported

PM2511143791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
20 Nov 91 Union Edition p 2

[Valeriy Kornev report under "Direct Line" rubric: "Volga Press Unites To Survive"]

[Text] Volgograd—A large regional association of periodical publications has emerged in Russia: The "Rus-Yevropa" [Russia-Europe] press association has been set up.

The association mainly includes young newspapers which have emerged recently—independent ones and those whose cofounders are soviets—and there are 33 in all. Most of them are published in the Volga region—on the territory from the lower to the upper reaches of the river. A number are published in the North Caucasus.

"At the founding conference," Ye. Shusterman, chief editor of Volgograd's NOVAYA GAZETA, who was elected president of the "Rus-Yevropa" association, told me, "it became clear that it is necessary to resolve the serious problems which editorial boards have encountered today. There have been attempts to establish an administrative diktat over newspapers. The printing base is weak. The position of journalists themselves under market conditions also must not be ignored—this concerns both social questions and pay. Together it will be easier to find the optimum options."

I will add that, in addition to shares—which will go, for example, to construct bases and rest homes—the association itself will also earn money by utilizing the journalistic potential of all editorial boards. The RUS-YEVROPA news agency is being set up under the association and will supply materials from this region to other publications under contracts.

### Subscriptions to Most Newspapers Show Decline in Last Year

PM2011145391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
18 Nov 91 Union Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Preliminary Results of the Subscription for 1992 (Thousands of Copies)"]

[Text] [Column A in table represents "Number of Subscription Copies as of 1 January 1991;" Column B represents "Subscriptions Received for 1992 as of 1 November 1991;" Column C represents "Percentage as Compared With the Number of Subscription Copies on 1 January 1991"]

Name of publication	A	B	C
<b>Newspapers:</b>			
GLASNOST	238.4	150.4	63.09
IZVESTIYA	3872.9	2781.1	71.81
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA	17249.8	12118.7	70.25
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA	644.3	384.3	59.65

Name of publication	A	B	C
LITERATURNAYA GAZETA	1099.5	287.1	26.11
MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI	1296.8	336.8	25.97
PRAVDA	2221.1	873.6	39.33
PRAVITELSTVENNYI VESTNIK	129.0	57.5	44.57
RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA	637.4	490.0	76.87
ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA	—	577.1	—
SELSKAYA ZHIZN	3398.3	3585.3	105.50
SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA	1321.4	780.1	59.04
SOVETSKIY SPORT	2204.3	1690.7	76.70
TRUD	18291.9	12320.0	67.35
UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA	476.2	313.5	65.83
EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN	510.9	584.7	114.45
ARGUMENTY I FAKTY	23840.7	22598.9	94.79
SEMYA	3426.3	2868.6	83.72
<b>Journals:*</b>			
DIALOG	363.6	90.7	24.94
ZVEZDA	140.8	62.6	44.46
ZDOROVYE	8543.6	6730.1	78.77
ZNAMYA	397.3	183.8	46.26
IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS	167.5	14.8	8.84
NEVA	250.1	99.6	39.82
NOVYY MIR	953.0	200.5	21.04
SVOBODNAYA MYSL	165.4	21.9	13.24
KRESTYANKA	13431.0	12777.4	95.13
OGONEK	1723.0	1492.4	86.62
OKTYABR	224.9	130.5	58.03
PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN	175.2	33.6	19.18
RABOTNITSA	11819.3	11161.0	94.43
ROMAN-GAZETA	2861.0	1841.6	64.37
SELSKAYA NOV	2565.1	2234.9	87.13
UTRO	—	83.2	—
YUNOST	941.6	583.5	61.97

### PRAVDA Readers Cite Subscription Problems

PM0511104991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
2 Nov 91 p 1

[N. Zhukovskaya report: "Will There Be a PRAVDA-92 in the Former Republics?"]

[Text] Will there be a PRAVDA-92 in the former republics? "There will," was the answer from Kazakh Deputy Communications Minister K. Bazylov to V. Orugunov, a PRAVDA reader from Tselinograd, who expressed concern over the receipt of PRAVDA in his republic in connection with the disintegration of the Union: After all, he has been a subscriber for 32 years now.

"There are and will be no restrictions on PRAVDA subscriptions in Moldova," F. Zumbryanu, chief of the republic's Moldpressfilateliya enterprise, said after acquainting himself with a letter from B. Kushnir, a Kishinev resident, who has also subscribed to our paper for over 30 years. He, too, had contacted the editorial office from fear of being deprived of his favorite publication forever because he has not been receiving it since 20 August.

In the latest mailbag there was another letter, this time from V. Smirnov, also a longstanding subscriber of ours, from Riga. He says: "I cannot subscribe to my favorite newspaper: Not a single post office in my rayon is accepting subscriptions to PRAVDA. Please advise me what to do."

Indeed, what are people to do? We put this question to M. Levina, chief of the Subscriptions and Retail Sales Department of the Latvian State Trade Association for the Sale of Periodicals.

"It is very simple," she replied. "Go to any subscription center of the Soyuzpechat agency in Riga City and fill out the necessary subscription. There are branches of the agency working in every rayon in the city plus another city agency (number seven) at Station Square. In addition, there is a special kiosk, window number nine, at the main post office where our staffers also accept subscription forms for all periodicals, including PRAVDA. Although I would not deny that some post offices are not keen on accepting subscriptions and, in view of that, we have created special centers."

Well, this is encouraging. The subscription period has been extended to 15 November and we would like to hope that the editorial office will no longer receive anxious letters and telegrams on the various misunderstandings in the postal service. Let everyone subscribe to whatever they want, including PRAVDA.

### NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Protests Restrictions on Freedom of Press

#### Editor's Protest

924B0091A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 29 Oct 91 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Tretyakov: "Freedom of the Press Is Being Interfered With"]

[Text] The Russian Ministry of the Press and Mass Information has accused the publication NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA of criminal conduct, and All-Union Television, distorting the facts, is attributing to it "acts of a provocative nature."

Last Friday evening [25 Oct] the Russian Ministry of the Press and Mass Media telephoned NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (NG) to find out the address of the editorial staff and the newspaper's founder. (The answers to these questions were apparent; for the address of the editorial staff appears in each issue, and that of the Moscow Council [Mossovets] may be found in any phone book.) Why all the hurry to know the address? In response we received this reply: The ministry is issuing a warning to NG. In connection with what? "You will hear it on the news on Russian TV." We heard nothing on the news, but we learned through channels of our own that the warning had to do with publishing an interview with Konstantin Masik, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

The secret machinations of the Ministry came to light on Saturday morning [26 Oct] when a press release by the RIA was published in KURANTY, alleging that an article had been published in NG, Issue 10, dated 24 October 1991, entitled: "Yeltsin Discussed With Military Leaders the Possibility of a Nuclear Strike on the

Ukraine." The RSFSR Ministry of the Press and Mass Media, it said, regards this as propaganda, fomenting war and international discord, in violation of the Law of the USSR: "On the Press and Other Mass Media," Section 1 Article 5, and it is issuing an official warning to the editors of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI (MN) as well as NG regarding their respective articles. (Earlier in the text, mention was made of an article in MN entitled: "From Foam on the Lips of an Angel"—V.T.)

I am not going to allude to the work of our colleagues in MN; I believe they can fend for themselves in dealing with the Ministry. With respect to NG, however, I am compelled to make the following statement.

The warning implies that NG is under the threat of being closed down in the event that another issue is published this year. This information is for the benefit of our readers.

And now to the heart of the matter. The RSFSR Ministry of the Press and Mass Media, in effect, accuses NG of committing criminal offenses (under articles 71 and 74 of the RSFSR Criminal code). Without informing NG of its actions, the Ministry released this statement to the RIA, which in turn distributed it through its own channels (apparently, to other publications) as well as carrying it in the pages of its own publication, KURANTY.

The accusation is not supported by the facts. It is groundless and absurd.

First. What is called by the Ministry an article is, in fact, an interview with Konstantin Masik, and the apparent lack of knowledge or desire on the part of the ministry that deals with journalism to see the difference in journalistic formats is indicative of the situation. The complete title of the interview published in NG, as distinct from the one cut for the convenience of making the accusation, is as follows: "Yeltsin Discussed With Military Leaders the Possibility of a Nuclear Strike on the Ukraine, First Vice Premier of the Ukraine Konstantin Masik Told Told a Correspondent of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA."

Second. The words used in the heading are the very ones used by the above-named member of the republic government in the course of this interview. Moreover, the newspaper's correspondent did not not ask Masik any leading question touching upon the topic of nuclear war.

Third. In the interview K. Masik makes direct reference to his conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, neither of whom have yet denied the information disclosed; nor have Masik's direct superiors, L. Kravchuk and V. Fokin, disavowed the words of their subordinate officer.

Four. If NG committed such a heinous crime, why is it that the office of the RSFSR public prosecutor has not initiated criminal proceedings? And why was it that the Ministry did not did not go to this office with its

complaint instead of spreading its accusations through its own channels of information?

Five. If the authors of this so-called warning had so much as glanced at the coverage of the Ukraine and the RSFSR and relevant editorial comments, they would have understood (if they wanted to understand, of course) that this publication cannot possibly be categorized in this way.

In light of the foregoing, the editorial staff of this newspaper utterly and completely rejects the accusations that have been made by the RSFSR Ministry of the Press and Mass Media. It demands that an immediate public apology be disseminated, together with a retraction of its allegations defaming NG, through the same RIA channels in KURANTY and other publications, wherever they appeared. Finally, we intend to demand through the courts that this warning be revoked, if indeed it was ever issued. (The editors still do not have an official text of the warning.)

On the same day that the RSFSR Ministry turned over the defamatory text about the newspaper to the RIA, a similar act was undertaken by the leading channel of the all-Union television network. On a news program which began at 2100 hours, the announcer stated that provocative information was "launched into orbit" by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA about a discussion between Yeltsin and military leaders concerning a possible nuclear attack on the Ukraine. In the first place, this information did not appear first in NG. In the second place, once again, no mention was made of the fact that the information was reported in an interview with a member of the Ukrainian government. This report was followed by coverage of a speech by Leonid Kravchuk in the Odessa Military District, where according to the announcer, L. Kravchuk responded to the "report of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA of a possible nuclear exchange between Russia and the Ukraine." L. Kravchuk's answer, however, was contained for some reason in conversation with a journalist. In fact, Kravchuk did speak of the provocative nature of the report, but he made no mention of the newspaper in this connection; nor did his subordinate K. Masik, although he would have been the logical one to throw out the first reproach, if indeed there was anyone deserving of reproach. In any event, Kravchuk did not deny the substance of the conversation as reported between Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Masik. From this we may infer a possibly deliberate falsification by mixing this topic in with the slander of NG and broadcasting it to discredit the newspaper's reputation.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA therefore demands that it be given the air time necessary on this news program to refute these allegations prior to the conclusion of the current subscription period. In the event of a refusal, NG reserves the right to refer this matter for judicial review in accordance with the law.

That same evening, on the prime-time program "Talk Show" of the all-Union Television Station, RSFSR People's Deputy Sergey Baburin and RSFSR adviser Sergey

Shakhray made some gratuitous and offensive remarks about the newspaper. Shakhray even went so far as to suggest that the liability of NG be reviewed in connection with the contents of this report. Once again, no mention was made by either Shakhray or Baburin of the fact that the matter concerned words uttered by an official representative of the government of the Ukraine—words that until now have not been denied.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA demands the opportunity to refute the charges made on this program as well.

The concentrated campaign waged against NG, which has been unleashed by the mass media of Russia and the USSR as well as certain republic officials (I remember that, on first television program of the evening described, a commentary on this publication favorable to the official organs was made by A. Tikhomirov and V. Lukin), prompts the thought that what we are dealing with is at attempt to restrict freedom of the press and even to punish journalists of the independent press who are honestly engaged in performing their professional duties.

The newspaper's attorneys have been instructed to study all relevant documents available to the editors in order to take all legal steps necessary to protect the reputation of NG against unfounded accusations and the newspaper itself against the threat of being closed down. Moreover, we are obliged to bear in mind the fact that all of this has occurred during a subscription campaign, and that as a result the newspaper faces the prospect of financial losses as well.

#### Comment on Text of Warning

924B0091B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 31 Oct 91 p 1

[Article by "NG" under the rubric: "In Brief": "The Text of the Warning to NG Has Still Not Been Signed!"]

[Text] According to unofficial information currently available to NG [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA], the warning to NG, which was made public a few days ago through the RIA, has, in fact, not yet been signed by RSFSR Minister of the Press and Mass Media M. Poltoranin.

This warning has not even reached the NG editorial staff. We have been unable to find a single person at the Ministry who would give us information even off the record on this subject.

If it should turn out that the so-called warning was made public before it was signed, this would cast doubt upon the legal standing of this action.

It might seem that it would be in the interest of NG to withhold this information for the present. But we are playing an honest game.



**RSFSR Official on Criticism of  
NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA**

924B0093A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 31 Oct 91 p 2

[Interview with RSFSR State Counsel Sergey Stankevich by Mikhail Karpov; place and date not given: "Why the Leadership of Russia Is Upset With NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: RSFSR State Counsel Sergey Stankevich Confesses Love for Our Newspaper"; followed by commentary by Vitaliy Tretyakov: "And We Love Russia, Too"]

[Text]

[Stankevich] I want to express my point of view. The current situation in the mass media is rather troubling. It is also understandable. During the subscription campaign the circulation of many previously popular newspapers fell dramatically, and the struggle for survival forces them to take sometimes extravagant actions. These actions are partially also explainable by a certain information famine, caused by a pause in the visible activities of the Russian leadership. We had a period of contemplation and certain preparations for the actions that are being undertaken now. Accordingly, no major events were taking place then. But the same period, I understand, coincided with the decisive phase of the subscription campaign, when the hunger for information capable of attracting the attention of the public was immense. In addition, the reading public also had a somewhat dulled perception of events. In the past it was possible to attract attention with, let us say, even relatively ordinary news about conflicts; now anything less than a scandal, anything less than a forthcoming nuclear strike, may have a difficult time penetrating the threshold of nonperception...

[Karpov] Our subscription campaign is important for us, but after all we lived for a year without subscribers. Our independence is more important to us...

[Stankevich] I was talking about the general picture, without referring specifically to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA.

[Karpov] But if we take the specific case of a publication concerning a "nuclear misunderstanding" between Russia and Ukraine: NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA did not invent it. The vice premier of the Ukraine said this on its pages!

[Stankevich] Still, I think they are all the reasons to be upset... Upset is not even the right word—the Russian leadership had all the grounds to protest. The newspaper says that it simply conveyed Masik's words precisely. Nevertheless, a newspaper does not convey words mechanically. A serious, responsible newspaper that values its reputation inevitably anticipates a reaction to the materials it publishes. If it so happens that it has in its possession a statement containing such a serious charge as consideration of a potential nuclear strike,

quite naturally in this situation the newspaper may publish a direct quote from, for instance, a Ukrainian statesman, but at the same time it may get in touch by phone with the press secretary of the Russian president and ask him to provide a comment, publishing it right there, below, since the president's press secretary will certainly say that all of this is baloney, an absurdity, and that one does not even feel comfortable offering serious comments on this kind of statement. It is so wild and absurd. And there is not even an occasion for polemics in this case. It is simply outside the boundaries of common sense.

[Karpov] For us, without direct lines or other special means of communication, it is almost impossible to get in touch with high-ranking officials quickly. Besides, I am surprised: Why should it necessarily be done in the first place?

[Stankevich] It cannot be made mandatory by law. I am simply trying to explain my understanding of the difference between a serious newspaper and one that is only interested in sensational material for its own sake. The former strives to provide food for thought for its audience by giving it objective information...

[Karpov] Are you not afraid to take the road traveled by CPSU party organs for over 70 years, always lecturing journalists what they should and should not do?

[Stankevich] I am not lecturing anybody in any way. I am simply talking about my subjective perception of what solid, serious press is. Naturally, nobody is obligated to follow this perception, and in general I believe that a newspaper has a right to define itself on its own. Another reason I feel I have a right to say this is that I had participated in the creation of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA to a certain degree; I participated in the discussion of this idea, and I feel a certain responsibility; besides, I love this newspaper. It really did become a serious national newspaper in a very short period of time. The only political, analytical newspaper, in which a thinking man interested in state political life can find all the information he needs.

[Karpov] So if it is that good, why does Poltoranin's ministry issue it a warning and even threaten to close it?

[Stankevich] Lately, I have discovered most regrettable shortcomings in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA—most regrettable. At first, it laid claim to a very high quality, established very high standards, but literally during the past two or three weeks I have been seeing certain things in it that are like a knife in my heart...

The story about a nuclear strike is, in my opinion, an out of the ordinary incident. And at such a moment...

I am also disturbed by an almost tabloid, devil-may-care style in relation to the Russian authorities that the newspaper has unfortunately adopted. It is, of course, not necessary to agree with the authorities; moreover, they need to be argued with. One may even argue

analytically and to a greater extent than is the case now. There is, however, a style of a sort of forced irony discernible in the material of some NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA authors: "statesmen," "a source of nonsensical ideas," and so on, and so on...

[Karpov] Can you please name whom you have in mind? We are used to openness.

[Stankevich] NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA columnist Portnikov, for instance. I have seen such things in his materials. I, for one, would never allow myself to use this style in communicating with serious political columnists of a newspaper. For some reason this style of familiar backslapping, sort of ironic putdown has been adopted by some journalists. Yes, we are not people without faults; we are not gods and do not clamor to have our image cast in bronze, but I think we do deserve a respectful dialogue—even a critical one. I can understand that, say, the yellow press is not in the habit of doing that, but even during the worse times the representatives of the yellow Bolshevik press would not allow themselves to use some expressions currently found in newspapers. It is slightly disturbing, although perhaps this is not the most important point.

[Karpov] Sergey Borisovich, does it not seem to you that this "absence of a serious Russian topic"—if such is indeed true—is not necessarily the fault only of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA journalists but also to a certain degree of the Russian leadership?

[Stankevich] I agree. I just want to explain what I mean. I can name only one or two serious publications on the problems of Russia as such. High quality materials. At the same time, from other materials one gets an impression that there is nothing that makes sense in the position of Russia, while far from sensible—from my point of view—actions, statements, and activities of republics surrounding us are presented as the only possible choice, and they are presented in such, I would say, a complimentary spirit—as a struggle against the new imperial center represented by Russia. That is despite the fact that so far I have not encountered any serious factual grounds for this.

In addition, commentaries on the events inside Russia are also one-sided; although the newspaper claims that it is independent, judging by published materials it does have a certain line. That is, events inside Russia are invariably interpreted in favor of its disintegration into independent republics and self-ruled territories. In any case, anything that appears on this topic, even if it is accompanied by open use of violence or armed groups, is presented as a struggle for national freedom. While the efforts of Russia at building its own state structure, the preservation of its own state integrity are presented, on the contrary, as something—let me put it this way—unnatural and antihumanistic. I am not saying that this point of view does not have a right to exist, but I have almost not encountered any other points of view in

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA; if this is an independent point of view, in my opinion, it creates a somewhat distorted picture...

[Karpov] Still, Sergey Borisovich, are the doors of your colleagues not closed too tightly for us? Both in the White House and other places?

[Stankevich] I am ready to admit that we need a better organized dialogue with the mass media. I think we need weekly briefings at the White House, conducted by either members of the State Council or the president's press secretary. In addition, we need to make access to the White House lobby easier for newspaper representatives, including those of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. I believe that the penetrability of its walls should be greater.

[Karpov] We will be grateful if this is accomplished, and we thank you for the interview...

[Stankevich] I would still like to add something... Everything I said about NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA belongs to the genre of "confessions of love." Because I love this newspaper...

[Karpov] A very original genre...

[Stankevich] Yes, yes, yes... These are the reproofs of a loving man. I, for one, cannot even imagine my political activity without your newspaper.[end interview]

#### P.S.

It is very rare that NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA offers comments to articles by or interviews with such respected authors as S. Stankevich. But in this case it is necessary.

First. Journalists do not create sensations—they only find them. Sensations are created by politicians. This is why they get so upset that newspapers find out what they want to hide.

Second. Regarding an opportunity to find out the Russian president's point of view on any subject. Lately, it has become exceedingly difficult (even with a direct line, which the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA does not have anyway). As for the president's press secretary, P. Voshchanov, it is virtually impossible to reach him on a regular city line. He simply does not answer. Why? Let his bosses ask him.

Third. On the point that, according to S. Stankevich, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA ostensibly "interprets events inside Russia in favor of its disintegration into separate republics and self-ruled territories." Permit me to disagree. I will not even argue this point, because NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA journalists love Russia no less than Russian politicians do. Of course, the newspaper does publish different opinions. By the way, S. Stankevich himself has been lately one of our frequent authors. What we do criticize are the from our point of

view inept actions of the Russian authorities and individual higher echelon politicians, which in the final count may lead Russia to disintegration.

In any case, everyone has a right to his own point of view on this issue.

As to the confession of love—thank you.

### **Journalists Protest Charge of Selling Information**

*LD1511041491 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 14 Nov 91*

[From the "TV Inform" newscast—read by announcer]

[Text] Today, like other editorial offices, we received the text of a statement by the committee for protecting freedom of speech and journalists' rights under the Confederation of USSR Unions of Journalists. We could not ignore this statement. The document asserts that incidents of state officials, including personnel of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Procuracy, and the USSR and RSFSR Ministries of Internal Affairs, selling information to foreign correspondents for currency have become more and more frequent. This is taking place with the knowledge and participation of RSFSR Procurator General Stepankov, the letter says, and he must officially renounce this dangerous practice which may have unpredictable consequences.

### **New Supplement To Publicize Economic Laws**

*PM2511143991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Nov 91 Union Edition p 3*

[Interview with Yuriy Feofanov, editor in chief of ZAKON supplement; date and place not specified; first paragraph is introduction: "The Law? There's ZAKON!"]

[Text] The IZVESTIYA editorial collegium has decided to issue a new supplement in 1992—ZAKON. It was registered by the RSFSR Ministry of the Press and Mass Media 15 November. Here are a few questions for the journal's chief editor, Yuriy Feofanov.

[IZVESTIYA] We'd like to start with a "detective" question: Who benefits? Whom is the journal for, to put it more simply?

[Feofanov] For businessmen. For entrepreneurs and managers in all sectors, cooperative workers, private farmers, legal advisers, and our businessmen's foreign partners. For everyone who is not afraid of taking a risk and starting his own "business."

[IZVESTIYA] The word "business" [delo] in our country also has criminal connotations—you're well aware of that. How much has been written about "businesses" that ended in the dock.

[Feofanov] The new journal also aims to gear enterprising people to success and becoming rich—without, however, the prospect of ending up in the dock.

[IZVESTIYA] What do you need for that?

[Feofanov] A civilized businessman is bold but law-abiding. Above all he needs to know the law. The journal will print the laws for the subjects, as lawyers say, of our economic community. Then—most important—the normative acts bringing the law into force: the orders issued by the republics' governments, statutes, instructions, circulars, and methods ratified by them.

[IZVESTIYA] Do you think that is enough? People say: We cannot do business without breaking the law.

[Feofanov] There are more than enough snares and even "trous-de-loup" in enterprise. Even a weekly journal, let alone a monthly, cannot keep pace with our legislators. Nevertheless we have to live. We expect to interpret the law and provide commentaries helping business people to find their bearings amid this confusion. Eminent officials, prominent lawyers, and experienced economists have agreed to cooperate with the journal. There will also be comments on our economic legislation from foreign lawyers.

[IZVESTIYA] Commentaries and interpretations are all very well... Do they settle the age-old problem of the law and life?

[Feofanov] That is indeed an age-old problem—even for well-ordered societies based on the rule of law. Nonetheless we will try to get to grips with it. I am sure that the word "precedent" will come into judicial practice. We intend to talk about the decisions made by courts and arbitration services on specific cases. And thus help both the parties in civil dealings and the courts themselves to find their bearings.

What is more the journal will provide its readers with competent consultations. ZAKON has been founded by the IZVESTIYA Publishing House and the "Moscow Lawyers" firm of attorneys. So there are opportunities for consultations. We also intend to tackle private cases, that is to investigate and publicize cases where enterprising people have their way barred by bureaucratic obstacles. We will also publish samples of documents and provide information on the procedure for concluding transactions and so on.

[IZVESTIYA] There is a vast amount of legislative material. How will you select it? How will you shape your issues?

[Feofanov] Every issue will have a theme. The first issue is to be "Privatization."

[IZVESTIYA] Privatization has gotten off the ground. Will normative acts to regulate it follow in its wake? Won't a monthly journal lag hopelessly behind?

[Feofanov] That's the problem. A great many pseudo-documents are being published now: drafts, instructions, and resolutions that have not been officially ratified. People are making money out of that. But business people may suffer serious loss if they operate in accordance with these pseudonormatives. That is why it is important to give the business world only acts that really are official. And the kind of commentaries that try to provide an escape from any conflicts. That is how I would summarize the journal's principles. We aim to provide full normative material and a competent interpretation of it, in an accessible form, with maximum jurisprudence and minimum journalistic activity. And with a minimum of good journalism.

[IZVESTIYA] Your journal is still an "unknown quantity." What if someone wants to contact you and make suggestions...

[Feofanov] Go ahead. My telephone number is 299-74-55. I have no secretary as yet.

[IZVESTIYA] How will the journal be circulated?

[Feofanov] The IZVESTIYA Publishing House will deal with subscription and distribution. Orders must be sent by registered mail to your address: We would ask you to transfer the requisite remittance for the number of copies to trading account No. 608001 at Moscow's Commercial People's Bank. The Bank code is 9191014, the interbranch clearing number [mezhfilialnyye oboroty] 191016. Orders with payment authorization are to be sent to Circulation Office, No. 5, Pushkin Square, K-6, Moscow, Special Municipal Mail, 103798. Telephone 209-22-50.

An issue costs 50 rubles.

[IZVESTIYA] Isn't that expensive?

[Feofanov] My friend and instructor in market ethics told me: Forget the words "expensive" and "cheap." Things cost what they are worth. And that will depend on us alone.

#### **New Russian Weekly for Peasants Published**

PM2111094991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
19 Nov 91 Single Edition p 1

[Report from "Pulse of the Day" roundup of PRAVDA and TASS reports]

[Text] The first issue of the social and current affairs weekly NIVA ROSSII, founded by the republican Agarian Union, has been published. The new newspaper is aimed primarily at peasants, irrespective of where they work—on a collective or state farm or in individual farming.

#### **New Weekly Paper NADEZHDA Published for Disabled**

924B0024A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 4 Oct 91 p 2

[Article by Natalya Bobrova: "Hope for NADEZHDA"]

[Text] It is well known that there are different kinds of newspapers. There are newspapers for everybody—and for the chosen few. There are entertaining ones and serious ones. There are newspapers that express one's own point of view; and, unfortunately, there are those with the opposite viewpoint. In short, picking out one's own little paper isle in the vast sea of journalism is a matter of personal taste.

Some publications, however, are difficult to size up in terms of general standards. They have special readers who are people unfairly treated by fate, deprived of the most ordinary human joys—particularly, of good health. No need to say how important it is for them to have access to information that directly concerns them!

Such an opportunity is now made available by the Russian weekly NADEZHDA, which is unique in the field in being designed for disabled persons.

"We are fully aware of the difficulties of our task and the full extent of our responsibility to people who, in many respects, have been victimized by society" said chief editor V. Galenkin. "This is why our newspaper, which has been in existence for less than a year, amid the difficulties of conversion to market conditions, carries 16 columns of coverage dealing with the diverse problems of the disabled in Russia."

The newspaper for disabled persons is currently encountering many problems. There are difficulties obtaining paper and typographic facilities. (The publication is now printed in Voronezh!) There is a dearth of financial support. But the editorial staff is not discouraged. The journalists know that their labors are needed by these disadvantaged people. The enterprise is essentially non-profit and magnanimous in nature. This means that the NADEZHDA, like a tiny vessel flying flag number 50239 (its postal address code), must embark on the stormy seas of the publishing world in search of its readers.

#### **Independent Political Journal KENTAVR To Be Published**

914B0024B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Oct 91  
Single Edition p 5

[Article by Professor N. Zagladin: "'KENTAVR' Commences Publication—A New Journal of Soviet and Foreign Political Scientists"]

[Text] It is often said that in recent years our society has become the most politicized in the world. I would disagree with that. We are only now assimilating the ABC's of political life and of politics as a science. It is an unfortunate fact that for the present we have no

resources for teaching political theory, no literature on the subject, and no research being conducted that measures up to world standards of modern political thought. The most that one can find are papers on individual problems in academic publications and articles by publicists, as a rule, reflecting a one-sided, biased approach.

Attempting to fill this gap is a new journal KENTAVR [Centaur], an independent scholarly publication, which makes available a broad spectrum of judgment and opinion on key problems of political theory and policy in Russia and the world. The first issue of this journal came off the press in April, and it immediately attracted attention. The fact is that one of the authors, Professor V. Pugachev, not only predicted the attempted coup of August but named the potential protagonists.

Subsequent issues have included articles generated by an international school of political science, consisting of scholars in the Academy of Science together with those from Yale University in the United States, on problems involved in the transition from totalitarianism to democracy. They have also provided coverage of the events of 19-23 August and articles on the establishment of the new political parties. In preparation is an issue containing works of Russian writers and philosophers whose political assessments still have not lost their timeliness (including L. Andreyev and G. Fedotov).

KENTAVR remains uncommitted to any kind of ideological or political currents. The publication FENIKS [Phoenix], in assuming the primary financial risk, is also independent. A guiding principle in establishing the journal is that it will print the articles of authors representing diverse views, primarily on subjects of political import, and a high standard of scholarship, without political diatribes or any kind of incitement to violence and without propaganda containing national or religious intolerance.

The position of an independent publication in our society is not an enviable one, even if it is not subject to harassment or repressive measures. The problem is of a different kind. "Dependent" publications, belonging to the CPSU or ministry departments, had easy access to typographic facilities, paper, transport services, a distribution network, etc. In other words, the "startup capacity" was completely unequal. Hence the higher price for independent publications and lack of regularity in bringing out issues. In the aftermath of the events of August, alas, things remain unchanged. Those who have influential political sponsors (or acquire them) flourish as before, while the rest are obliged to struggle for a "place in the sun." Now, however, justice surely requires that equal conditions be assured in the struggle for the attention of readers.

Nevertheless, subscribers to KENTAVR will receive six issues of the journal, I hope, before the end of the year as promised. Persons who have not yet subscribed may apply to the editors at the following address: P. O. Box

167, Moscow 117602. Our publication is sent COD. Retail circulation is limited.

### **Paper Gains Access to Far East Using New Facilities**

*PM061111191 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Nov 91 First Edition p 7*

[Own correspondent Nikolay Belyy report: "Break-through to Amur"]

[Text] From the beginning of November readers and fans of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA will no longer be contacting the newspaper's Amur correspondents' center about the abominable delivery of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's publication to subscribers and for retail sale. People's complaints were absolutely justified. During the past year deliveries to the Amur region from Mother Moscow of the newspaper which gained popularity here from its first issue have been constantly held up in transit—intentionally, too, it would seem. But as of 1 November people in the Amur region can read ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA on the day of publication. It is being transmitted here using space communications channels and is being duplicated using a modern printing complex which, incidentally, was until recently the property of the CPSU Central Committee. ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA could have reached local readers promptly far earlier, but for some reason the party took an open dislike to the newspaper and rejected editorial office requests for it to be printed in the Amur region. The State Committee for the State of Emergency also helped, thank you very much.

The newspaper is being printed for people in the Amur region and possibly in the future will begin to be delivered from here to readers in the western region of the Far East.

### **New Sociological Weekly Views Chernobyl Panel Findings**

*PM1111132791 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Nov 91 First Edition p 2*

[Unattributed report from TASS and "Our correspondents" roundup under "One-Line Cables" rubric: "ROSSIYSKIY CHERNOBYL Weekly"]

[Text] The first issue of the socioecological weekly ROSSIYSKIY CHERNOBYL [RUSSIAN CHERNOBYL] publishes findings of the independent public inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station] and its disastrous consequences. Its founders are the labor collectives of the publishing house and editorial office of the oblast sociopolitical newspaper BRYANSK RABOCHIY [BRYANSK WORKER], and also the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic State Committee for Liquidating the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES and the Radiation Rehabilitation of the Territory.

**Trial Issue of Journal Released on Disk**

924B0100A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 19 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Lagovskiy: "Leafing Through Computer"]

[Text] *A trial issue of the first computer magazine in the country has come out. It is called DELO I PRAVO.*

"And where is this journal?" I asked.

"Here it is." Editor in Chief Oleg Danilov takes a magnetic disk out of its envelope and inserts it into the computer.

The name appears on the screen and then a kind of table of contents—laws, acts, instructions, news... It is unusual but, perhaps, convenient. Push the button and the necessary page appears right on the screen.

"Do you want to do without any paper at all?"

"We will leave just a little. About 10 little pages will be included in the envelope—a survey of the state of affairs for the month. A person who does not wish to change his habits so abruptly can look them over, say, while lying on the couch. But the main information will be on the computer."

"What are you doing, colleague, chopping off the branch we are all sitting on?"

"God be with you," Oleg Danilov smiled, "but we have not even begun. It will be possible to speak about serious competition for paper publications only when a ramified computer network appears. And everyone who wishes will be able to obtain an electronic newspaper or magazine at home over ordinary telephone lines. But for now we are oriented toward concrete users—entrepreneurs. Hence the specific topic—the law."

Specialists invited to collaborate with the magazine conducted a poll at more than 100 enterprises and found out what they needed to know. And they selected from among the most necessary documents the ones which both make it possible to conduct business intelligently and stay on the right side of the law. They were included in the initial package. This will be the basis for the news and analytical surveys on various kinds of entrepreneurial activity. In the words of workers of the editorial staff, these are not simply documents but guides to action which to some degree motivate people to engage in business.

"The annual subscription rate for the monthly electronic journal is 1,200 rubles. Is that not expensive?"

"Not at all," answers the editor in chief, "other organizations are now asking 10 times as much for a similar product, only on paper."

**Central TV's Yakovlev on Plans for Television**

924B0100B Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*  
in Russian 20 Nov 91 p 2

[Article by G. Rezanov and T. Khoroshilova: "Who Is Knocking on TV's Door?"]

[Text] In the Union of Cinematographers there was a roundtable discussion about problems of television filming today. Yegor Yakovlev, representative of the All-Union Radio and Television Company, participated in the discussion. The result of the discussion was disquieting for many. And the table at which the discussion took place was not round at all but had corners.

There were no young people at the table. Gray-haired people were concerned what would happen to them now. They know how to make movies, but the question for them is different today: What to film?

Marina Goldovskaya, the author of the films "The Solovetskaya Power," "The Archangelsk Peasant," and many others, expressed the sensible idea that the people gathered in the hall did not know what they were talking about because they did not know what they were doing. It is becoming clear that the age of stagnation was just as bad for many others. There was censorship, but while resisting it the directors experienced themselves. The gifted ones made movies in spite of the bans—and this was generally their order from society.

Today there is no client. Today it is possible to spin out and film everything, but in this turmoil, this social apocalypse, must we look for light, the positive which must be there if society has come to the end of the tunnel?

Those in attendance were nostalgic about the sixties. When society was stable, movies progressed, and they were made with the energy of resistance. When the period of decline began here they were made with the energy of the decline. But the period of the nihilistic movie is coming to an end. It must be replaced, according to the ideas of the masters, by faith and confidence. And although we are technically behind the West, the Soviet movie has wealth—creative potential. The natural desire of those in attendance could be heard in the proposal of director Sergey Kolosov: Reinforce the existing production structures within the framework of television and Mosfilm even if the latter becomes a joint-stock company or concern. And not be in a hurry to give all this up to for the producers to tear to pieces. The majority of those assembled also liked the idea of retaining the socialist principle: to each according to his labor—from each according to his abilities. Nobody said: to each according to the results of his labor, as they do in developed countries.

The second part of the meeting (it could be called the upbeat part) began with the entry into the hall of the chairman of the All-Union Television Company, Yegor

Yakovlev, an imposing figure with a lot of self-confidence. After taking a chair at the table opposite the presidium, he stated quite clearly and firmly that they were at the end of the tunnel. And there was no light there. A completely different life had begun. And if the directors did not start earning money they would continue to beg for it and look for the nonexistent light.

There was not an iota of idealism in his words:

"And if you gray-haired people do not find ways, our discussions are meaningless. Because you are all living with the psychology of that tunnel.

"I ended up in that immense home, the budget organization, that terrible free 'pie,' which will be divided among various associations without recourse.

"Everyone is expecting political leadership from me. But I do not have it either. I phone Yeltsin and Gorbachev more frequently than they phone me."

He said that the political documentary film was finished. Perhaps we will move on to a new ideological search. If there are expose films, they should be secondary.

"It is time to make a discovery and see how our psychology has changed since 1985. M. Goldovskaya's film 'Archangelsk Peasant' occupies a position there, but it too is all in the past."

Yegor Yakovlev does not know what the ideology should be; he only understands that this is man's path to himself. People must be taught to take pleasure in what they themselves want and not in what they were promised in 1970.

When he came to the television station he admitted that he was experiencing a condition of rejuvenation, which, to be sure, was also causing him to suffer since he got the feeling that he had gone back six years and returned to the way of thinking that dominated the newspapers IZVESTIYA and MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI.

Central Television is an organization of the preperestroika period. There are businesslike people there, but the way they are businesslike has nothing in common with what is needed today. These are people from the propaganda ministry, who are not needed today.

He added that the Ekran association completely reflects the geriatric debility of the country and Central Television.

Discussions to the effect that the bureaucrat is standing in the way of the creative worker are yesterday's discussions. When he came to television the new chairman of the Radio and Television Company assumed that he would abolish all the dues paid to television. But television workers like things they way they were: manipulating people with advertising and bringing money into the studio through advertising. And yet it is hard to describe the corruption surrounding advertising. But still it is clear that it is impossible to keep television the way

it was. At the same time the television company leader admitted that he could not just kick everybody out and get new people.

Ye. Yakovlev still has two walls he leans on: program ratings and criticism. He receives xerox copies of all articles about television, reads them with interest, and finds nothing significant in them. He gets the best articles and the worst ones, but they are all superficial, everything is scrutinized too closely, and there is no profound thought.

In a year he hopes to beef up the budget since the republics are interested in central broadcasting. They are afraid of Russian television broadcasting and therefore they need the USSR president. But Yakovlev still had a long conversation with Yeltsin, in which he expressed the idea that if the house of cards called the Soviet Union collapses, Central Television will still remain in Russia and it is vital for Russia to have a second television company that is capable of competing with the Russian one.

Ye. Yakovlev discussed in detail the reorganization of Central Television and the formation of six independent subdivisions which would create everything that is advantageous for survival. Soon a document will be adopted concerning unified ownership of the company. The air time will be turned over to the company, and the information program, political programming, and sports will also remain in its hands, and everything else will be auctioned off. Independent studios will be invited into television and will compete for air time with the main subdivisions of the television company. This will solve the problem of internal alternative television.

The time of the sixties generation has come to an end, and it is necessary to look for young people who will help society emerge and develop a new ideology.

Participants in the roundtable discussion remarked to Ye. Yakovlev, however, that he is a newspaper person, and long years of working on newspaper have left their mark, but television should not be politicized to the extent that it is today. A movie director should earn money but he should not set the goal of making a living for himself. He must set the goal of creating a work for which he will be paid. Making money should be a priority for television. At the same time it was noted that when there is no unifying ideology in the society, television could take on this role.

...Recently society has moved beyond perestroika, the putsch, and the destruction of borders. If we leave culture behind and devote ourselves fully to commerce, it could end up being the most terrible catastrophe.

Regarding relations between the leadership of Central Television and the leadership of the Russian commodity and raw material exchange... Borovoy wants to purchase the television company. He calls representatives of the new authorities neo-Bolsheviks who restrict the freedom

of the entrepreneurs. Judging from everything, Yakovlev wants to show that Borovoy is not the only "belle of the ball"...

#### **TV, Radio Advertisement Purchase Procedures To Change**

*LD2511182691 Moscow TASS in English 1422 GMT  
25 Nov 91*

[Text] Moscow November 25 TASS—According to the latest issue of the Moscow weekly "KOMMERSANT" a new system for television and radio ads will soon be in effect. The Central Television and Radio Station has established minimum and maximum levels for purchasing air time, which will be controlled through a central agency that has yet to be named.

Those purchasing television time between midnight and 6 AM pay the minimum, 10,000 rubles per minute, while the most expensive ad time, 60,000 rubles per minute, is between 8 PM and 11 PM. Prices will be doubled for urgency. Radio ads will cost between 250 and 3,500 rubles per minute. These prices, however, are subject to periodic revision.

Ads containing violence, alcohol, or tobacco are forbidden, nor can any ads interrupt informational, religious or children's programs. Ad time during any broadcast may also not exceed five percent of its duration.

KOMMERSANT reports that television and radio advertising activities will be arranged according to the Strasburg convention on cross-cultural television.

#### **St. Petersburg, Russian TV in Dispute Over Equipment**

*LD1611233791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network  
in Russian 1400 GMT 16 Nov 91*

[Text] The chief editors of St. Petersburg Television have not agreed on the matter of transferring part of the station's technical equipment to the Russian Television and Radio Company so that it can create a St. Petersburg directorate. In particular Aleksandr Nevzorov and Vsevolod Bolgarchuk, editor in chief of the information program "Fakt", were against such a decision and said that, if the directorate, headed by Bella Kurkova, takes new equipment from St. Petersburg Television, this will have an effect on the quality of St. Petersburg Television's information programs. The RIA correspondent who sent this report has discovered that a number of labor collectives in the city are prepared to finance St. Petersburg Television. Certain of the city's public and political organizations are prepared, if the decision to hand over part of the equipment to the Russian Television and Radio Company is not cancelled, to begin picketing the St. Petersburg television center.

#### **Pickets Protest Transfer of St. Petersburg TV Assets**

*PM2611163591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 21 Nov 91 p 4*

[A. Molokov report: "Pickets Outside Television Center"]

[Text] St. Petersburg—About two weeks ago it became known that there is an agreement whereby a significant proportion of the technical facilities and studio space of the television center at 6 Chapygin Street is being transferred to Russian Television's "St. Petersburg" directorate, which Bella Kurkova heads.

The making public of this agreement shook television's creative personnel. In effect it signals the technical death of local TV broadcasts.

"You get the impression that V. Yugin, the present director of the St. Petersburg television and radio company and former editor of the local newspaper SMENA [CHANGE], was sent here for just one purpose—winding up independent television in St. Petersburg," Aleksandr Nevzorov stated. His program "NTK-600" appealed to the city's inhabitants for support.

The television center was first picketed a week ago, and last Saturday a rally took place here. And yesterday the citizens of this great city, which increasingly being turned into a provincial one and which today they are even trying to deprive of its own television broadcasting, came here again. Communists and monarchists, deputies of the St. Petersburg Soviet and delegations from labor collectives, and patriots and democrats stood shoulder to shoulder demanding V. Yugin's resignation and an end to the robbery by Russian Television.

#### **'Vid' Program Producer on Future Plans**

*924B0104A Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Nov 91 p 4*

[Interview with Andrey Razbash, chief producer of the "ViD" Television Company, by G. Viktorov; Moscow, date not given: "Views on 'ViD,' One Year Later."]

[Text] The advertising boom has literally affected not only the entire press, but has filled the streets, houses, and roads. And here, in a row of striped posters, on the road divider next to Ostankino, one cannot help but see something like an Oriental theater mask, and under it the abbreviation "ViD."

"That is not a mask," says Andrey Razbash, chief producer of the "ViD" Television Company ("Vzglyad," and others), beginning our conversation. I became interested in a sculptured image of a man's head at one of the exhibits of a museum of Eastern cultures in a capital city. The sculpture seems to exude mysterious fluids. It really hides much that is unexplainable and there is some secret about it. It was found in the grave of a Chinese general who fought two thousand years ago against the enemies of the then emperor. Why and how come the



head came to be buried has never been explained. There are no similar sculptures in existence.

So we decided to make it our logo, behind which lies the unexpectedness of twists in subjects and a never-ending quest for the unknown, for the unrevealed secrets of life or nature.

**Your television company began a year ago with modest creative resources and an indefinite future. What has happened since?**

Now we are really "Vzglyad and Others". Other programs were born and became on-the-air fixtures based on ours. These, I would like to remind readers and viewers, were "Field of Wonders" [Pole chudes], "Show Stock Exchanges" [Shou-birzhi], "The Case" [Delo], "Music for Those Awake at Midnight" [Muzyka dlya polunochnikov], and "Matador." And of course, new programs are being shot.

**For example, an announcement has been made already about the program "Studio 13-31." Are television experts getting it ready, or...?**

The program is being prepared by students of beginning courses of the journalism department at Moscow State University [MGU]. That is our testing ground. In the first place, many ideas have their test run here, even the craziest. Secondly, the program is directed at young people and really brings out some talented kids who, with time, will replace our current "stars."

**And what awaits us viewers in the future? What surprises are these "stars" preparing for us? Hasn't the effect of all the visual innovations been dampened?**

Well, we are not the judges of that. As far as surprises are concerned.... We presented the leadership of Gostelradio with a list of 27 future programs. Among them are three "big name" programs:

[Lyubimov] "The Red Square" [Krasnyy kvadrat]. This is a political program; television bridges with discussions of participants who are at the center of events, live dialogue with television audiences with answers to any of their questions. Lyubimov is attracting the best political experts in preparing this program.

[Politkovskiy] "Politburo." The program is going, as they say, "from the plow and the lathe," from down below. Instead of action there are "hot spots": Armenia, Checheno-Ingushetiya—in other words, those places where you will not get bored because of lack of action....

[Listyev] "Theme" [Tema]. And here we have complete unpredictability. The narrator takes on the investigation of such, let's say, nonstandard problems as the suicide syndrome or the reasons for husbands' unfaithfulness.

**Are you firmly on your feet now? How are you doing in the bustle of the pre-market period?**

We established our little enterprise with its independent financial structure and, in addition, a network of joint enterprises, including some with foreign partners. We have experience now and we have worked enough so that we can say that we shall survive and shall not fall apart.

**"ViD" has a difficult future. You have been attacked quite a bit by orthodox producers. After all, "Vzglyad" had to work underground for a while, didn't it? Are you going to tear the umbilical cord that is tying you to Gostelradio?**

This is an important question. Fortunately we have not been infected by the "sovereignty" illness. We consider it a professional obligation to work on government air time. Now when the country is undergoing most difficult times, we do not have the moral right to abandon the government in its hour of need or to abandon one of its most important activities—TV.

**Environment Minister Decries Wasteful  
'Economic Mechanism'**

92WN0154A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY  
VESTNIK in Russian No 31, Jul 91  
[Signed to press 26 Jul 91] p 1

[Article by N. Vorontsov, USSR minister of natural resources utilization and environmental protection: "A Word From the Minister: Spare the Environment!"]

[Text] Now, there is nothing new about speaking of crises in various aspects of our lives: economic, political, ethnic and otherwise. Unfortunately, our environment is also suffering through what is by far not the best of times.

In order to get a general idea of this, it is sufficient to examine the economic side of the problem. According to official figures, due to soil erosion—caused by water, wind and the like—our economy has been losing 16 billion rubles a year; due to water pollution—15 billion; as a result of air pollution (due to forests that have become unusable, respiratory ailments among workers and the like)—12 billion rubles. This means about 42 billion (at 1990 prices). However, according to expert evaluations, these figures were underestimated by at least two times. If we translate all of this into current prices, we obtain astronomical quantities that are frightening to think about.

And how much have we allotted to environmental protection, including reforestation? You won't believe it—less than 12 billion rubles. And these funds were "spread" over all the departments. And there has been no single keeper of this budget, nor is there one now. Our ministry's "wealth" consists of only 40 million rubles. With such miserly amounts of money, we have no cause to speak seriously of ecological measures: we can only "approve", "support", "recommend"... Ministerial appropriations only go towards controlling and maintaining the biosphere preserves, which serve as a kind of standard.

What kind of funds are necessary to support the ecological order? Let's use the United States as a comparison. And this is in no way a tribute to fashion: the fact is that the ecological problems of that state are very similar to ours, and it is also a large country. And so, environmental protection organs in the USA are allotted approximately 80 billion dollars a year. If we multiply our losses in the ecology by two, considering the fact that they are being underestimated, then it works out that we need the very same 80 billion rubles. That much money would be enough to maintain an ecological balance. Expenditures for emergency situations, the resolution of problems in ecological disaster zones would have to be covered by additional sources.

From all of this one can understand, or at least get a general idea of, the amount of money required to remedy the ecological situation, which is an urgent one for society. Even last year, the government was presented with a state ecological program that would take us up to

2005, published in PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK. Many years were spent in its preparation, even before the beginning of our movement towards a market economy. And now, we must seriously rework it. However, the strategic goals and figures will most likely be retained in their entirety: which ecological parameters, norms and standards we should work towards, what sort of allocations we need, how many cleaning facilities we should build, what must be rebuilt and redesigned...

For example, we have calculated that over 15 years, we will have to invest about 340-380 billion rubles in the environment. This would give us an opportunity to achieve stability and even to improve the ecological situation in the majority of "hot" ecological spots. But this is not the solution to the ecological problems. What do I have in mind? Krivoy Rog holds second place in the USSR for releasing harmful substances into the atmosphere—1 million 380 thousand tons. But there are plans to reduce this figure to 700 thousand by 2005. However, this means that the ecological situation here in 15 years would still be 2-2.5 times worse than it is today in Dnepropetrovsk, Dneprodzerzhinsk, Zaporozhye, Mariupol, cities where the state of the environment is simply awful.

The program, of course, provides for an improvement in the state of the environment in these and other points. Figuratively speaking, it was developed according to the principle "one pair of earrings for each sister". Let's take Sumy. There, 30 thousand tons are discarded each year; after implementation of the program, this figure will be 20 thousand. This is not bad at all. But all the same, in my opinion, we should have concentrated our efforts on the most neglected regions, where the technical equipment needs to be completely replaced, a task that the state has not had enough money to complete.

In this manner, I think that the basis of the state program—final quantities, intended actions—will be preserved. But where can we get the funds? Again, I will use the United States as an example. There, only 40 percent of the basic resource allotments are made by the state. The remainder comes from fines imposed upon firms, and in the form of environmental taxes. Back in 1990, we conducted an experiment in 49 cities and oblasts in the USSR on the collection of environmental payments. We were successful in this—the money we obtained went into a special environmental protection fund, 85 percent stayed in the oblast environmental protection committee, 10 percent went to the republic and five percent—into the union fund.

One way or another, the economic mechanism for the implementation of measures that would improve the country's ecological situation needs change, serious change; it must be almost completely reworked. At the same time, despite the extremely complicated situation in the national economy, we cannot drag out the resolution of our ecological problems: further delay could mean irreversible damage to the environment.

PHOTOGRAPHS: A concentrating mill smokes in Kemerovo Oblast; there are still fish in the Tomi River.

**Aral Sea 'Catastrophe' Suffers Continued Neglect**  
*92WN0117A Moscow TRUD in Russian 14 Nov 91 p 7*

[Article by writer Grigoriy Reznichenko: "We Simply Stifled the Aral"]

[Text] That about which scientist Magomed Alklychev told the readers of TRUD on 12 September was, in my opinion, only a good hypothesis. A great deal in nature is mysterious. However, the reasons for the plight of the Aral are nonetheless in plain sight. The overflow of the Caspian Sea may have a different underlying cause: ebbs and flows on a world scale, a shift of the Earth's axis with regard to the Sun, redistributing gravitational forces, which might cause rivers to accelerate their flow... God only knows what might cause the flow of water into the Caspian to increase.

However, the Aral has died exclusively as a result of human activity. Cotton has been planted as a single crop for decades. There are even sayings about it in Uzbekistan: "If you do not plant cotton, they will plant you." Or: "If you do not pick cotton, they will pick you."

The 2.5 million hectares of new land which were developed and put into use in the 20 years from 1965 to 1985 were basically intended precisely for cotton. It is interesting to compare: Before 1965, 4.5 million hectares of fields in Central Asia were irrigated, and 50-54 cubic km of water (about 10-11,000 cubic meters per hectare on the average) were used for this. Later, the arable land was increased to the above-mentioned 2.5 million hectares, but not 30 cubic km of additional river water was required, as one would expect, but 60 cubic km! The addition of each new hectare, it seems, required the addition of double the water, double the application of chemical fertilizers and pesticides.

The predominance of cotton has led to an unprecedentedly high share of cotton cultivation. It has reached 75-80 percent of the crop structure. This is almost absurd. In world practice, cotton cultivation does not exceed 50 percent. The worst distortion of agrotechnical conditions, when cotton is planted after cotton on 75-80 percent of the land over a long period of time, has irrevocably damaged the fields themselves and has exhausted the soil. A Central Asian field that requires irrigation has lost up to 40 percent of its humus. A decline in crop yield has started not only for cotton, but for other agricultural crops as well. The land can be forced to bear only under the influence of doubled, and then even tripled doses of water, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides. Having raped the people, the Bolsheviks undertook to rape the land. What has come of this? Today everyone knows about the Aral ecological catastrophe and the inconceivable mass of ecological disasters throughout the country.

The orientation toward cotton entailed the construction of new supply and drainage canals and of many water reservoirs. They now extend for about 200 thousand km in the region, and almost all of these water arteries are laid on a dirt or sand foundation, without isolating the water. The efficiency coefficient of the irrigation networks is not above 0.54-0.62. The water is flowing into the sand, and not figuratively, forming wild lakes in the deserts and around the former sea. A miser pays twice, so to speak. In this regard, we pay not the same 90 million rubles, as Minvodkhoz assessed the disappearance of the Aral in its day, but more by a factor of 500. A small mistake was made, all because of "let us catch up with and outstrip America." We long ago outstripped it in terms of cotton. Mercilessly exploiting the unwilling, poorly-paid labor of the local peasants, the system attained the production of 8-9 million tons of cotton annually...

Let us ask ourselves a question: Why did we produce so many millions of tons of cotton annually? Is it that we are processing an incalculable amount of fabric? Or are we transferring the raw material to industry, which in exchange is providing the population with a number of other goods that it needs? Or are we exporting the cotton and receiving hard currency, ultra-new equipment, or technology in exchange?...

It is easy for the reader to draw a conclusion. It is obvious: We have simply stifled the sea. Only 400-450 cubic km of water remain in the Aral, yet there were more than 1,000 in the early 1960's. Let me note that the annual flow of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya comprised 114-117 cubic km. Starting with 1971, the amount of water taken from the rivers increased with every year, because the planting of cotton was increased. It reached the point that the Amu Darya ceased to supply the Aral in the mid-1970's, and the sea received about five-eight cubic km a year from the Syr Darya. However, the evaporation of the sea water stayed the same: 36-40 cubic km a year. Now the Aral is disappearing. A crime has been committed. It is a crime, the damage from which can and should be compensated. There is an example of this in world practice. Lake Erie, destroyed in the U.S., was restored to its original ecological condition in a period of 10 years. This cost the Americans 42 billion dollars.

Over these years, the level of the Aral dropped 14 meters. The shoreline has receded about 60-80 km. Where waves only recently splashed, over almost 3 million hectares, a hot, dusty desert, named the Aralkum, has formed. In the remnants of the sea, on its dried-up bottom, billions of tons of poisonous salts, pesticides, and herbicides including DDT, have accumulated, which came here for decades along with the water that drained off the fields into the rivers. The toxic chemicals have poisoned the land around the Aral. Today the wind scatters these toxins for hundreds of km. And everything alive feels the Aral's vengeance for itself.

The most terrible of all calamities, of course, is the suffering of the people. Tashauz and Kyzl-Orda oblasts, Khorezmskiy Kray, and Kara-Kalpakia, where 3 million people reside, receive a dose of toxins that exceeds all permissible norms by a factor of 10. This is genocide: No other term comes to mind. The Amu Darya is fed not only by the water of the Pamir glaciers. Up to 15 cubic km drains into the river from the fields of Bukhara and Kashka Darya oblasts, the same water that passed through the thousands of hectares of fields and is saturated with the same toxins with which the land is stimulated and compelled to bear. The same happens in the upper reaches of the Syr Darya. Flowing downward, this water once again flows into fields, already larded with chemicals. The melons, watermelons, grapes, and vegetables, having taken in the poisons, transfer them to people. Few cattle remain here, but even they, eating poisoned fodder, pass on the contamination to people.

Or the drinking water. In Muynak, for instance, as well as almost everywhere in the Aral area, river water is collected in a basin, sprinkled with chlorine, which is called purification, and supplied to the city for drinking, preparing food, and baking bread. Yet another example: On the outskirts of Muynak part of the area is surrounded by dikes, which are filled with the poisoned water. Fish are raised in these basins. The fish are also

contaminated. Do you refuse to eat fish, grapes, and tomatoes? Then you may as well give up and die.

The people have no way out. They are doomed to die. Medical research and statistics show: There is no higher rate of infant mortality in the Union, than in the Aral area: 76 of every 1,000. There are many rayons where death strikes 98, or even 118 newborns in every 1,000. In Aralsk, Muynak, and a dozen other settlements infants are rejecting their mother's milk, because it contains more salts by a factor of three-four, than the milk of mothers who live, for instance, in Alma-Ata. Last in this tragic list: 69 of every 100 adults are incurably ill.

This is the result, these are the far from complete consequences of the degradation of the natural Aral environment. The destruction of the Aral Sea, as is increasingly obvious, is the first and biggest such man-made ecological disaster in the world.

People have a right to ask: What has been done, for instance, in the last 10 years, to stop the destruction of the sea and of the nature which surrounds it, to help the people survive? To answer this question seriously: virtually nothing. The people of the Aral, cheated by fate, have been cast aside, abandoned by everyone, by the authorities both past and present. There is no one to deal with human grief.

**Single 'USSR' Team To Participate in 1992 Olympics***924B0107B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Nov 91 Union Edition p 11*

[Article by S. Taranov: "To Albertville and Barcelona—One Team, Paying Its Own Way"]

[Text] The athletes of the sovereign states and republics of the former USSR will appear in the 1992 Winter and Summer Olympics as single teams. The chairman of the USSR Olympic Committee, Vitaliy Smirnov, announced this at a press conference held on Thursday evening in the Moscow hard currency restaurant "Casino Royale".

The news is really sensational. Let us recall that the acquisition of political independence in certain republics began with the refusal to participate in all-Union competition. And until the very start of the press conference on 21 November 1991, no one knew how V. Smirnov's meeting with the representatives of the national Olympic committees of Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan would end (the rest had sent their written consents the evening before). And suddenly there was a unanimous decision to form single Olympic teams, and, in fact, the largest ones in the entire history of Soviet sports; 350 athletes are being sent to Albertville and 800-860 to Barcelona!

This fact needs to be analyzed and interpreted—even if only as a good example of interrepublic cooperation.

First, participation in the USSR team (as it is conditionally called for now) will not compel the independent republics to renounce their own dignity. They may use the Olympic flag and Olympic hymn. A flexible diplomat, Smirnov does not at all insist on preserving the USSR Olympic Committee in its traditional form, assuming that in the fairly near future his organization may itself become an association of republic Olympic committees with all participants having equal rights.

Secondly, each of the states which make up the general team will save hundreds of thousands of rubles and dollars for training the athletes and for fees to participate in the Olympic Games. The USSR Olympic Committee will assume their expenses and in turn will not request even one kopeck from the states, earning the money itself.

In V. Smirnov's words, by the end of the year there will already be 20-30 million rubles in the Olympic Committee account (remember that the Olympic Committee became a legal entity only this year). The Olympic Committee will allocate 300,000 dollars to the Olympics in Albertville and 1 million to participate in the Games in Barcelona. Incidentally, a contract was recently signed which provides USSR teams capital and equipment worth 1 million dollars. One quarter of a billion rubles is to be obtained from the Olympic Lottery. The Olympic Committee intends to open a network of its own stores—

for now in Moscow, Petersburg, Rostov-na-Donu, and Krasnodar—and organize its own exchanges and banks.

The USSR Presidential Decree of 5 November 1991, which authorizes the use in 1991-1992 of "all hard currency receipts obtained from its own foreign economic activity for purposes related to training Soviet athletes for the Olympics," was very timely.

The third factor which "cemented" the single USSR team is the position of the International Olympic Committee. On the one hand the IOC does not refuse or impede the recognition of Olympic committees of the new sovereign states, and on the other, it is in no hurry to invite their individual teams to the Olympics, justifiably assuming that it is much simpler to undo a system created over the decades than to achieve high results from athletes from small republics who are experiencing hard times. And without the highest achievements, the Olympic Games will cease to be attractive to those who watch and to the sponsors.

Finally, I would like to talk about the interests of the athletes themselves. For most of them (especially the strongest ones) not participating in the Olympics might mean the collapse of all their hopes. For winning in the Games in itself pays quite well and "attracts" profitable contracts with professional clubs.

Now it is up to the small ones—to make a respectable showing both in Albertville and in Barcelona. The Winter Olympics begins quite soon—8 February 1992.

**Students Appeal to Yeltsin Over Funding***PM2611100591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Nov 91 p 3*

["Appeal From Participants in Conference of Association of Moscow VUZ Students' Trade Union Organizations to the RSFSR President"—PRAVDA headline; carried under the general heading: "Students Seething"]

[Text] Esteemed Boris Nikolayevich!

Moscow's students are concerned by the situation that has taken shape of late in the higher education system. With the elimination of Union ministries VUZ's [higher educational establishments] under Union jurisdiction, the pride of our national higher education, have found themselves without enough money to live. With the transfer to RSFSR jurisdiction, world-renowned educational establishments have found themselves in a highly complex financial situation. It was only recently that the issue of paying the November grant was decided; many VUZ's have been forced to take out loans whose repayment will impoverish them once and for all and freeze social programs.

At the same time the slightest delay in the payment of grants may be the catalyst that sparks off a social explosion among students. We state that Moscow's students, irrespective of the state of affairs in their VUZ's,

support their comrades who are forced to take to the streets to settle their problems.

Moreover, we note that your Decree No. 1, with which hopes of an end to the leftover principle in educational funding were linked, has every chance of just remaining a fine declaration. The RSFSR Government's draft resolution: "On Additional Measures To Provide Young Students With Social Protection," which develops your decree, has been lying around at the RSFSR Finance Ministry since September. We cannot understand why your decree: "On Raising the Wages of Personnel at Budget-Financed Organizations and Establishments" says nothing about raising grants—that is particularly important for students in Moscow; after all, prices have effectively begun to be liberalized in our city.

We ask you to respond to our appeal, either via the mass media or during a meeting with our association's representatives before 1 December 1991. Otherwise we will be forced to resort to mass protest actions.

[Signed] On behalf of the association's fourth conference, V. Potapov, chairman of Moscow's Institute of Precision Chemical Technology student trade union committee.

#### **All-Union 'Znaniye' Society To Change Name**

PM0711142391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 5 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

["Our correspondent" report under "Direct Line" rubric: "'Znaniye' Is Dead. Long Live..."]

[Text] Moscow, 4 Nov—The 11th Extraordinary Congress of the All-Union "Znaniye" Society began work in Moscow 4 November. A report: "On the Transformation of the All-Union 'Znaniye' Society Into the International Scientific and Educational Association" was delivered by the chairman of the society's board, Academician K. Frolov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

This morning the founding congress of the Internal Science and Educational Association will open. It is proposed to adopt the association's statutes, elect a president and an executive committee chairman, and form a council.

#### **New Organization Seeks To Improve Social Conditions**

92P50048A Moscow IZVESTIYA Union Edition  
in Russian 11 Nov 91 p 2

[Article by Yelena Kalacheva; "One More 'Hope'"]

[Text] The 'Nadezhda' Association, which unites doctors, lawyers, ecologists, public figures in science and culture, journalists, religious figures and entrepreneurs on a voluntary basis, has started its activity.

It was founded by the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (SKZM), the interbank organization 'Menatop',

the Moscow Oncological Clinic, the 'Triada' and 'Phenix' firms, the Institute of Sorption and Endo-Ecological Problems, and other organizations and departments working in various areas of science, culture and production.

"We have set ourselves the goal of aiding the improvement of medical care and the enhancement of social protection for people who have suffered as a result of natural disasters and the technogenic disasters which are particularly characteristic of our time," says Andrey Chaplyuk, the association's executive director. "The strategy consists of uniting the efforts of the community and scientific teams engaged in these problems."

Another sphere of activity of 'Nadezhda' is the anti-cancer fight. With the help of numerous specialized institutes and with extensive participation by the community and media, the association intends to increase anti-cancer propaganda to a qualitatively new level matching world standards.

#### **First Shelter for Homeless To Be Opened in Moscow**

924B0102A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 20 Nov 91 p 4

[Article by Olga Alekseyeva: "A House for 20 Million"]

[Text] By an order of Moscow Vice Mayor Yu. Luzhkov to the Pomoshch public philanthropic fund, which deals with problems of the homeless part of the population, two buildings have been turned over to be opened as the first overnight lodging house in Russia. This fact is commented on by a former vagrant who is now chairman of the Pomoshch fund, Ye. Tretyakov.

In all recent years in our country the homeless have been handled by the militia: For violation of passport rules they were hunted down and put in jail. About two years ago various societies began to appear which tried to solve this problem in a different way. But even if some organization did try to gather the homeless together in one place to spend the night, within half an hour a "paddy wagon" would come and with complete justification take them all down to the station. Now the law that sets the punishment for vagrancy and violation of passport conditions has been suspended. There is talk of abolishing it because it is not in keeping with the Human Rights Declaration. This is why it has become possible to get something done.

At the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies I received support and even became the "deputy" for the homeless. But for two years things did not get beyond the point of talk. After the putsch everything changed sharply. But there is no state program yet. Although it is understandable that two or three flop houses will not solve the problem. Therefore we are appealing to the RSFSR ((Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic))

Supreme Soviet with proposals for a state program of aid to the homeless, who, incidentally, throughout the world include people who spend the night in train stations and boiler rooms but also those whose housing does not meet the established sanitary norm, those who live in dormitories, and those in our country who do not have residency permits and huddle in corners and have practically no rights.

A person may spend no more than five days in a shelter and he must register. During the time while he is eating and getting warm, we try to find him a job that includes housing in a dormitory, we fill out the documents, and we give him material assistance.

### **National Committee To Combat AIDS in RSFSR Urged**

924B0072A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Oct 91 p 3

[Reply to Letter to Editor, by V. Proskurina: "AIDS: Sound the Alarm! Is It Possible That This Dreadful Disease Is Receding?"

[Text] "Recently in the newspapers, including PRAVDA, we hardly ever encounter any information about AIDS. Is it possible that this dreadful disease has receded, and we no longer need to worry about our children and grandchildren?"

N. Nikiforova.

City of Moscow.

We forwarded our reader's question to Nadezhda Vasilyevna Sirotina, the chief specialist on AIDS at the RSFSR State Sanitation and Epidemiological Inspectorate.

"Not only need we worry; we must sound the alarm about this oncoming disaster," she declared. "AIDS is advancing ruthlessly and irreversibly. As of 1 September 1991, there were 502 infected persons registered in Russia, including 267 children. This lethal virus has also been discovered in 346 foreign citizens visiting our country. Fifty-five persons have fallen ill with AIDS, and 33 of them have died. The infection has been registered in 44 oblasts and autonomous republics. Moreover, these are only the official figures. Nobody knows how many persons have actually been infected in our country. But we do know that their number is increasing with each passing day...."

At first glance, the figures cited by N.V. Sirotina are not too dreadful. But their growth trend is frightening: over the past five years there has been a 20-fold increase in the number of HIV-infected persons!

We must give our medical personnel their due; after the well-known cases of intra-hospital infection in Elista and Rostov-on-Don, they took all possible measures to shore up and strengthen the barricades against this lethal virus. Along with the presently operational All-Union

Center for Preventing and Combatting AIDS, a Republic-level clinical center has now been opened and—under its aegis—six more regional centers. Approximately 500 diagnostic laboratories have been organized. In conjunction with the oblast-level health centers, the RSFSR State Sanitation and Epidemiological Inspectorate is engaged in disseminating information about AIDS. "Confidential telephones" have been set up, and an anonymous survey of "risk groups" is being conducted.

Unfortunately, just as was the case before, there are not enough disposable hypodermic syringes and other instruments. But children's hospitals and maternity homes are being supplied with them on a priority basis. Supplementary monitoring controls have been set up over the process of sterilizing reusable instruments. The danger of intrahospital infection has been reduced to a minimum, although it is impossible to eliminate it 100 percent. A great deal depends upon the nurses' conscientiousness.

"Unfortunately, the prevention of AIDS depends not only upon medical personnel," N.V. Sirotina explains. "This has been understood for a long time in other countries, and national committees have been formed to combat HIV infection. As a rule, these committees are directed by the state's foremost persons. Such committees coordinate an entire complex of measures: surveying the population and treating patients, producing medications, disposable instruments as well as hygienic materials, disseminating knowledge about preventive measures, particularly among young persons, the observance of the pertinent laws and even charitable nursing service, which an AIDS patient is entitled to."

But what is the situation in our country? Except for medical staffers, there are few persons concerned by the onset of AIDS. Insufficient funds are being allocated even for scientific research, not to mention for the purpose of disseminating information. Meanwhile, it costs the state 35,000 dollars to treat each AIDS patient....

The situation is indeed acute, especially in the RSFSR, which accounts for 75 percent of all HIV-infected persons. Whereas we are concerned with searching out "enemies" within the Fatherland, a most cruel foe is advancing against us. This foe does not choose his victims in accordance with their political coloration but ruthlessly swings his scythe to the left and to the right. If certain persons think that this dreadful infection will remain somewhere within the lower reaches of society, among prostitutes and drug addicts, they are cruelly mistaken. AIDS has penetrated into the family: 11 children have already been born infected with it.

Unless we combine our efforts against the HIV infection now, we will lose valuable time. And we need to set up a national committee to combat AIDS—hopefully headed up by the President. We must also adopt a state program to be financed on the same high-priority principles that prevail in the Ministry of Defense. Otherwise, within a

few years—given our poverty and the collapse of the economy—AIDS will force us to our knees.

### **Psychotherapy Introduced in Treatment of Alcoholics in RSFSR**

924B0098A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 20 Nov 91 p 4

[Article by Aleksandr Igorev: "A Health Resort for...Alcoholics"]

[Text] When we think of the treatment of alcoholism, as a rule, it is associated with rather unattractive places—LTP's [work-treatment facilities] and outpatient drug treatment facilities. Therefore a person who comes for the first time to the Gagra Treatment-Rehabilitation Center will probably be somewhat surprised: the ancient pine forest, the sea surf, the picturesque landscape, the excellent apartments—all this somehow does not fit very well with the grim struggle with the "green serpent."

The new center is the brainchild of the Agency for Legal Culture and Social Assistance. At first glance this organization, which was instituted by the Moscow Legal Center and the Moscow Culture Fund, seems remote from problems of medicine. But, as it turned out, the lawyers had a reason for engaging in the treatment of alcoholism.

"Alcoholism is officially considered a disease in our country," said agency chairman Vladimir Turkov, "but the methods practiced for so-called treatment in reality are nothing but the well established cynical system of enslaving people who are ill and a good way of patching up holes in the state budget."

With this system human rights are violated at every turn. Thus the individual is sent to the work treatment facility by the court, even though he has committed no crime. Essentially, people are put in jail as prevention because they are considered to be socially dangerous, which violates both the country's constitution and international legal norms. The concept of work-treatment facilities is a kind of continuation of the GULAG, since it is directed toward the enslavement of human beings.

It was the desire to help one of the most legally unprotected categories of people, the alcoholics, that motivated the agency workers headed by V. Turkov to search for methods of treating alcoholism as alternatives to the state methods. And there was no need for any earth-shaking theoretical developments. As early as 55 years ago in the United States methods were created for treating this ailment, and today they are being applied successfully in more than 120 countries. They are fundamentally different from the Soviet methods, which were based on fear (the patient is frightened by the real and imagined consequences of further consumption of alcohol, but, as practice shows, after the completion of the control period of treatment, the alcoholic drinks again). The use of medications is almost ruled out there

(after all, it is detoxification) and highly skilled psychologists work with the patients. In other words, the method consists of psychological adjustment of the alcoholics' behavior, their psychophysical and social rehabilitation.

The Agency for Legal Culture and Social Assistance began to test the foreign method last year when they organized an outpatient treatment facility. The six-month program cost only 500 rubles [R] and the treatment was strictly anonymous. The results were fantastic. About 500 people went through the outpatient facility in a year, and 90 percent of the former patients are now leading a sober life.

It is important to note that parallel work is done with members of the patient's family to restore a normal home atmosphere. And in order to make sure that upon completion of treatment the former patient undergoes social rehabilitation as well, the agency created and continues to create small enterprises where they go to work after their release.

The successful experience in outpatient treatment motivated the workers of the Agency for Legal Culture and Social Assistance to think about an inpatient facility. Incidentally, aid came from former patients from Abkhazia who were looking for a suitable complex in Gagra. The sponsor, the Sigma Scientific Production Association, allotted R100,000 for initial expenses. First-class specialists were recruited for the work, many of whom had already had training abroad.

The course of treatment in Gagra, which lasts 28 days, is not cheap—R3,000. And the agency itself can take no profit from the center—all the money goes for leasing the complex, maintaining it, and paying the salaries of the specialists. But let us look at it from the other side: 3,000 for the restoration of a full-fledged family and the spiritual regeneration of a human being—is that such a high price?...

**From the editors:** The contact telephone number of individuals interested in the new methods of treating alcoholism is 287-70-12.

### **Jews in Soviet Union Organizing Politically, Socially**

92AE0027Z Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
1 Oct 91 p 1B

[Article by Lili Galili]

[Text] Many of those returning from a recent visit to the Soviet Union have made observations comparing what is happening in Jewish affairs in Russia to the processes that characterized the Jewish community's early organizing in the United States. Even if the analogy between the two situations is imperfect, large groups of Soviet Jews apparently are in different stages of developing themselves into a deeply rooted diaspora whose activities are inspired not by longing for return to Zion but by a desire to continue life where they are. Soviet Jews no



longer face the choice between immigration to Israel and disappearance through assimilation. They can now choose to perpetuate an active Jewish life in the homeland they have no intention of abandoning.

Throughout its existence, Israel has been accustomed to treating the Jews of the Soviet Union from only two perspectives. For many years, it was a silent community around which Israel and the world fought a battle whose slogan was "Let my people go." With the opening of Soviet gates to Jewish emigration, Israeli efforts have focused on the scope of immigration and feverish pursuit of the oscillations in the numbers of immigrants and the reasons for those variations. Accordingly, the Israeli establishment has not turned its attention to considering anew the possibility that even if immigration continues, the Soviet Union will still be home to a sizable group of Jews that is carving out a niche for itself.

It now seems that the conventional view of the world, which sees the Jewish future built on two great centers, Israel and the United States, must include as well a third center composed of the Jews of the Soviet Union.

One of the most prominent features of this development is the process of "coming out of the closet" for the Russian Jewish intelligentsia, which is forming its own identity that will contribute to the creation of a new and different Soviet Union. This group of intellectuals, clustered primarily in Moscow and Leningrad, is excited by the liberalization their country is undergoing and sees its future as an inseparable part of that process.

At the same time, countless Jewish organizations are springing up. The proliferation of these groups and camps brings to mind the early stages of the American Jewish community.

The appearance of organizations based on religion and ethnicity in the Soviet Union, however, is not peculiar today to the Jews. The collapse of the totalitarian regime, which was marked by a total absence of social and voluntary organizations, has left a society lacking all civic associations. Into this vacuum, which is being filled by the tides of nationalism inundating the Soviet Union, organizing on the basis of an existing religious foundation is easy and opportune.

In Moscow alone, there are 95 different Jewish organizations engaged in small-scale struggles for power and influence both inside and outside the Jewish community. In just the past several weeks, the 30 Jewish schools in the Soviet Union were augmented by two more Jewish elementary schools. The first seminar was held last month on Jewish leadership. The well-to-do among Soviet Jews have been signed up to support and obtain money for those Jewish groups they wish to honor. During his last visit to the Soviet Union, Dr. Ron Kronic, representing the American Jewish Committee in Israel, encountered an even more far-reaching phenomenon. In a meeting with a wealthy Jew—and those do exist—the idea came up to establish a Soviet branch of the Jewish National Fund to elicit contributions for

Israel. Even if we proceed on the well-founded assumption that nothing will come of that idea, it reveals the differences arising in the relationship between the diaspora in the Soviet Union and Israel.

One important aspect of the new Jewish organizations is the extent of their influence on internal politics in the Soviet Union. It is an open secret that the umbrella organization, the "Va'ad" [council], played an active part, on Boris Yeltsin's side, in the aborted coup. Its leaders not only came out publicly in his favor but even actively offered him aid through the use of its communications network to link Yeltsin with his supporters in different places.

Even if Soviet authorities still do not officially recognize the Jewish leadership, they do not scoff at its power. This attitude has been formed primarily with an eye towards the wealth of world Jewry on which the Soviet Union is now so dependent. Hopes for investment of Jewish capital in the Soviet Union also are fueling the courtship of the top levels of the Jewish Agency, which officials regard as the government of the Jewish people. The Jews of the Soviet Union are assuming the role of an important intermediary between Soviet authorities and Jewish money, a situation likely to afford them in time the status of a pressure group.

These developments within the Jewish community depend, of course, on social-political developments in the Soviet Union. An interruption in the process of liberalization, or an outbreak of anti-Semitism, would nip this progress in the bud. Stabilization of the situation and renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel, on the other hand, probably would strengthen the new tendencies towards crystallization of the Jewish community and grant it legitimacy.

The Jewish Agency's official policy provides that all its official actions within the Jewish community in the Soviet Union are directed solely towards immigration and clearly against anything that could help further a Jewish presence in the Soviet Union. In light of the changes occurring, the Agency and Israel must reassess their position towards the diaspora in the Soviet Union which, nonetheless, will continue to exist.

#### **Decline in Children's Health Facilities Examined**

924B0089A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
11 Nov 91 p 3

[A. Aleynikova report: "The Time To Think About Summer"]

[Text] "Prepare the wagon for the winter." This is what folk wisdom teaches. Come November it is time to sum up the results of the children's summer vacation and think about the summer of 1992. In Russia, as in the other republics, there are more than enough causes for alarm. On the eve of the market, children's health facilities have become an impossible burden for some enterprises, a burden from which they are trying to rid themselves by all

kinds of methods. Across Russia, in 1990 alone 1,129 children's health complexes were closed down. Some 150,000 children of various ages used to spend leisure time there when they operated on just one shift. Multiply this figure by three... The epidemic of liquidations has also affected the sports camps and labor-and-leisure camps, and the city camps. And even at the camps that are operating, 30 percent of the places are empty: Not all parents can afford to purchase the vouchers even when they are subsidized by the trade unions.

As a result, the number of idle children has increased by 1.5 million. And this has made itself felt in the sharp increase in the figures for juvenile crime.

But at least our children did have a summer in 1991, despite the seizure of the camps just as people wished, despite the uncontrolled increases in prices for literally everything: food, furniture, bed linen, travel, security, leasing. Leasing deserves special mention. Money is now needed for everything: land, water, the roads, the bridge over the creek. With air being so necessary for weakened children, it is a wonder a tribute is not being exacted for that too.

In order to rescue summer 1991 following the April price increases, a republic reserve fund was urgently set up to compensate for expenses. The 130 million in this fund was not a particularly large sum considering the size of the republic. But even this did manage to save some of the camps that were in a critical situation. But what can we expect for the summer of 1992? It would be naive to count on any improvement in the situation.

The process of privatization, free prices, and disruption of the links between the republics are all objectively against summer vacations for the children. And, strange as it may seem, we must look for salvation in those very same market structures. What can be done? Practical people have been sharing interesting experience. N.G. Fomina, the director of one of the children's camps in Pskov, claims that leisure for children can be arranged without incurring a loss. Shareholders to whom 40 percent of the travel vouchers were given repaired one of the buildings and assumed part of the responsibility for maintaining the camp. The building does not stand empty during the autumn and winter. Mushroom pickers, fishermen, and tourists wanting a two or three-day break outside the city eagerly buy the travel vouchers. The assets derived from the travel vouchers during the autumn and winter can be used for repairs and to acquire furniture and sports equipment.

The summer of 1991 showed that special attention should be paid to the health of children and teenagers. It has deteriorated sharply in recent years, both because of the environmental situation and because of the inadequate or, more accurately, poor quality diet. In the opinion of experienced pediatricians, today only 10 percent of children can be deemed healthy; the rest are suffering from various chronic diseases. And at some camps the validity of the travel vouchers has been reduced to 19 days because of increased costs. Is it conceivable that a child's health can be improved in such a short time?

It makes sense to have a significant proportion of the camps specialize. Meanwhile, the medicine in the children's camps consists of a thermometer, bandages, and iodine...

Last summer quite a lot was done to strengthen the health of children from the Chernobyl zone. But here, any efforts cannot be too extreme. In the summer of 1992 medical personnel are proposing that the forms of leisure and treatment for children from environmentally unfavorable regions be varied. If would be a fine thing if a medical worker were present with the children to observe them constantly. Then the children could be adapted more easily to the new conditions, and this would have a positive effect on treatment.

Of course, new treatment centers for children are also needed. In 1992 about 200 million rubles should be allocated for the construction of children's health facilities. But if we take into account the fact that in 1992 there will be contract and free prices, then one thing is clear: In the years immediately ahead we will hardly improve the health of children during their summer vacations. The consequence of this neglect will then tell throughout society, when hundreds of thousands of children with chronic diseases will be added to the millions of disabled children.

We have become accustomed to letting the trade unions deal with all the problems of the summer. They have done and are doing a great deal in the present difficult circumstances. But without new forms of cooperation with the local authorities and without attracting funds from the cooperatives and joint-stock societies and from special funds used to maintain children's health facilities, it is already difficult today, and in the summer of 1992 it will simply be impossible.

We must seek new ways to work with the adults now today, in order to avoid having the gates of the camps that do exist be slammed shut.

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